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ABSTRACT 
In psychology and psychiatry there is a fundamental presumption that a 
categorical difference between “normal” and mentally ill people exists. 
The primary research goal of this thesis was to explore the measurement and 
meaning of coping in a psychiatric population. The major research questions 
were:  1) Does the underlying assumption about “not coping” in those diagnosed 
with a mental illness do justice to the complexity of what coping might be for 
these people? and 2) Does it make sense to measure coping in a psychiatric 
population? Quantitative and qualitative approaches were employed to answer 
these questions.   
Study A examined the psychometric adequacy of an existing coping scale, 
the Coping Scale for Adults Questionnaire (CSA; Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997) and 
its ability to discriminate between the coping strategies of a “normal” (n=369) and 
a psychiatric sample (n=110).  Comparisons were made between the two groups 
across the 19 coping strategies, in terms of factor structure, gender and age. An 
additional comparison of coping strategies was made between a sub-sample of 
those diagnosed with schizophrenia and the “normative” sample.  
Study B was a separate study between an age-and gender-matched sub-
sample from a separate community sample in Western Australia matched to 
members of the psychiatric population.  
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Study C extended the examination of the CSA, with the inclusion of a 
sample of undergraduate university students (n=110).  The CSA was found to 
have adequate psychometric properties and the ability to discriminate between the 
coping strategies of the psychiatric, community and university samples. However, 
it was identified that built into quantitative measurement of coping is a set of 
problematic assumptions about the coping strategies of those diagnosed with a 
mental illness that raised concerns about both the validity and sole reliance on 
quantitative measures in this area, prompting further qualitative studies.  
The first part of the qualitative analyses comprised 25 male and 13 female 
inpatients of a psychiatric hospital who were interviewed about how they coped.  
The thematic analyses of psychiatric patients’ descriptions of their coping 
revealed five key themes: patients reported that professional intervention reduced 
their ability to cope; they distrusted the mental health system and its 
professionals; coping mechanisms were misinterpreted; situational crises 
modulated coping; and, that sometimes coping was just “not coping.” 
The second qualitative part of the thesis comprised case studies from 
interviews, medical file information and patient demographics of 10 psychiatric 
inpatients. Psychiatric patients’ narratives contained in the case files revealed 
commonalities in coping strategies and much more detailed descriptions of how 
they coped. Employing both the methodology of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to coping offers an opportunity to construct a powerful and plausible 
argument about how people diagnosed with a mental illness cope.  Overall, the 
findings from the studies revealed that the bedrock assumptions underpinning the 
current mental health system to understanding the meaning of coping in those 
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diagnosed with a mental illness did not reflect or do justice to their actual 
accounts of coping. A more respectful, nuanced understanding of the notion of 
coping by mental health professionals is suggested.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 Overview 
In psychology and psychiatry there is a fundamental presumption that a 
categorical difference between “normal” and mentally ill people exists 
(Boyle, 2002; Bracken & Thomas, 2005; Breggin, 1991; Double, 2006; 
Kinderman, Read, Moncrieff, & Bentall, 2013; Moncrieff, 2010; Klerman, 1978; 
Porter, 1987). For many years psychology and psychiatry have been labouring 
under serious misunderstandings about the meanings of “madness.” As will 
become apparent throughout this thesis, new frameworks are needed for patients 
to be understood less in terms of individual pathology and more in terms of their 
response to relative deprivation and social injustice, which erode the emotional, 
spiritual and intellectual resources essential to psychological wellbeing. 
Indeed, traditional psychiatry is predicated on the idea that a defining 
feature of people diagnosed with a mental illness is that they have coping skills 
deficits, i.e., their coping strategies differ from the rest of the “normal” population, 
but this perspective has been directly researched by only a few. Taylor and 
Stanton (2007), in their review of coping, suggest that there is a “lack” of coping 
in those people diagnosed with mental illness, such as schizophrenia, anxiety 
disorders, and depression, which makes it difficult for them to manage challenges 
in daily living. Other researchers (e.g., Buchanan, 2007; Kraepelin, 1899; Tyler, 
1995) categorize the coping efforts of patients as  “symptoms” of a disorder, for 
example, avoidance in the diagnosis of schizophrenia, and, by doing so, diminish 
the meaning of the coping strategy for the person. Labelling patient symptoms as 
part of a diagnosis is connected to, and justified through, the theoretical 
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frameworks underlying the term “mental illness.” Summerfield (2012) highlights 
that diagnoses play a role in decontextualizing peoples’ lives. Labels, such as 
“depression,” switch the focus inward, whereas understanding the life story of a 
person provides a context in which the behaviour/s may be understood and 
provide meaning to those people. Throughout this thesis the terms “those 
diagnosed with a mental illness” and “those diagnosed with schizophrenia” and 
other diagnoses for that matter, will be used. However, it is acknowledged from 
the outset that both mental illness and schizophrenia are contested entities. 
Furthermore, coping is not directly defined in psychiatry, rather, coping is 
understood to be what the person is not doing, which effectively is the 
psychopathology. Therefore, the primary aim of this thesis is to firstly investigate 
the meaning of how people diagnosed with a mental illness manage everyday 
problems. An additional aim is to investigate if it makes sense to measure their 
coping in ways currently defined. In so doing, this thesis explores both the 
measurement and meaning of coping in those diagnosed with a mental illness.  
Given the pervasive influence of classification systems, such as the ICD-
10 and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV and 
DSM-V) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; 2013), that are used 
throughout mental health departments to classify and define “mental disorders,” 
issues regarding diagnostic classification can not be overlooked. However, as 
Kinderman et al. (2013) contend, the psychiatric and psychological professions 
may be on the cusp of a major paradigm shift in the way psychiatric disorders are 
perceived. Specifically, the current DSM-V has received a wide range of criticism 
that has also highlighted scientific, philosophical, practical and humanitarian 
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weaknesses in the diagnostic approach to psychological well-being. This 
paradigm shift is long overdue, and researchers are only now beginning to move 
away from heavy reliance on diagnostic approaches, as diagnoses exclude and do 
not acknowledge the individual attempts that people make, as a result of their 
experiences, to manage their psychological wellbeing.  The diagnostic approach to 
understanding meaning-making in patients’ lives also prevents patients from 
understanding how they might use their own resources or coping mechanisms to 
address their difficulties.  
In the chapters to follow, information with clinical relevance will be added 
where appropriate, as much of the inclination for this research came as a result of 
my work in high care psychiatric inpatient and outpatient facilities throughout 
Western Australia. To further explicate the reasoning behind this thesis and my 
role as researcher within it, I shall now describe my background. I am a Clinical 
Psychologist-(reg) with over 19 years experience, providing direct psychological 
intervention to children, adults and older adults in Western Australia. I have been 
employed in both the public and private sectors and currently run my own private 
practice.  
Given my extensive work experience with minority populations, 
particularly in psychiatric settings, my research interest in the coping of those 
diagnosed with a mental illness came from exposure to the circumstances and the 
systemic issues with which patients were faced. Firstly, I recognised patients had 
survived circumstances few people would have coped with and that those 
patients’ coping attempts were not fully acknowledged or understood by the 
current systems in place within mental health in Western Australia. Secondly, I 
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noted that within psychiatric hospitals in Western Australia there was no 
integration of patients back into the community. Patients went from being 
inpatients, to receiving relatively quick treatment (usually through heavy 
sedations and various medications), with little or no psychological input, and then 
were discharged back out into the community. Being discharged, usually back 
into abhorrent living circumstances, meant a high readmission rate for these 
patients, sometimes within the space of weeks.  
Hence, I witnessed the “revolving door” first hand and the consequences 
of this, specifically, more medication, more unhelpful time away from the 
supports they did have, irregular living situations, and, for the most part, their 
problems remained unresolved. My eagerness was to understand in more detail 
how these people coped and what was going to aid them in this task. However, 
after quantitative and qualitative investigations I learnt a great deal more about 
what coping meant for these people in the psychiatric system, and, as with most 
PhD research, the thesis evolved into what I have submitted.  I became aware that 
the models used by the professions of psychiatry and psychology, particularly 
within mental health settings, had profoundly disempowered, at best, and 
systemically, actively harmed, at worst, the most vulnerable. 
When I commenced this research project, I was interested in how to 
measure coping and what coping meant for patients within a psychiatric context. 
My study was primarily exploratory and, while understanding some of the limits 
of regular coping questionnaires and checklists, an existing scale, the Coping 
Scale For Adults  (CSA),  presented an opportunity to measure the concept of 
coping within this population. This coping scale also had the advantage of clinical 
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utility, as suggested by its developers in Australia, Frydenberg and Lewis, (1997). 
While the scale appeared to be a psychometrically sound measure, as I discuss in 
this thesis, it had not been used with psychiatric samples. However, the CSA was 
chosen over other coping inventories on the basis of its sound psychometric 
properties, clear item structure and previous use in the Australian context. As will 
be described further in Chapters 2 and 4, a review of the CSA indicated that it 
provided a better alternative than other coping inventories, such as the WAYS of 
coping questionnaire (1988) for assessing the measurement of coping in a 
psychiatric sample (Frydenberg & Lewis 1997).  
In order to investigate my research question authentically, a qualitative 
approach also needed to be adopted, whereby the patients were asked directly 
about their experiences of coping. Such an approach honoured the meaning of 
coping for these people. As a result, quantitative and qualitative approaches were 
used to investigate the meaning and measurement of coping in psychiatric patients, 
and to determine if firm evidence existed for the suggestion that those diagnosed 
with a mental illness have “coping skills deficits.” The studies revealed a set of 
findings which highlighted the different meaning of coping for these people, 
along with several systemic concerns relevant to the study of coping in psychiatric 
populations.   
As a result of the methodological shift in the work reported, the thesis is 
presented in two parts. Each part orients to particular theoretical and 
methodological concerns. Part One of the thesis is concerned with the 
measurement of coping in those diagnosed with a mental illness by means of a 
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standardised questionnaire (CSA). It offers the first report of the evaluation and 
use in practice of the CSA in a psychiatric population.  
Part Two, however, adopts a different stance. The process of conducting 
the work reported in the first part of the thesis raised difficult questions about the 
validity and authenticity of the enterprise of asking people diagnosed with a 
mental illness standardised questions about their “coping,” as an evaluation of 
how they manage difficult situations in their lives.  
Looking at the two parts of the thesis in more detail, in Part One, the first 
two chapters set the context for the work conducted. Chapter 2 of the thesis 
reviews the history of mental illness and, particularly, research in the area of 
coping in relation to those diagnosed with a mental health disorder. In doing so, 
the general coping literature is reviewed, in full recognition that a more specific 
literature review of coping in those diagnosed with a mental illness would contain 
few research studies, which combine the whole spectrum of those diagnosed with 
a mental illness. Studies have mostly focused on the coping repertoires of 
individual diagnoses, e.g., those diagnosed with: schizophrenia, depression and 
anxiety. While there are indeed many excellent books written about the issues 
within mental health (e.g., Breggin; 1991; Newnes, Holmes, & Dunn, 1999) and 
later books documenting the life stories of patients and their experience of living 
with a mental health diagnosis (Hallam & Bender, 2011), as for documented 
research studies of patients’ accounts of coping within mental health systems, 
there are few.  
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Research into coping over the last 20 years has utilised mainly quantitative 
measurements, such as questionnaires and checklists and is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3 in the Measurement of Coping.  
The CSA scale used in this thesis to distinguish between “productive” and 
“non-productive” coping among three groups (a psychiatric sample, a university 
sample and a normative sample) is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 4 presents an overview of the CSA and the quantitative studies 
with the CSA. The findings of these quantitative investigations echoed sentiments 
of previous conclusions drawn from other researchers, in particular Oakland and  
Ostell (1996), who highlighted the contradictory and ineffective findings in the 
coping literature, which suggest that a particular coping strategy cannot be valued 
and labelled as effective or ineffective without reference to the context in which it 
is used. As can be seen in Chapter 4, the CSA as a measurement tool revealed that 
it is a very sound statistical instrument, for the purposes of measuring 
“productive” and “non-productive” coping. However, further research was 
required to reduce the gap between the theoretical importance and clinical 
usefulness of the coping concept in those diagnosed with a mental illness.  
In Part Two of the thesis Chapter 5 is a qualitative study (published at the 
time of submission), which generated information from patients’ interviews about 
their coping. By means of thematic analyses, five themes emerged which provided 
a detailed account of how those diagnosed with a mental illness cope and of the 
meaning of coping for these people. Patients reported that professional 
intervention reduced their ability to cope; they distrusted the mental health system 
and its professionals; coping mechanisms were misinterpreted; situational crises 
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modulated coping; and, that sometimes coping was just “not coping.” The 
findings from this qualitative study revealed that if you talk to patients about the 
nature of their experience and the ways in which they deal with it, what you find 
is that the bedrock assumptions in which the mental health system operates do not 
do justice to these peoples’ experience.  
Chapter 6, entitled “Meet the People,” provides a detailed description  of 
patients’ narratives through the interviews, case notes and demographic 
information collected on each patient. The case studies revealed commonalities in 
coping (such as childhood trauma, poverty and learned helplessness, systemic 
issues) and more detailed descriptions on what coping means to psychiatric 
patients.  
The final chapter, Chapter 7, of the thesis offers a summary of and 
conclusions drawn from the work conducted in the area of coping in those 
diagnosed with a mental illness, along with implications for future research and 
clinical practice. 
Some chapters of this thesis have been submitted for publication during 
the process of writing-up, with one now published. In the journal article which is 
Chapter 5 of this study the reference to “we” is for the purposes of the journal 
article and not to the work carried out. For all such papers, I am first author, in 
recognition of my roles as primary researcher, analyst and author. 
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PART 1 
CHAPTER 2 
Introduction 
“No excellent soul is exempt from a mixture of madness . . . ”  ~ Aristotle 
Preamble 
The literature review will focus on coping in psychiatric patients and the reasons 
why the coping of this particular group has been singled out for special 
consideration in this current thesis. The basic layout of this chapter is as follows: 
Prior to discussing the literature on coping in psychiatric patients it is important to 
describe how the various terms relating to coping i.e., coping strategies, and 
coping styles, will be used throughout this thesis.  There will be discussion of the 
coping construct differentiating between: a) coping as an action or way of 
thinking, without its functional consequences, and b) coping as a type of 
behaviour that implies success or failure (i.e., coping and not coping). The 
conceptual issues in the measurement of coping will then be discussed, followed 
by the general literature review directed at coping in psychiatric patients and how 
this differs from coping in the wider community. Finally, in order to comprehend 
how coping is understood within the mental health system, literature from the 
medically driven field of psychiatry that has its roots in the disease model of 
illness and pathology, is explored with specific attention given to the diagnostic 
framework around schizophrenia.   
How the Concept of Coping will be Used Throughout This Thesis 
The overall literature itself does not clearly define the various coping 
terms in every study and quite often coping is used interchangeably with coping 
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styles, coping resources and coping strategies. The definition of coping used in 
this thesis is one of the more commonly used psychological definitions of coping, 
namely, it views coping as a multidimensional concept as described by Lazarus 
and Folkman (1984). They defined coping as a construct, which constantly 
changes, comprising both cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific 
external and internal demands. These efforts are either appraised as taxing or 
exceeding the resources of the person.  According to Lazarus and Folkman, in 
order to fully understand the coping process, one needs to understand three main 
features, namely: 1) what a person thinks and does, 2) what the person thinks or 
does as examined in a specific context, to get an understanding of what the person 
is coping with, and 3) the change in coping thoughts and acts as the stressful 
encounter unfolds. As the status of the person-environment changes, so does the 
coping process, and thus various coping strategies are used throughout the 
different stages of this process. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) suggest,  “the way 
people cope heavily relies on the resources that are available to them and the 
constraints that inhibit use of these resources in the context of the specific 
encounter” (p. 158). A person is resourceful if they have many resources such as 
money, help, people, and relevant skills; to counter the demands placed upon 
them (Folkman & Lazarus, 1984).  
Coping as a description of a type of action or thinking, without regard to 
its functional consequences is called a coping strategy, whereas a group of various 
coping strategies that are used preferentially over others is termed a coping style. 
A coping style includes a number of coping strategies known to the person using 
them to be effective or ineffective in a particular situation (Frydenberg & Lewis, 
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1997). Coping styles are thought to be made up of both personality traits and 
behaviours expressed as a result of a stressful encounter (Carver et al., 1989). In 
this way coping can be both active, e.g., dealing directly with the situation, or 
passive, e.g., avoiding or ignoring the situation (Fledderus, Bohlmeijer, & Pieterse, 
2010). There are also the categories of problem-focused (planning, dealing 
directly with the situation) and emotion-focused (venting emotion, seeking the 
emotional support of others) coping strategies (Ward, Cichy, & Almeida, 2008). 
The term coping repertoire will be referred to in this thesis from time to time as 
the store of coping strategies and resources available to the person.  
A review of the psychological literature from approximately 1967 
indicated that psychological abstracts began to utilise a separate category for 
“coping” (Snyder, 1999). A recent (October 2013) literature search using 
ProQuest for journal articles with “coping” in the title revealed that interest in the 
subject of coping itself spans a vast area, with 29,024 references to coping in 
peer-reviewed scholarly publications. Indeed, interest in the subject of coping has 
grown dramatically, with coping receiving attention in educational systems (e.g., 
Ebata & Moos 1991; Frydenberg & Lewis, 1993; 1994; Lewis, Romi & Roache, 
2011; Romi, Lewis & Roache, 2013), psychiatry (e.g., Cohen & Berk, 1985; 
Crossley, 1995; Koeing, 2009; Pierre, 2012; Rollins, Bond, Lysaker, McGrew, & 
Salyers, 2010) and psychology (e.g., Aldwin, 1994; Aldwin, & Park, 2004; 
Aranada, & Lincoln, 2011; Folkman, 2010; Holahan, Moos, Holahan, Cronkite, 
Randall, 2003; Holahan, Pahl, Cronkite, Holahan, North, & Moos, 2010; Lapidus, 
Shin, & Hutton, 2001; Lazarus, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Monat, Lazarus 
& Reevey, 2007; Ogden, 1996; Olsen, Trevino, Geske, & Vanderpool, 2012; 
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Perrez & Reicherts, 1992). Relatedly, in the area of mental health there has been a 
resurgence of research interest in the “psychology of the positive,” (e.g., Farhall, 
& Cotton, 2002; Provencher, & Keyes, 2011; Ritsner, Ben-Avi, Ponizovsky, 
Timinsky, Bistrov & Modai, 2003; Singh, Sharan, & Kulhara, 2002; Tobin, 2000), 
in contrast to historic perspectives, which were based on psychopathology.  
It is generally accepted that there is no single coping mechanism so 
outstandingly effective that its possession alone insures a person’s ability to fend 
off stress or the difficulties one encounters throughout the lifespan. Frydenberg 
and Lewis (2002a) highlighted that the kinds of responses and resources people 
bring to bear in coping do make a difference to their emotional wellbeing. 
Nevertheless, research is yet to uncover an entire coping repertoire that might be 
effective for the general population, an impossible task given the very individual 
nature of coping, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  
Throughout the psychological literature, coping has been used in many 
different contexts, such as coping with stress, coping after a traumatic incident, 
and coping with mental health symptoms. In addition, a myriad of ‘coping 
strategies’ have been prescribed to “work best” in these situations. For example, 
individuals with ‘good social support networks’ are believed to ‘cope better’ with 
stress and, indeed, the overall literature suggests that good social support systems 
act as a buffer against stress (Cohen, McGowan, Fooskas, & Rose, 1984; Cohen, 
Towbes, & Flocco, 1988; Cummins, 1988; Hobfoll, 1986; Ford & Procidano, 
1990; Granovetter,1982; Greenglass,1993; Potasznik, & Nelson, 1984). For 
example, Greenglass (1993) suggested that social support provides a source of 
acceptance and intimacy, a source of guidance and provides services and resource 
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assistance. Of note here is that, historically, only a minority of researchers in the 
literature have recognized the usefulness of maladaptive strategies in helping to 
manage stressful encounters (Menninger, 1963; Snyder, 1999).  
How people cope varies depending on the different kinds of stress to 
which they are exposed. For example, the loss of a loved one may be stressful, but 
may or may not be traumatic for the individual. There are many factors involved 
in grief, such as whether the death was sudden, the type of illness suffered and 
duration of the illness. There are also individual differences in personality traits 
and resources (McCrae, 1984), the cultural context (Greer, 2012), the person’s 
well-being and their physical health (Lazarus, 2000), which will have a bearing on 
how an individual copes. These substantial differences in individual 
characteristics that exist in the participants involved in coping research make 
comparative analyses between studies difficult, as do the different methodologies, 
the contexts of the studies and the definitions of coping utilised by the researchers.  
Researchers to date have recognised the role of coping in moderating the 
impact of stressful encounters. There is general agreement in the literature that 
long-term stress leads both to adverse mental health states, such as experiences of 
anxiety and depression, and also to physical illness, such as cardiovascular disease 
and type 2 diabetes (Kiecolt-Glaser, McGuire, Robles & Glaser, 2002; Taylor, 
Lerner, Sherman, & McDowell, 2003b). There is also a strong link between 
coping and physical and “mental health” (Aldwin & Park, 2004; Aldwin & 
Revenson, 1987; Antoni, Lehman Kilbourn, Boyers, & Culvers,  2001; Folkman, 
2010; Hallam, 2007; Holahan et al., 2003; Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; Holahan, 
North, & Moos, 2010).  
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A meta-analytical study of the association of coping to physical and 
psychological health outcomes in a non-clinical population was carried out by 
Penley, Tomaka and Wiebe (2002). The authors specifically examined a series of 
meta-analyses on non-clinical samples aged 18 and over, investigating the 
associations between coping strategies (specifically on the Ways of Coping 
Questionnaire; Ways of Coping Checklist; Ways of Coping Checklist- revised) 
and health-related outcomes.  The results revealed that problem-focused coping 
was positively related to overall health outcomes and that confrontive coping, 
distancing, self-control, seeking social support, accepting responsibility, 
avoidance, and wishful thinking were negatively correlated with overall health 
outcomes. The type of health, i.e., physical vs psychological health, and 
situational characteristics, such as the type of stressor and perceived control and 
the duration of the stressor, moderated many of the overall associations.  
In the literature there has been a long debate about the relative 
contribution of intraindividual and socioeconomic factors in the development of 
individuals’ capacity to manage stress. As it is now, the weight of the evidence 
suggests that social factors do play a major role and their influence is seen in the 
degree of long-term stress that individuals have to cope with. However, this 
knowledge is seldom transferred into research practice within psychiatry or into 
psychiatric research. Research within psychiatry still mainly focuses on 
intraindividual factors, resulting in diagnoses, with the resulting treatment being 
mostly pharmaceutical intervention and psychological therapies for such 
“illnesses” (Kinderman, Read, Moncrieff, & Bentall, 2013; Layard, 2006). The 
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abilities that people have to manage or cope with these stressors are seldom 
acknowledged (Adler & Matthews, 1994; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).  
Conceptual Issues in the Measurement of Coping 
Conceptual issues in the measurement of coping are usually embedded in 
the type of methodological assumptions used. The different conceptualisations of 
coping impact on how the concept of coping is measured, providing very real 
issues for the measurement of coping. There are well-documented problems with 
the measurement of coping, with a plethora of research on coping scales and 
checklists (e.g., Coyne & Gottlieb, 1996; De Ridder, 1997; Endler &Parker, 1990). 
Existing coping scales differ in a number of important ways.  Any particular 
instrument generally reflects how coping is defined, the theoretical assumptions 
employed and whether the coping that it is attempting to assess is in relation to a 
particular stressor or not.  Generally, the instruments developed reflect the 
complex nature of the measurement of coping. The more popular coping scales 
used in psychiatry have been: The Ways of Coping Scale (WAYS-Revised), 
Folkman and Lazarus, 1988; The COPE Inventory, (COPE), Carver, Weintraub 
and Schier, 1989 and the Coping Response Inventory, Moos, (1992).  These 
scales are situation specific scales designed to measure how individuals cope with 
a given situation (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985). However, coping is a 
multidimensional concept and covers many aspects of behaviour.  
There is also controversy in the ways in which coping strategies have been 
assessed. Carver et al. (1989) make reference to this exact point, highlighting that 
most measures of coping strategies do not assess clear aspects, or include clear 
ideas about certain theoretical interests, though there may be good diversity in the 
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aspects that they measure (McCrae, 1982, 1984). Furthermore, some of the 
measures do not have a clear focus in their items that indicate what specific 
response a certain item is measuring. For example, some items may consist of 
words with different meanings to different people and as such the response means 
different things to different individuals.  An item such as “I used alcohol to cope” 
may mean that a person used a controlled drinking approach of 1-2 glasses in a 
social environment which helped them relax, whereas others may interpret it as a 
tension reduction approach used regularly to cope by drinking a bottle of vodka 
while alone leading to a decline in their relationships. There is no clear way of 
measuring the full meaning of  individual responses to items.  In the Ways of 
Coping Questionnaire by Folkman & Lazarus (1984) some items have such 
ambiguity, e.g., item 6 states: “I did something which I didn’t think would work, 
but at least I was doing something” (p. 328). This item is most confusing for the 
respondent and again would elicit many different responses depending on its 
interpretation.  
The variability in the measurement of coping and gaps in the research on 
coping make it difficult for direct comparisons between studies to be made 
(Endler & Parker, 1990; Felsten, 1998; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Keyes, 
2007; Ptacek, Smith & Dodge, 1994). Indeed, the methodological shortcomings of 
most coping scales reflect more basic underlying conceptual problems regarding 
the coping construct (DeRidder, 1997).  For example, coping checklists 
encompass too narrow a conception of coping, resulting in incomplete and 
distorted measurement of coping (Coyne & Gottlieb, 1996).  
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A specific example of where the measurement of coping has failed can be 
seen in the study by Oxlad, Miller-Lewis and Wade (2004). Oxlad et al. 
investigated the validity of The Billings and Moos Coping Checklist (1981), one 
of the more popular coping checklists in mental health settings often used within 
such hospital settings to examine the strategies people use to cope with crisis. 
Oxlad et al.  (2004) investigated the factor structure and psychometric properties 
of the Billings and Moos Coping Checklist. The Billings and Moos scale along 
with a number of other self-report questionnaires (Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale, 
Beck Hopelessness Scale, The Mental Health Subscore of the SF-36, The Life 
Orientation Test- Revised, The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales) was 
administered to 515 undergraduate university students and 119 patients awaiting 
elective coronary artery bypass graft surgery. Using both confirmatory and 
exploratory factor analyses the authors summarised and described the coping 
responses. The authors made two adjustments to the scale. Firstly, to improve its 
sensitivity, the scale response set was altered from the yes/no format to a 4-point 
Likert type scale. The second amendment was they changed the measure from 
situation-specific coping to dispositional coping. However, the major finding 
suggested that the Coping Checklist did not adequately fit the data. Specifically, 
the factor structure, internal consistency, test-retest reliability and validity of the 
Coping Checklist were “weak”. The internal consistencies of the Billings and 
Moos scale for the groups were as follows: avoidance (0.44), active cognitive 
(0.72), and active behavioural (0.80). There was no data on test-retest reliability of 
the scale. The authors suggested that their amendments to the response set and 
also the focus from situation-specific to dispositional coping might account for 
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this poor fit. However, Schwarzer and Schwarzer (1996) claim scales such as the 
Billings and Moos Coping measure demonstrate unsatisfactory internal 
consistencies. Oxlad et al. (2004) also report that the Billings and Moos scale 
lacks information on its factor structure and psychometric properties.  
Previously, Steed (1998) cautioned researchers that the use of factor 
analysis to identify the dimensionality of coping scales was fraught with problems. 
Lazarus and Folkman (1980, 1985, 1988) also reported that they found varying 
numbers of factors in their research, as items used for particular subscales 
changed from one study to another, and the sample used also varied. However, 
factor analyses have been used by many researchers to identify the dimensionality 
of coping scales (Ferguson, 2001; Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997, 2002a,b; Robbins 
& Tanck, 1978; Sawang, Oei, Goh, Mansoer, Markhum, & Ranawake, 2010), 
despite being critiqued heavily mainly due to the lack of transferability of results 
from one study to another. The findings from the Oxlad et al. study support this 
interpretation.  
Steed (1998) acknowledges that choosing a scale for a specific study is 
difficult, given the number of coping measures from which to choose. Steed 
discusses the differences between specific and general measures of coping and has 
suggested the use of general measures is preferable, the advantage being that 
general measures allow the comparison of a number of coping strategies across 
various stressors. However, the reality is that neither a specific nor a general scale 
is likely to capture the whole coping repertoire and some coping strategies may be 
missed. Therefore, a combination of both qualitative and quantitative 
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measurement is likely to more effectively measure coping overall, than reliance 
on a single scale.   
Coping as a Type of Behaviour that Implies Success or Failure.  
Coping has also been referred to as a type of behaviour that implies 
success or failure i.e., not coping. For example, a person dealing effectively with 
something difficult could be seen to be ‘coping,’ whereas a person not dealing 
effectively with something difficult may be seen to be ‘not coping.’  This 
assumption of “coping well” or “coping badly” is particularly problematic when 
considered in the individual and functional context of the life of a psychiatric 
patient. One cannot assume that actions classified as of the coping type are 
necessarily examples of coping well or badly, as the patient’s attempts at dealing 
with difficulty could be of functional value in the life of the patient. To recast, one 
cannot infer that a line exists between not coping and coping, it is impossible to 
produce a set of criteria or definitions that can be used objectively to discriminate 
between those who cope successfully and those who do not cope. Similarly, it is 
impossible to determine exactly when an experience reaches the point where it is 
considered significant and meets the criterion for “not coping.” As a consequence, 
if the reliability and validity of the measurement of coping depends on the 
“threshold” of what constitutes coping and not coping these too are impossible to 
achieve.  
Classification systems of coping that have been developed by researchers 
also tend to group various styles of coping into categories which reveal those that 
are more effective than others, therefore implying adaptive vs maladaptive 
functions of coping (Aranada, & Lincoln, 2011; Carver,  Scheier, Weintraub, & 
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Jagdish, 1989; Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997, 2002a; Snyder, 1999). These 
classification systems do not bode well for assessing the functional consequences 
of coping of a psychiatric patient and do not acknowledge that not coping can 
have some value for psychiatric patients. For example, it is not uncommon for 
some psychiatric patients to fain illness for adaptive purposes. “Creative” types of 
coping that might be seen with psychiatric patients are not directly measurable 
with existing scales and checklist, but interpretable through closer examination 
and discussions with such patients. There is also literature supporting an 
existential/phenomenological view that so-called madness is coping (e.g., Bentall, 
2003). Bentall believes: 
 . . . people who are experiencing psychological distress are rarely passive 
 victims of their emotional turmoil; rather, they usually make active 
 attempts to cope with it . . .some of these attempts may successfully 
 ameliorate distress, other coping strategies have the unfortunate effect of 
 increasing the likelihood that the distress will persist (p. 163).  
This view in its strictest form, most certainly renders the use of coping scales 
redundant for psychiatric populations. However, research to date has shown that 
there are some commonalities in chosen coping strategies amongst psychiatric 
patients.  
Folkman and Lazarus (1984) make reference to this very problem of being 
too definitive with the definition of coping and interpretation of coping and they 
state:  
“Coping as a concept is typically equated with adaptational success, 
 especially in the ego psychology models, wherein unsuccessful or less 
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 successful efforts to deal with stress are called defense. This results in 
 a confounding of coping and its outcome. If progress is to be made in 
 understanding the relationship between coping and outcome, that is, 
 what helps or hurts the person and in  what ways, coping must be viewed 
 as efforts to manage stressful demands regardless of outcome. 
 Accordingly, no strategy should be considered inherently better or  worse 
 than any other; judgements as to the adaptiveness of a strategy must be 
 made contextually” (p. 140).    
Folkman and Lazarus (1984) advise against categorizing coping efforts as 
maladaptive. Within psychiatry, viewing coping in this way is problematic, 
because the very functional behaviour, which carries people through situations, 
needs to be understood in order to verify and, perceive the significance of such 
behaviour. It is only through such understanding that one can be sympathetic and 
knowledgably treat psychiatric patients.  
Theories of Coping and How Coping is Theoretically Understood  
In historical terms, the concept of coping has only been studied as 
“coping’ since the 1960’s (Snyder, 1999). Prior to this time the concept of coping 
was studied and understood under a variety of other names. The roots of coping in 
psychology and psychiatry can be traced back to Freud’s work on defense 
mechanisms (see A. Freud, 1968). Freud described coping as a defense 
mechanism that enables an individual to deal with unconscious and aggressive 
conflicts. Therefore, thoughts and feelings, which are troublesome to the 
conscious mind, are rendered unconscious. This concept of defense is still used 
today by many psychoanalysts, to describe the process by which the mind changes 
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the perception of stressful circumstances, which stem from internal processes 
(Snyder, 1999).  While Freud interpreted defenses as protecting the ego against 
internal instinctual forces, Adler interpreted defenses as safeguards that serve to 
protect the self from external environmental threats (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 
1967).   
Many different theoretical models of coping have been proposed in the 
last 30 years (e.g., Hobfoll’s (1989) multiaxial model; Lazarus’ (1966) 
transactional model). Hobfoll’s (1989) model is based on the conservation of 
resources theory (COR), which predicts that loss is the principle ingredient in the 
stress process and it is the conservation of resources which influences the stress 
response. Hobfoll (2001) suggested that because resources are used to prevent 
resource loss, if there is enough loss this impacts on the individual’s coping. 
Hobfoll stated, “This theory is seen as an alternative to appraisal-based stress 
theories because it relies more centrally on the objective and culturally construed 
nature of the environment in determining the stress process, rather than the 
individual’s personal construal” (Hobfoll, 2001, p. 338). This point is now evident 
in many researchers’ work in the area of mental health, as they claim that both 
sociocultural factors, as well as individual factors, form part of the self (Hallam, 
2009; Summerfield, 2004, 2012a) and some have argued that therapeutic 
interventions have sometimes done little to “help” (Newnes, 2013). In relation to 
coping or not coping, Summerfield (2008) raised an interesting point, that is, how 
much or what kind of adversity can someone face and still be classified as 
“normal.”  
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Coyne and Racioppo (2000) declared that coping research inadequately 
captures person-environment transactions and the coping process. However, 
Lazarus believed Coyne and Racioppo’s review on coping is “greatly overdrawn” 
(Lazarus, 2000, p. 666). A review of the literature suggests that there is some truth 
in both views and, recently, more researchers have advocated for qualitative 
approaches to uncover the very individual nature of coping (Hasson-Ohayon, Roe 
& Kravetz, 2006; Robilotta,  Cueto, & Yanos, 2010; Tischler, 2009).   
In general, there are two key approaches, which characterize the 
psychological literature on coping. The first, the trait-based approach, has 
endeavoured to investigate the effect personality variables have on individual 
coping capacity (e.g., Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010; Coan, 1973; McCrae, 1984; 
McCrae & Costa, 1986; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, & McDowell, 2003a). When 
coping is viewed as a trait, the assumption is that once in place, it operates as a 
stable behaviour. Therefore, research investigating trait-based coping has focused 
on how individuals cope in particular ways over their life course.  
The second approach in the coping literature focuses on identifying the 
strategies people use to manage difficult situations and then measuring the 
outcomes of these strategies (e.g., Carver, Scheier, Weintraub & Jagdish, 1989; 
Endler & Parker, 1990; Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997; Moos, 1992; Moos, Holahan, 
& Beutler; 2003). This approach is sometimes referred to in the literature as the 
coping process. In line with this approach, coping is viewed as a vital feature of 
the emotion process and the emotional life. The relationship an individual has 
with their environment determines what coping mechanisms they use and the 
level of stress an individual experiences (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Through the 
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processes of primary and secondary appraisals the individual assesses a situation 
as threatening, and then determines whether or not they have the resource 
strategies to cope with that particular situation. Seen this way, relational meaning 
takes place, whereby the person’s sense of the harms and benefits are weighed up 
in a particular person-environment relationship. Thus, the relational meaning 
influences the coping process. 
The two central approaches to coping differ in terms of the extent to which 
they take into consideration contextual variables. Lazarus and colleagues have 
favoured approaches, which are strongly contextualist (e.g., Holahan & Moos, 
1987; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), whereas others (e.g., Bodenmann, Charvoz, 
Widmer & Bradbury, 2004) have concentrated on individual level variables. Most 
notably, trait approaches give value to personality characteristics (Carver & 
Connor-Smith, 2010; Coan, 1973; McCrae, 1984; McCrae & Costa, 1986) or 
individual and social resources (Holahan & Moos, 1987), such as optimism and 
social support (McColl, Hau & Skinner, 1995; Taylor & Stanton, 2007).   
In both trait approaches and process approaches, coping is typically 
understood as the use of ‘rational responses’ to so-called ‘objective problems’. 
This construal permits the division of coping into both adaptive or maladaptive 
coping, as well as the presence or absence of coping skills or deficits. In contrast 
to the deficit focus of much of the psychological literature (cf. Rose, 1989), more 
recently, some researchers (e.g., Iwanaga, Yokoyama, & Seiwa, 2004; Keyes, 
2007; Yanos, 2001) have proposed that coping is better understood as a positive 
concept, and have focused on the use of adaptive strategies, such as building upon 
an individual’s strengths.  
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As described, the different models of coping reported over the last 30 
years have not necessarily advanced the area of coping research, in that there is no 
general agreement amongst researchers regarding one style of coping. Of special 
concern, the two major approaches have not culminated in a consistent 
conceptualization of the nature of coping for those diagnosed with a mental illness. 
Furthermore, the research carried out has utilised mostly standardised 
questionnaires, with very little use of qualitative research, and has had the 
tendency to categorise coping as adaptive or maladaptive (Skinner, Edge, Altman 
& Sherwood, 2003). The use of different methodologies, along with different 
theoretical orientations about “coping,” makes comparisons of coping research 
problematic. Throughout the overviews of coping, both old and new, one 
theoretical model, which does stand out and has “stood the test of time,” is the 
tried and tested model of Lazarus. In this model the coping process is the 
relationship between an individual and the environment and this relationship 
determines the level of stress and subsequent choice of coping strategy. This 
consequent relational meaning is a more fluid way of understanding and 
measuring quantitatively the concept of coping and seems to fit in the current area 
of adult mental health. This approach combined with qualitative measures has the 
potential to add to the understanding of what coping actually means for somebody 
who is diagnosed with a mental illness.  
How Coping is Construed in Light of the Medical Model 
It was made quite clear by various researchers (e.g., Boyle, 1990,1999, 
2002, 2007; Breggin, 1991; Kinderman et al., 2013; Moncrieff, 2008), that the 
categorization of behaviours as “disorders” is neither reliable nor valid and such 
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categorisation has major implications for understanding coping in those diagnosed 
with a “mental disorder.” The notion of “threshold” also needs to be considered 
when accounting for distress, unusual experiences and how one copes. It is 
certainly known that within the mental health field one criterion for identifying an 
experience as “a mental health problem” is how unusual it is. But the question 
needs to be asked, what is that threshold? When does an experience become so 
unusual that it is considered significant and meets the criterion for a mental health 
problem? This question is important because research has shown that some so-
called unusual experiences associated with distress are far more common than 
usually believed (see Wise, 2004 discourses on hearing voices).  
Before discussing this research, it is also important to draw attention to the 
very fact that the ambiguity around the classification in thresholds for so-called 
mental disorders, highlights why it is hard to make comparisons within the 
literature as it stands on coping in a psychiatric population and how it differs from 
the wider community. As Cromby, Harper and Reavy (2013) point out: 
“Many diagnostic criteria are formulated without any empirical 
 investigation of base rates in the general population. This may explain 
 why there is a frequent disparity between numbers of people seen by 
 mental health services and numbers of people in community 
 surveys who meet diagnostic criteria” (p. 10). 
To illustrate this point, Van Os, Hanssen, Bijl and Ravelli (2000) reported that in 
a random sample of 7076 Dutch people, aged between 18-64 years (53.3% 
women), the prevalence of “true”, psychiatrist-rated clinical delusions and 
hallucinations, which met all the diagnostic criteria, was only 3.3%. However, the 
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prevalence for delusions and hallucinations that were not considered to be 
clinically relevant (i.e., not seeking help for the experience or bothered by the 
experience) was an additional 8.7%.  
Coping with distress and the efforts of patients are rarely understood or 
acknowledged in light of the current medical framework.  What is the focus of 
mental health professionals is what patients are “not” doing.  Most of the time, 
diagnosis is seen as the end point, as opposed to the beginnings of understanding a 
patient’s behaviour in terms of the context of their life.  The diagnosis also 
determines the kinds of treatments patients receive in a psychiatric hospital. 
Preconceived notions of diagnosis have implications for how health professionals 
may view their patients’ ability to cope, in terms of what patients can and can’t do. 
A diagnosis also creates psychological inflexibility for both the patient and 
treating health professional’s understanding of the true nature of patients’ coping. 
Understanding the meaning of coping for psychiatric patients is a necessary first 
step in recognising the sorts of things that must be taken into account in the 
treatment of those who are mentally ill. However, this first step has not been taken.  
In the wider community coping can also be seen as part and parcel of 
everyday life. People are experiencing the effects of love, loss and also many 
health, social and material conditions evident in every day life. Just like other 
experiences are also influenced by biological or genetic capacities, meaning by 
our very nature as living organic human beings.  So while coping is really not a 
separate aspect of experience, and is composed of many different things for 
different individuals, it can also not be known where it starts and ends. For this 
reason a completely reliable and valid way of categorising behaviour especially 
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through standardised psychological questionnaires, psychiatric practices and 
psychological practices as it stands, is not achievable. What is achievable in order 
to get a closer idea as to what ‘coping’ may be for those diagnosed with a mental 
illness could involve asking the patients directly if their ‘coping’ accomplished 
what they thought it would e.g., what the individual set out to do and if patients 
themselves thought they had achieved ‘coping’.  Moreover, coping in psychiatric 
populations differs from coping in the wider community in that people diagnosed 
with “mental illness” often present to hospital with a number of often traumatic 
and distressing life events and situational crises. Therefore, we can assume this 
group of people are dealing with a different set of adversities with which the 
wider community has to “cope.”  
A strict behavioural approach to coping e.g., a functional analysis, might 
also yield quite reliable and valid information.  Taken into consideration would be 
what are thought of as the four main functions of behaviour: firstly, to get 
attention; secondly, to get tangible things; thirdly, to escape, delay or avoid; 
fourthly, simply because of the stimulation engaging in the behaviour provides. 
This approach closely examines the relationship between the individual and their 
environment and how the individual modifies their environment using their 
behaviour.  Therefore, coping seen in this way would be the things an individual 
engages in to modify their environment in a way that makes their situation more 
bearable or comfortable in some way, i.e., the function of a particular coping 
behaviour is to modify the environment in a way that makes the individual’s 
circumstances better or more favourable. Another coping behaviour might modify 
the environment in a different but equally favourable way (e.g., feigning a 
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“mental illness” for adaptive purposes, such as saving government allowance 
money while in hospital). Therefore, behaviours are very individual in both 
psychiatric populations and the wider community and these behaviours, from the 
point of view of ‘coping,’ need to be seen in this way by the clinician and 
researcher.  
Moral Treatment of Mental Illness: Past and Present 
 Providing a safe environment and a place to rest and recuperate with the 
aim focused on comfort and recovery for the mentally ill was posited by 
psychiatry’s grandfathers. It was at the end of the eighteenth century in both 
America and England that moral treatment reigned. It was approximately in 1792 
that a man named William Tuke opened the York Retreat as an alternative to the 
York Asylum, which was known for the mistreatment of the people admitted 
(Boyle, 2002). Moral treatment argued against the treatment of  the term “mental 
illness” in the same way as “medical disease” was treated, noting that emotional 
and mental illness required a different approach. Treatment centres were set up 
which focused on recovery and wellness. In moral treatment centres education, 
manual labour and physical exercise were the experience of the patient. Patients 
were in surroundings furnished well, with enough freedom to come and go, 
thereby maintaining their rights as citizens. This initial earlier, very gentle system 
was promotive of coping and encouraged coping and wellbeing with less focus on 
insanity. Not surprisingly, such centres lead to vast improvements in well-being 
and high discharge rates with full recovery (Shershow, 1978). The idea of the 
moral treatment movement was that it allowed individuals with difficulties to live 
a relatively normal life.  Shershaw (1978) quotes Page (1900), an early advocate 
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of moral treatment, who claimed that common practices of the time were to “dig 
deeply” into the family and personal history of the patient. By doing this, valuable 
information was obtained to see if a possible link between the phenomena of 
mental illness in question and previous family difficulty or trauma could be 
established. In addition to this analysis, safeguards for the patient and those aiding 
in patient recovery were discussed, to guard against further occurrences of the 
behaviour.  
According to Sherman, the dissolving of moral treatment occurred 
because its developers passed away and they were not replaced with likeminded 
individuals. This lack of followers, combined with a new psychiatry profession, 
along with a surge in immigrants into the eastern parts of America, saw an 
overburdening of the treatment houses and, as such, the deterioration of moral 
treatment centres began. The attentive care diminished and the new breed of 
psychiatrist, along with more focus on so-called “scientific” advances, brought a 
different focus to the term mental illness. Current mental health systems in 
Australia mirror this demise in treatment centres. 
The influence of these so-called scientific advances, with no likely return 
to moral treatment, have resulted in the downward spiral of psychiatry. Even with 
the knowledge of the problems associated with these so called advances the 
problems are still occurring, despite these researchers best efforts to bring about 
change (Breggin, 1991, 2008;  Moncrieff, 2008; Newnes, 1999, 2011; 
Summerfield, 2006; 2012a). Among the many problems identified are: labelling 
and diagnosis, medication as first line of treatment (and the routine use of 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT; commonly used as a treatment option for  so-
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called drug-resistant depression and often for older people with depression; see 
Newnes, 2011), and ignoring the valuable contribution of individual factors.  One 
of the major reasons postulated for the lack of substantial change within the area 
of mental health is that the focus has been, and still is, on the medical model. 
Today this approach still dominates, along with the heavy influence of the 
pharmaceutical industry, within psychiatry and in the subsequent development of 
a service industry around mental health  (Bracken & Thomas, 2001, 2005; 
Bracken et al., 2012; Breggin, 1991, 2008; Moncrieff, 2008; Summerfield, 2012a).  
Nevertheless, in 2005 Brackin and Thomas suggested that times were 
changing as real dialogues were starting to occur between those who experienced 
a so called mental illness and the society in which they lived. There is indeed now 
more collaboration between psychologists and psychiatrists in recognising the 
need for user involvement in the planning and development of services. However, 
the extent to which this collaboration has changed some of the inherent 
difficulties within the psychiatric system is unclear. There is a lot of referencing 
to this change, but the actual “doing” is not clearly reported on in the literature. 
Indeed, we might be on the verge of a paradigm shift (Kinderman et al., 2013), 
but based on current practices this shift has not yet occurred. 
In 2013 the DSM-V was still published despite severe criticism by 
researchers and academics (Cosgrove, Krimsky & Vijayaraghavan, 2006). 
Example, Summerfield (2012c) claimed that he would challenge any psychiatrist, 
or anyone for that matter, if they could provide a scientific way of distinguishing 
between depression as a biomedical category and unhappiness – other than by 
reference to methodologies we have devised. Summerfield (2012c) goes on to 
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state that the current methodologies involve a clustering of symptoms by 
professionals and not nature, with the end result being a diagnosis, if enough 
“symptoms” are present. He claims: “It is “we” who cluster symptoms not nature 
and, if there are enough of the symptoms, we declare a mental 
disorder”(Summerfield, 2012c). The title of an article by Bentall (1992), “A 
proposal to classify happiness as a psychiatric disorder,” reflects just how faulty 
the current diagnostic paradigm truly is. As emphasised in a commentary by 
Rapley, “[But] real sciences do not decide on the existence and the nature of the 
phenomena they are dealing with via a show of hands with a vested interest and 
pharmaceutical sponsorship” (see Lane, 2012). Hence, the problem with 
diagnostic categories.  
The Problematic Nature of Diagnoses Within Mental Health Systems: How 
Diagnosis Impacts on Coping Attempts 
The World Health Organization (WHO) definition of mental health is: “A 
state of well-being in which every individual realizes his or her own potential, can 
cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is 
able to make a contribution to her or his community” (World Health Organisation, 
2011). This definition is rarely transferred over into mental health settings. 
Coping is not directly defined in psychiatry, rather, coping is understood to be 
what the person is not doing, which effectively is the psychopathology.  Double 
(2002) provided a compelling commentary on the limits of psychiatric diagnosis.  
He wrote that a better way of understanding diagnosis could be through 
developing an understanding of the reasons behind a patient’s presentation, as 
opposed to viewing their presentation through a biomedical model.  Double 
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warned against a sole reliance on an ‘underlying hypothetical disorder’ and an 
elimination of the meaning of patient’s distress, as this minimises the many social, 
familial and economic concerns of the individual, and objectifies patients so that 
they become “bodies requiring treatment.”  
There is now a body of evidence accumulated in the research which 
supports the assertion that what has happened to people in their lives plays a 
major part in their resulting distress and behavioural problems (Bentall, 2003; 
Read, van Os, Morrison & Ross, 2005; Tew, 2005; Wilkinson & Pickett, (2009). 
Lucy Johnstone (1999, 2011) wrote about the traumatic lives of people diagnosed 
with mental illness. Johnstone (2011) believed that the key issues relating to 
psychosis would be better understood as individual reactions to trauma and abuse 
(sexual and physical abuse and neglect). Recent studies show clear evidence for 
physical and sexual abuse to be a major cause of what is labelled as schizophrenia 
(Larkin & Morrison, 2006; Larkin & Read, 2008; Morrison, Frame & Read, 2003; 
Read, 1997, 2005;  Read & Bentall, 2012; Read, Morrison, & Ross, 2005). This 
finding within psychiatry is not unlike the finding Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson 
(1984) stumbled across while going through the archives of Freud’s letters. From 
these letters Masson wrote a book, “The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of 
the Seduction Theory.” In this book Masson provides the evidence, which 
revealed that Freud renounced the seduction theory (which was that emotional 
disturbances in adults, usually seen in women, stem from actual early traumatic 
experiences and the knowledge of which is repressed) in favour of the new theory, 
which was that female patients fantasize about early memories of rape and 
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seduction. This view formed the basis of psychoanalysis and Masson claims that it 
“poisoned” the profession hereon.  
Bentall (2003) argues that the problem modern psychiatric services are 
faced with is not one of lack of personnel or resources but of the lack of “ideas.” 
Bentall argues that too much work has gone into the nature of mental illness under 
serious misunderstandings of what actually constitutes it.  Not being able to cope 
is not, in itself, a sign of a mental illness, but individuals’ attempts to manage 
what is going on for them, or cope with what has happened to them and this is not 
directly assessed in initial interviews in psychiatric inpatient hospitals throughout 
Australia. Generally, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual and the ICD-10 are the 
diagnostic tools of choice within most psychiatric hospitals across Australia. But, 
it must be acknowledged that the DSM-V definitions of  “significant impairment,”  
“distress,” and “disability,” and the continuum of “normal,” are highly subjective, 
as such definitions rely upon the clinician’s interpretation of these categories.  
Clinical judgement plays a critical role in the diagnostic process. However, 
even with appropriate training, clinicians will differ from one another.  Utilisation 
of concepts, such as  “significant impairment,” in psychiatry has led to many 
diagnostic formulations, which exclude the voice of the individual and, therefore, 
are of questionable reliability and validity (Kinderman et al.,  2013; Kutchins & 
Kirk, 1989, 1997; Lane, 2012). What seems to be forgotten is that mental distress 
is on a spectrum of  “normal” experience, and psychosocial factors, such as 
poverty, unemployment and trauma are, to date, the most strongly evidenced 
causal factors leading to the  diagnosis of a mental illness (The British 
Psychological Society Response, 2011). There is strong evidence, which has 
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established a link between family relationships in childhood and common 
psychiatric disorders in later life (Keyes, et al., 2012; Read, 1997, 2005a; Read & 
Bentall, 2012; Weich, Patterson, Shaw, & Stewart-Brown, 2009).  
One of the major problems with diagnosis is that clinicians and 
researchers often complain that patients do not fall neatly into standard diagnostic 
categories. Moreover, some patients often fall short of a symptom and, therefore, 
either do not meet the diagnostic requirements or have symptoms, which 
challenge definitional assumptions (Garety, 1985). Another issue with research 
including only those who fit neatly into diagnostic categories is that only this 
research gets published, which maintains the dominance of diagnostic categories 
(Harper, 1996).  Boyle (1990, 1999) identified yet another issue with diagnoses 
which are the vested interests of “others” in this diagnostic process, the “others”  
being: the relatives of those diagnosed mentally ill, mental health professionals 
and the pharmaceutical industry. There are still many psychologists and 
psychiatrists who focus on the assessment of an individual’s ability to cope 
through classification systems. The role of diagnosis to date within mental health 
settings determines what treatments are provided with the aim of improving 
maladaptive/abnormal human behaviours. Relatively little attention is given to the 
person and their relationships to other people, groups, social institutions and 
society as a whole, and the very factors which may be maintaining or contributing 
to the issue of concern. Clinicians also need to be wary of imposing their views 
when formulating a diagnosis. As stated in the DSM-IV: 
Clinicians assessing the symptoms of schizophrenia in socioeconomic or 
cultural situations that are different from their own must take cultural 
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differences into account. Ideas that may appear to be delusional in one 
culture (e.g., sorcery and witchcraft) may be commonly held in another” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p 281.)  
This is especially true for the treatment of those rural aboriginal people diagnosed 
with schizophrenia. These people are also not immune from the effects of the 
western psychiatric model. A survey by Kowanko, Crespigny, Murray, 
Groenkjaer and Emden (2004), with 57% of the sample being from rural and 
remote regions, revealed the difficulties with medication management for 
aboriginals in rural settings. Not surprisingly, itinerant aboriginals had “particular 
difficulty storing their medications,”  there was poor medication compliance, 
partly reported as being due to “the unwanted side effects of medications 
prescribed,” and transport issues to access medications. Also reported was a 
reluctance to access services related to experiences of or perceptions of racism 
and lack of confidentiality.  Unfortunately to date, there are no known studies 
carried out on the meaning of coping for these people and the use of their specific 
cultural mechanisms for dealing with adversity.  
Many researchers are aware of the construction of mental illness and the 
stigmatizing effects of diagnoses and labels on people, along with the associated 
negative consequences (Ben-Zeev, Young & Corrigan, 2010; Boyle, 1990, 2002; 
McHoul & Rapley, 2003b; Newnes, 2011; Summerfield, 2001b). Indeed, the 
unreliability of diagnoses and the continual inaction within the fields of 
psychology and psychiatry has caused many of their professionals to become 
quite critical of their own profession (Healy, 2012; McHoul & Rapley, 2003a; 
Newnes, 2004; Rapley, 2012; Summerfield, 2006, 2012a). For example, 
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Moncrieff (2008) states, “Even when they acknowledge that there is no evidence 
for a ‘chemical imbalance,’ many psychiatrists believe that the term is still 
justified and appropriate, thereby, demonstrating a deep underlying commitment 
to the idea” (p.11). Moncrieff also described that pharmaceutical companies 
employ a similar language in their advertising campaigns, likening depression to 
physical illness, such as arthritis or diabetes.  An even louder version of this is 
echoed throughout the media, one of the most influential forces in the portrayal of 
public views on what constitutes a mental illness. As Rowe, Tilbury, Rapley, and 
O’Ferrall (2003) pointed out, this inherent belief, embedded by the profession and 
now the media, uses stigmatizing language to draw parallels between violence and 
crime and the mentally ill, which further negatively influences the general 
population’s understandings of what has become known as mental illness.  
The issues with diagnosis within mental health are problematic on many 
levels. Boyle (1999) claimed that diagnosis does two things. Firstly, by attempting 
to classify those presenting with behavioural complaints in much the same way as 
those who present with physical complaints, psychiatry claims it is a branch of 
medicine. Secondly, psychiatry purports to have links with science, given the use 
of the diagnostic classification system, e.g., coding “like with like.” The veil of a 
science protects the discipline of psychiatry from questions about diagnostic 
reliability and disagreements regarding particular categories. The process of 
formulating a diagnosis does not take into consideration the very nature of 
understanding and responding to psychological distress and, thus, dismisses the 
experience of the patient (Newnes, 1999).  
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According to Moncrieff (2008), the claim that there are specific 
biochemical deviations in the brains of people with various psychiatric diagnoses 
is weak and inconsistent. However, the idea that “drugs cure a mental illness” is 
now embedded into the public consciousness, fundamentally changing the way we 
view ourselves and the nature of our experience (Rowe, 2007). Clinically this is 
evident in many presentations to General Practitioner (GP) clinics. For some 
people a form of coping is to consult their GP for a chat about their woes, and 
many leave with a script in hand, wondering then what is wrong with them. 
Unfortunately, with the widespread use of labels and categories, it is sometimes 
difficult to convince the psy-professions that people are usually “driven crazy by 
bad things that happen to them” (Read, Mosher & Bentall 2004, p. xvii).  
Psychiatry, with its focus on mental illness, is essentially a medicine of the 
mind (Bracken & Thomas, 2005). As Bracken and Thomas claim the mind is not 
something tangible and, as a result, a medicine of the mind needs to be 
qualitatively different to a medicine focused on bodily tissues. Simple as this 
sounds, this important truth is far away from the discipline of psychiatry in 2013. 
Since its origins in the mid-nineteenth century, psychiatry has sought to model 
itself on a “medicine of the tissues,” and, by doing so, Bracken and Thomas 
(2005) believe it has not ignored such things as meanings, values, relationships, 
but it has rendered these as secondary concerns. Moreover, and somewhat 
unfortunately, the circular reasoning continues to exist in mental health settings 
and the community today.  
An example of this circular reasoning is described clearly in an article by 
Smith (1978) who illustrated how patient “K” was diagnosed as mentally ill. The 
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article reports on how various agencies of social control worked through the 
institutionalised procedures for gathering information on an individual and then 
matched this information against the medical paradigms which provide 
“membership” of being “mentally ill”. As seen with many cases within psychiatry, 
much of what Smith counted as the informal work (e.g., the individual’s ideas of 
what was happening for them, and then the family and friends’ ideas) was already 
done before even entering into the official process (e.g., the mental health 
inpatient setting). Smith highlighted that these informal accounts can also be 
described as social organisation, which precedes the production of the actual 
interview within a psychiatric setting and can impact on individuals. Smith 
suggested that it is reasonable to assume that people do react in ways, which seem 
odd to others when they are going through the mental health process and, hence, 
such behaviours should not be classified as a symptom of a disorder. Moncrieff 
(2010) reported that this classification process presents serious concerns, because, 
once a psychiatric diagnosis is applied, it is a cue to implement actions of “care” 
presented in the guise of  “treatment,” which largely constitutes “behavioural 
control.” It is this process which causes the relevant social circumstances and 
individual suffering to be bypassed, unexamined and unchallenged (Rapley, 
Moncrieff & Dillon, 2011). ! 
Coping in Those Diagnosed With a Mental Illness 
This section will begin with a review of the literature on coping in 
psychiatric patients and how this differs from the wider community. A series of 
research findings will be reported on which will help to cast light on this contrast. 
Coping has rarely been measured from a general perspective; more often it has 
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been measured in response to specific situations and or stressors, e.g., coping with 
grief, coping with trauma. When assessing ones coping strategies research has 
often made gender comparisons of which particular coping strategies are used by 
one sex or the other. The research conflicts with some research supporting gender 
differences and others arguing that there are no difference. How an individual 
copes in general is important to consider, given the many individual factors that 
come into play during the coping process.  
Gender and Age Differences in Coping 
While there is an abundance of research highlighting gender differences in 
coping amongst people from the wider community, there is little known about 
gender differences in coping mechanisms specifically for those people diagnosed 
with a mental illness. In summary, the literature on coping suggests that women 
seek social support and use emotion-focused coping to a greater extent than men 
(Felsten, 1998; Porter, Marco, Schwartz, Neale,  Shiffman, & Stone 2000; Ptacek 
et al., 1994; Stroebe, 2001).  But there is little research evidence that psychiatric 
samples show any different gender patterns in coping from those seen in the wider 
community.  
There has been little research into coping strategies and age differences 
within psychiatric samples. However, possible reasons why coping in psychiatric 
patients is likely to be a function of age, can be explained through a behavioural 
paradigm. Most patients diagnosed with a mental illness and frequent hospital 
admissions over time develop strategies and ways of coping both with their 
symptoms and the system itself (as will be discussed a little later in this thesis 
under coping with the mental health system). Psychiatric patients along with the 
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wider community also deal with the developmental milestones of life and the 
stressors of daily living (Agar-Jacomb & Read, 2009; Aldwin and Revenson, 
1987; Barnett & Lapsley, 2006). However, psychiatric patients are more likely to 
incur more stressors such as unemployment, poor housing and unhealthy social 
and familial relationships than people living in the wider community which may 
or may not contribute to distress (Barnett & Lapsley, 2006). In Bentall’s (2003) 
book Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature the main aim of his book 
was to highlight as he quotes: “. . . the vanishingly small difference between the 
‘us’ who are sane and then ‘them’ who are not” (p. xiv).  
It is also important to consider that the experience of a hospital admission 
in itself may be something difficult that the patient has to deal with (depending on 
the type of admission involuntary or voluntary, diagnosis given medications they 
need to comply with). As well as coping with a hospital admission, the following 
scenario would be common: the patient might be coping with a relationship that 
just ended, all the friends they have lost, and the job they are struggling to keep, 
along with the money problems that have resulted. They might possibly be coping 
with the unmet expectation of “getting their life back together,” when their life 
has disintegrated. Any new adaptive behaviour that they were using is not likely 
to maintain, since they do not have a life to embed it within and such behaviour is 
not able to be reinforced. For many patients, losing social support and the 
isolation that may accompany a long admission would be added stressors 
requiring coping.  
It is commonly referenced in the psychological literature that people 
diagnosed with a mental illness, such as depression, schizophrenia or anxiety, lack 
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adequate ‘coping’ for managing the challenges of daily living, which at times 
causes these individuals psychological distress (Piccinelli & Wilkinson, 2000; 
Taylor & Stanton, 2007). In addition, there are now a few studies that have 
recognised the need to investigate coping specifically among persons diagnosed 
with mental illness (Keyes, 2007; Tischler, 2009; Yanos, 2001). However, an 
extensive search of past literature indicates that there has been little research into 
evaluating coping strategies in people diagnosed with a mental illness. This 
historical lack of research on coping in people diagnosed with a mental illness 
contrasts with other research, into stress and coping in those caring for an adult 
diagnosed with a mental illness (e.g., Mackay & Pakenham, 2012), that has found 
that coping resources emerged as the most consistent predictor of adjustment. 
Nevertheless, the paucity of research on coping in those diagnosed with a mental 
illness is consistent with the historical tone in the fields of psychology and 
psychiatry, whereby maladjustment has received more attention in the literature 
than positive functioning.  
Before beginning with the research evaluating coping strategies in those 
diagnosed with a mental illness, and within the general community, it needs to be 
highlighted that coping studies conducted in the general community usually 
compare differences between men and women in their ‘coping’ response to a 
particular crisis or trauma or grief, whereas coping research in those diagnosed 
with a mental illness has focused on their use of “maladaptive coping styles.” 
Some limited attempts at research evaluating coping strategies of those diagnosed 
with a mental illness can be seen in the area of adults coping with childhood 
sexual abuse (e.g., Walsh, Fortier & Dilillo, 2010). However, Williams (1999) 
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claimed that histories of abuse are seldom heard within mental health services and 
not from the lack of women wanting to share their stories. It seems many women 
have spent a considerable number of years in and out of mental health services 
without being provided with a safe environment to talk about their experiences or 
with someone who could offer support. This state of affairs continues to occur 
despite research efforts, such as Weich et al. (2009), that have indicated that 
trauma in childhood due to family is reflected in mental health problems later in 
life. In their systematic review of studies between 1970-2008, Weich et al. found 
that abusive relationships predicted depression, anxiety and PTSD (Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder). Such findings justify the much earlier position of 
Page (1900, cited in Shershaw, 1978), who advocated for the moral treatment 
approach, which seems more suitable to these presentations than what psychiatry 
has to offer to date. 
Other coping research has looked at particular coping strategies, such as 
leisure, which help relieve the symptoms of a “diagnosis of mental illness”, such 
as depression (e.g., Nimrod, Douglas & Berdychevsky, 2012); and at the types of 
major and chronic stressors that people diagnosed with a severe mental illness 
experience which influence coping (Robilotta, et al., 2010). Nimrod et al. (2012) 
based their investigation on data from 25 online depression “communities” 
through the Internet. Their study identified four loose themes, these being: leisure 
activities thought to be very beneficial in coping with depression; unhealthy uses 
of leisure (e.g., avoidance, doing nothing); difficulty participating in healthy 
forms of leisure; and that various strategies (e.g., taking one step at a time, time 
management) helped with constraints on the use of leisure to improve ones health. 
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These findings must be interpreted cautiously due to non-random sampling. There 
was an inherent bias in this study towards focusing on those who were more 
inclined to use the Internet and on a group that was more willing to share their 
thoughts online. 
There are also studies on coping that have focused on what types of 
coping styles are most beneficial for people diagnosed with mental health issues, 
such as the study on self enhancement by Taylor et al. (2003a). Ninety-two 
participants (45 men and 47 women) participated in the study that investigated 
just what constituted self-enhancement. The researchers used multiple measures 
of self-enhancement, such as personality assessments (e.g. Eysenck Personality 
Inventory; Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory), interviews (the authors 
listed the areas of discussion but did not state the actual questions they asked the 
participants), friend ratings (friends were nominated by the participant to provide 
information), peer judge ratings of mental health (two people were recruited by 
the authors and provided with instructions on how to evaluate the criteria for 
mental health), and clinician ratings (made by one clinician who was 
“psychoanalytically oriented,” asked to use the Emotions Memory Test (EMT)) 
and then rated his judgements of the participants on a 3 point scale  (1 not very 
confident to 3 very confident)).  
While the overall results of Taylor et al. (2003a) were supportive of a 
linear relationship between self-enhancement and psychological adjustment, with 
a cluster of coping resources, including optimism, mastery, self-esteem, and social 
support, related to multiple indicators of mental health, the results again should be 
interpreted with caution. Taylor et al. (2003a) implied that there was a qualitative 
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element to their study, however, the word “qualitative” was only used in one 
paragraph of the method under the clinician’s ratings of participants. In referring 
to the clinician who carried out the ratings, the authors stated:  
 “He was then asked to attend to qualitative factors such as how the self 
 was represented, how the interpersonal world was represented, the 
 affective tone of the material, whether the memories were narratively 
 coherent or contained inner contradictions (suggesting omissions and 
 distortions)” (p. 169).  
It seems with this study that a myriad of research variables were thrown together 
and that the study was not well thought out. There are procedures, outlined by 
Shenton (2004) and Harper (2013), to ensure trustworthiness in qualitative 
research projects, such as credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability that were not apparent in Taylor et al.’s study.  
Coping Research in Those Diagnosed with Schizophrenia 
Those studies which have been carried out which review coping within the 
sample of those diagnosed with a mental illness have largely focused on 
schizophrenia and how coping in this sample differs to coping within the wider 
community. In assessing research into coping in those diagnosed with the specific 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, the findings suggest that “productive” coping is 
reflective of the number of social supports, as those diagnosed with schizophrenia 
are more isolated and are reported to have “less sophisticated” coping 
mechanisms (Cohen & Berk, 1985; Falloon & Talbot, 1981; Lysaker, Bryson, 
Marks, Greig & Bell, 2004). Some research has reported on patients’ coping with 
being diagnosed with schizophrenia (Rollins et al., 2010); and other research has 
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found that those diagnosed with schizophrenia experience difficulties in coping 
with major and minor stresses (Carr, 1988).  
In another study into coping in those diagnosed with schizophrenia, 
Rudnik (2001) investigated the impact of coping on the relation between 
symptoms and quality of life in those diagnosed with schizophrenia. The author 
postulated that the relation between severity of symptoms and level of quality of 
life in those diagnosed with schizophrenia is not strong. The study set out to 
investigate whether coping strategies help to regulate the symptoms experienced 
and quality of life of the patient. Fifty-eight adult outpatients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, who were recruited from a community mental health centre 
participated in the study.  The patients completed the Positive and Negative 
Syndrome Scale (PANSS), the Ways of Coping Checklist, and the Wisconsin 
Quality of Life Index. While negative symptoms reported by outpatients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia were inversely related to activities of daily living, 
the positive symptoms patients experienced were directly related to distress. The 
overall results confirmed that coping, either problem-focused or emotion-focused, 
did not moderate the relation between symptoms and quality of life, with the 
author advocating for further research into coping in those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia.  
 Subsequently, Rudnik and Martins (2009) re-analysed data from the  
Rudnik (2001) study. Their findings suggested that problem-focused coping was 
not more effective than emotion-focused coping in many circumstances for those 
diagnosed with schizophrenia and that assumptions that applied to the broader 
general population, specifically that problem-focused coping is better than 
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emotion-focused coping, may not apply to this population. The authors also found 
that factors linked to emotion-focused coping, such as the concept of “hope,” may 
be more helpful in many circumstances for individuals who are diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. This last point is useful for researchers investigating the well-being 
and coping of those diagnosed with schizophrenia and, in particular, their choice 
of coping mechanisms, because evaluations usually entail what these patients are 
not doing, rather than what they are doing.  
On a positive note there were two earlier studies that looked at coping and 
subjective experience that showed just how capable those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia were; however, these findings did not transfer into further research. 
One of the earliest studies by Cohen and Berk (1985) looked at the techniques 
those diagnosed with schizophrenia had developed to cope with their 
“symptoms.” The researchers noted that “there was an absence of any systematic 
accounting of these techniques in the professional literature” (p 407). An 
observation that is still current almost three decades later. Cohen and Berk found 
that the methods that people diagnosed with schizophrenia use can be an 
important adjunct to therapy and postulated that techniques successfully utilised 
by patients could be incorporated into psycho educational programs to treat 
patients and their families.  
In their study in Brooklyn 84 outpatients (52%men, mean age 43.3years) 
met the diagnostic DSM-III classification of “schizophrenia” with exclusion 
criteria (not acutely disorganised, agitated, paranoid). Ninety three per cent had a 
previous hospital admission and all patients were taking prescribed neuroleptic 
medications as well as being involved in-group or individual therapy. The patients 
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participated in a 30-minute open-ended interview that asked how they dealt with 
each of the 29 symptoms on a psychiatric symptom questionnaire derived from 
Herz’s list of 29 pre-morbid symptoms commonly reported with those patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
One of the progressive factors of this study was that the main aim was 
targeted at getting the patients to explain those methods which worked best for 
them and that were developed by the patients themselves, although also included 
were techniques they had learnt from professional intervention. Of the 1501 
responses recorded, there was an average of 17.9 methods per patient, with 
fighting back the coping mechanism most frequently reported, indicating that 
those diagnosed with schizophrenia often employed active strategies to subdue 
their symptoms. However, the second most frequent method was “does nothing – 
accepts,” suggesting that many learnt to live with their symptoms and treatment 
regimes. The results also suggested that “medical strategies” were commonly used 
for anxiety and the symptoms usually associated with schizophrenia. The authors 
noted that prayer was used almost exclusively as a coping mechanism for the 
“symptoms” commonly associated with the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Coping 
responses were also noted to vary depending on demographic, social and 
psychological functioning. Employment as a coping strategy allowed those 
diagnosed with schizophrenia to use the coping strategy “fight back” more often 
than those who were unemployed. While there were differences noted between 
males and females in this study, these differences did not reach statistical 
significance. There were also no age differences in responses, suggesting similar 
patterns of coping responses across age in those diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
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The overall conclusions of this study suggested that those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia develop a variety of coping mechanisms to deal with different types 
of symptoms.  
What studies like these show, and what is quite commonplace within 
mental health settings when the more “severe diagnoses” are applied, is that there 
are two very polar opposite “coping” responses to the “illness” of what is termed 
“schizophrenia”. However, the studies demonstrating significant functional 
coping in those diagnosed with schizophrenia are rare. The diagnosis of 
schizophrenia is one of the most highly psychologically inflexible diagnoses, 
because of the treatment regime this diagnosis dictates. There are the restrictions 
to the individual of medication compliance, and the well-known side effects these 
medications carry which patients have to manage. There is also the stigma 
attached to the label of schizophrenia, which affects how these people are 
perceived by others. It is not surprising that some people do nothing, give in, give 
up, which is also seen as treatment compliant, and others “fight back.”  
One study from 22 years ago is also worth discussion, because of the 
findings of the study and how they were reported at the time, which highlights the 
degree of subjective clinical judgment that is often involved in such cases.  
Cutting and Dunne (1989) developed a “standardized assessment” to elicit the 
subjective experiences of patients with the “major psychiatric illnesses of 
schizophrenia” and depression over three stages. The first stage, an open-ended 
interview, covered nine areas of psychological functioning and was conducted 
with three groups of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (acute, remitted and 
chronic) and one group of depressed patients. On the basis of their replies, a 
 50 
structured interview was given to the patients on two separate occasions, 
approximately six months apart, to test inter-rater reliability. The findings 
indicated that for some patients their accounts did not vary much within this time 
period, thereby supporting inter-rater reliability of the interview instrument. The 
authors state “Perceptual dysfunction appears to be the most invariant feature of 
the early stage of schizophrenia, but a qualitative disturbance of thinking also 
occurs” (Cutting & Dunne, 1989, p. 217).  These findings were not elaborated 
upon and “qualitative disturbance” was not defined, which makes a replication of 
this study difficult.  The authors also downplay positive aspects of their findings, 
as they state they were “surprised” at the number of subjects with “good memory” 
and the “clarity” of their reports detailing their first psychotic breakdown, which 
occurred many years after the event. This study demonstrates the assumptions 
held by the researchers that are not unlike some of those held by health 
professionals today, and the stigma associated with the diagnosis of schizophrenia.  
An earlier study by Carr (1988) investigated the techniques for “coping 
with schizophrenia.” Carr developed a questionnaire to assess how non-
hospitalised patients diagnosed with schizophrenia coped with various symptoms 
of their illness. The questionnaire was not a standardised questionnaire, and, 
therefore, was of questionable reliability and validity. The author wrote “all 
patients were administered a questionnaire, the items of which were derived from 
the few empirical studies cited above and anecdotal reports of clinicians and 
patients” (Carr, 1988, p. 342). Carr reported that “about 350” individual coping 
techniques were identified and these ranged from behaviour change, socialisation, 
cognitive control and the use of medical care, as well as behaviours which were 
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likely to have been identified by others as symptomatic of the illness. The results 
were not expanded upon and, obviously, these findings must be interpreted 
cautiously, because the study lacked reliability, due to the type of questionnaire 
developed and the approximations of results provided. A qualitative note is that 
the coping strategies that Carr described people diagnosed with schizophrenia 
used, all seem very sensible and logical ways to manage what is considered by 
some to be a serious illness. Had the instrument been reliable and valid, 
replication by other researchers could have possibly been useful in clinical 
settings.  
In essence, the research on coping in those diagnosed with schizophrenia 
is limited and unreliable. The focus of this research is reflective of the diagnostic 
approaches to the treatment of the illness, with studies investigating more 
medication noncompliance rather than the underlying features of what has 
happened to patients in the past, the meaning of their experience of the illness 
labelled “schizophrenia” and the various coping mechanisms they already have in 
place  (Lysaker et al., 2005; Rollins et al., 2010). These points will be drawn upon 
further within this literature review.  
The Medical Model and Concepts of  “Mental Illness”  
Many of the misunderstandings of patient coping by health professionals 
begin with the ways in which ‘coping’ and so-called ‘normal’ aspects of 
behaviour are defined. The idea of normality originated from the mid-17th century, 
from a Latin base, norma ‘carpenter’s square’ (Oxford Dictionary ). The 
definition of normality in English is, “the condition of being normal; the state of 
being usual, typical, or expected” (Oxford Dictionary). People have been 
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describing this concept juxtaposed with “madness,” which is defined as: “the state 
of having a serious mental illness” (“Madness,” n.d.), for some time. Bracken and 
Thomas (2005) argue psychiatry itself had its origins during the European 
Enlightenment and in the modernist culture that emerged. They believe two major 
themes “preoccupied the thinkers of the Enlightenment period,” (p. 6).  The first 
was the quest for truth by means of human reason, as opposed to religious 
revelation. This was a change from previous styles of thinking. Scientific 
investigation was commended and became the idealized tool for the “revelation of 
truth.” The second was the exploration of the many aspects of what it was to be a 
person, the idea of human rights, and exploration of what made up an individual 
(e.g., personalities) and out of which evolved the need for a “mental” science. 
Thus, psychiatry was born and its focus was on reason and order.  
Bracken and Thomas (2005) believe the enlightenment gave rise to a 
generation that attempted to clear the ‘unreasonable’ elements. Unreasonable 
people, such as those deemed “insane,” were confined in institutions. Porter 
(1987) believes that attitudes to and treatment of those deemed “mad” also 
resulted from a political shift in thinking during this time. This thinking took form 
in the rise of  “exclusion” and “labelling” people as “delinquent” or having 
“dangerous” traits. Furthermore, the emergence of institutions was, as many 
believe (Bracken & Thomas, 2005; Porter, 1987, Read, 2004c), more an act of 
social exclusion, than one of a medical venture. Seen in this way, any behaviour 
could be reconstructed into a symptom of mental illness simply by “expert” 
decree (Read, 2004a,b).  
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It was during this time researchers in the field of psychiatry set out to 
discover the universal laws underlying human behaviour and its causal factors. In 
relation to “madness” and “distress,” however, psychiatry continued to replace 
spiritual, moral, political and individuals’ understandings of madness within the 
framework of psychopathology and brain dysfunction (Read, 2004a). The very 
important aspects of the social contexts of peoples’ lives and the attempts people 
make to alleviate the distress from their lives were excluded from consideration. 
A possible reason for this was provided by Szasz (1971), who claimed that the 
principle problem in psychiatry is the threat of the feared violence of the 
“madman,” and the actual counter-violence of society and the psychiatrist against 
him. Szasz reported that this resulted in “dehumanisation oppression, and 
persecution of the citizen branded mentally ill” (p. xvii). 
It was not until the late nineteenth century that the concept of mental 
illness was defined by etiology by the fathers of modern psychiatry, Emil 
Kraepelin and Eugene Bleuer (see Klerman, 1978). Kraepelin was significant in 
psychiatry as one of the first to approach mental illness in terms of causation and 
etiology using the principles of modern scientific medicine. Although 
“schizophrenia” was not Kraepelin’s term, he and several other European 
psychiatrists combined clinical observations of what they each considered to be 
schizophrenia.  Klerman (1978) clearly indicated that within current psychiatry 
there is a split between mad and normal. The Kraepelinian approach towards 
mental health placed its emphasis on categorizing diseases.  
While most of the debate in the literature concerns the nature and theory of 
disease, implicit in these debates are very practical decisions, such as who will be 
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considered sick, who will be treated within the medical system and under what 
financial umbrella (Bracken  & Thomas, 2005; Klerman, 1978; Read 2004b; 
Summerfield, 2006). 
How the Medical Model Impacts those Diagnosed with “Mental Illness”  
The “medical model” has become a phrase that polarises professions and 
as such the term mental illness is a contested entity. It is for this reason, along 
with the fact that it is often used to justify many of psychiatry’s practices, that the 
medical model is often criticized both within medicine and by other professions. 
Klerman (1978) pointed out that  “the concept of illness is not arbitrary but 
reflects areas of shared consensus, embodying truths arrived at by rules of 
evidence” (p. 107). However, there are the conformists to the medical model and 
the antagonists against –the antipsychiatrists and critical psychiatry movement. 
Closely following are social psychologists, in particular Rosenhan (1973) who is 
critical of the normal/abnormal divide, as what is viewed as normal in one culture 
may be seen  quite differently in another, highlighting that the notions of 
normality and abnormality may not be quite as accurate as they are claimed to be. 
Rosenhan believes the medical model serves to rationalise and control behaviour 
that is “different” or “odd.”  
In 2007 an Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing, 
focusing on the 12-month and lifetime prevalence of mental disorders in the 
Australian population, revealed the following. For anxiety, affective and 
substance use disorder, the survey estimated that “almost half (45.5%) of 
Australians aged 16-85 (7.3 million people) experienced a mental disorder over 
their lifetime. Each year, 1 in 5 Australians (20%) in the 16-85 age range or 3.2 
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million Australians, are estimated to experience symptoms of a mental disorder.” 
The “low prevalence” group, including psychotic illness, eating disorders and 
severe personality disorder, were followed-up through The National Survey of 
Psychotic Illness. Results showed that an estimated 64,000 people in Australia 
aged 18-64 have a psychotic illness and are in contact with public specialised 
mental health services each year. This equates to 4.5 cases per 1000 population. 
This survey found that schizophrenia accounted for almost half (47%) of the 
diagnoses, and people diagnosed with a psychotic illness also experienced poor 
physical health outcomes, such as heart or circulatory conditions (26.8%) and 
diabetes (20.5%). The prevalence of diabetes was more than 3 times the rate seen 
in the general population (Australian Government, Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare, n.d).  
Not surprisingly, the literature indicates that medical interventions 
dominate the treatment of those diagnosed with a mental illness, with drug 
treatment being used as the first line of intervention, neglecting other avenues of 
treatment (Breggin, 1991, 2008; Hansen, McHoul, & Rapley, 2003a; Moncrieff, 
2008).  Moncrieff (2008) refers to the “new drugs” as a “panacea” introduced 
around the 1950’s and 1960’s when the beginning of drug-centered treatment took 
over in psychiatry. Labelling of people as “mentally ill,”  according to Klerman 
(1978), serves to do a number of things: 
. . . reinforces his deviant role within the community, legitimizes his 
isolation from the rest of society, and contributes to the stripping from him 
of his dignity, civil rights, and personal autonomy. Viewed in this context, 
psychoactive drugs are a further extension of medical model labelling. 
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They reinforce the symbolic power of the psychiatrists by giving them 
chemical control, which leads to the further dehumanization of the 
individual, so-called “patient” (p.109).  
Labelling thereby separating people into “mad” and “bad” was considered a major 
humanitarian gain in psychiatry (Bracken & Thomas, 2005; Klerman, 1978). This 
separation has been imprinted onto the psyche of many and, in particular, a large 
portion of the psyche of psychiatry and psychology, despite the weight of 
evidence contrary to the idea of madness.  There has been little consideration 
given to cultural variations in behaviour and what is considered to be normal 
within a particular tribe or society. Therefore, this apparent “humanitarian gain” 
has resulted in dire consequences for people who are being diagnosed and treated 
for a “mental illness”. The recent release of the DSM-V has codified even more 
diagnostic categories, while also loosening the thresholds of some existing 
categories, allowing many more behaviours to be diagnosable.  
One example of the recent change in the DSM-V is the inclusion of a 
category labelled Somatic Symptom Disorders, which some have argued has no 
adequate justification to be classified as a “mental disorder” at all (Frances & 
Chapman, 2013; Sykes, 2012) and is more the result of “problems in living” (this 
reference originally created by Szasz, 1960), such as housing or economic 
problems.  With the new classification system now in place, it is more likely that 
everyday behaviours may be subjected to judgements on a continuum of the ever 
lop-sided continuum of normal-abnormal. Sentiments of Porter (1987) in his 
summation of the history of madness come to mind, when reflecting on the 
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current DSM-V. Porter writes: “Is it possible to be odd, to be strange, in ways that 
still make sense?” (p. 5). 
The unhindered progress of psychiatry means that most parts of being 
human need not be experienced without some form of readily accessible 
psychological or psychiatric help (Bracken et al., 2013; Summerfield, 2004; 
Summerfield & Veale, 2008). The concept of the person within the mental health 
system has changed from one of coping to now one of vulnerability, which, in 
part, is due to the professionals within mental health projecting the meaning of not 
coping onto others (Pupavac, 2001). This has further reinforced the power 
dynamic between the doctor and patient. Few patients question medicine itself, 
with most patients putting their trust in and following advice from doctors, 
psychiatrists and psychologists and, thus, psychiatry remains undisputed. 
The role of clinical psychology as an accomplice to the profession of 
psychiatry within the area of mental health, should not be overlooked. Psychology 
with its many sub disciplines (e.g., social psychology, developmental psychology, 
educational psychology, cognitive psychology, humanistic psychology, and 
neuropsychology) was never originally intended to “treat” madness or “disorder,” 
but rather was partly developed out of the need for classification systems. There 
were of course, those psychologists who were swept up in the birth of  the 
psychoanalytical movement. However clinical psychology has since flourished, 
with its classification systems within mental health, and has put its diagnostic, 
assessment and  measurement tools (e.g., intelligence tests, personality tests) to 
use. These results can and do provide many of the bases of some diagnoses 
provided to individuals today.   
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Hansen, McHoul and Rapley (2003) go a step further in identifying the 
problems with diagnosis in their book, Beyond Help. They state that in all of the 
publications they collected and reviewed, psychological distress was represented 
as “illness” with biological origins and associated diagnostic categories’ 
“symptoms.” They state: 
mental illness was presented as an entity that individuals can have and 
know, at the same time as being distinct from persons as such, in the same 
way that the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) may sensibly be 
separated from the actual person who it infects. The mind is reduced to 
being identical with the brain which, as a bodily organ like any other, may 
become “diseased’”(p. 149).   
Hansen et al. (2003) continue to argue that the psy-disciplines fail to reliably 
identify any underlying processes for these diagnostic groups, yet continue to use 
language, which conveys that these matters are scientifically known. To illustrate 
this, here is an excerpt from an online pamphlet in Australia titled “What is 
schizophrenia?”  
. . . certain biochemical substances in the brain are believed to be involved 
in schizophrenia, especially a neurotransmitter called dopamine. One 
likely cause of this chemical imbalance is the person’s genetic 
predisposition to the illness. Complications during pregnancy or birth that 
cause structural damage to the brain may also be involved” (“What is 
Schizophrenia,” n.d.). 
The terms “one likely cause” are vague constructions, which specify nothing, 
while giving the impression that a chemical imbalance is a known truth of those 
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diagnosed with schizophrenia. These unsubstantiated claims are in circulation 
throughout most hospitals in Western Australia and the implications of such for 
society is that they will continue to perpetuate this false belief that the diagnosis 
of a mental illness are akin to  “diseases.” 
There are now mental health service-user groups in Australia: Australian 
National Association for Mental Health (ANAMH); Australian Psychiatric 
Disability Coalition (APDC); GROW Australia; National ARAFMI; SANE 
Australia, Hearing Voices Network (HVN) and Consumers of Mental Health 
Western Australia  (CoMHWA). The Hearing Voices Network (which is part of 
the Richmond Fellowship) provides a framework and environment, which 
facilitates the recovery of people who experience hearing voices. The network 
educates both sufferers and society about the  “meaning” of hearing voices, which 
is a real experience and not uncommon. The motto of HVN is that the voice 
hearer is asked questions about “what has happened to you,” as opposed to “what 
is wrong with you.” Another service-user group, called Survivors Speak Out, is 
one of the largest groups of British mental health service users. All of these 
groups allow people to access resources and help people to be “heard.” 
Chamberlin (1994) refers to the “Mental Patients’ Bill of Rights,” which she 
helped draw up as her work in the Mental Patients’ Liberation Project in New 
York City. This Bill of Rights was drawn up to provide a voice to many people 
who had negative experiences with mental health services and who were rightly 
so very angry over their mistreatment.  The basic premise of these rights were: 
treat humans as human beings; treat with decency and respect with rights like any 
other citizen; citizens have the right to not be treated like a criminal and not to be 
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locked up against their will; citizens have the right to retain their own personal 
property and the right to bring a grievance to any person who has mistreated them 
(Chamberlin, 1994).   
Chamberlin stated that the Bill of Rights became legal and emphasised 
this point about her efforts: “Does this sound like it was written by people unable 
to tell what is happening to them or able only to articulate “pitful” requests for 
cigarettes or spare change?” (p. 286). The success of support groups depends upon 
a number of factors and, as Crossley and Crossley (2001) pointed out, “the 
formulation of “voice” remains dependent on existing schemas of habitus which 
may shape it in various ways. Simultaneously, however, it depends on the 
existence of audiences and relations of symbolic power which allow it to be 
heard” (p. 1488). However, overall, mental health consumer and support groups 
are effective in that they allow people to share their personal experiences, bonding 
in the commonality of issues which develops empathy towards one another, as 
fears and discomfort are shared along with stories of victory.  
Over 42 years ago Szasz (1971) raised questions about psychiatry’s 
practices being ill conceived within the field of diagnosing mental illness and 
concluded that psychiatry’s practices were particularly destructive to personal and 
political dignity. Today, the concept of mental illness as a myth seems to be 
grasped by more professionals within the area of psychology and psychiatry. 
However as Newnes (2011) in his article, Toxic Psychology, highlighted:  
Despite the profession-generated myth that clinical psychologists are 
determinedly anti-psychiatric, many not only ape medical colleagues in the 
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use of diagnosis or so-called treatment but are also silent when it comes to 
opposing medically defined ills and aid (p. 225). 
Newnes goes on to highlight that there are many critics of psychiatry, many of 
whom are psychiatrists themselves (e.g., Breggin, Healy, Laing).  
In the United Kingdom there is a strong movement, called the critical 
psychiatry movement, which is now well established and influential in the area of 
psychiatry. The critical psychiatry movement could be viewed as a positive 
reframe of the anti-psychiatry movement. The messages of the movement are 
clear and quite uncompromising, as Hallam and Bender (2011) put it, “. . . the 
message of these critical voices (now sometimes called the anti-psychiatry 
movement) was blunt: madness is a product of a mad family or a mad society” (p. 
17).  The critical psychiatry movement aims to bring psychiatry back to a more 
controlled, authentic discipline.  
In a parallel movement, Thomas, Bracken, and Timini (2012) claim that 
evidence-based medicine has brought major benefits in somatic medicine, but the 
benefits are “less clear” within psychiatry. The authors advocate for framing 
mental health problems outside of a technical idiom and including both culture 
and meaning within mental health practice. One of the original arguments for 
including cultural contexts dates back to Kleinman (1977) who contended that 
psychiatric theory excluded cultural variables. Given that the individual is also 
interpretable within a wider social system of relationships, and their own dynamic 
behavioural repertoires, it makes sense that in order to fully understand the person, 
we must also understand these various contexts (Hallam, 2009).  
 
 62 
 
Those Diagnosed with Schizophrenia, Coping Efforts and Treatment 
Modules to Date. 
This next section will review those diagnosed with schizophrenia their 
coping efforts and the historical background of the development of schizophrenia 
and mental illness.  
Studies into those diagnosed with schizophrenia are varied and have 
ranged from the belief that the “symptoms” of  (those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia), were the result of a vitamin deficiency (Hoffer, 1973), which 
improved with an increase in multivitamins; or that is was a dopamine disorder, 
which saw the emergence of neuroleptic drugs (Insel, 2010), but eventually, the 
evidence mounted against these drugs and the dopamine hypothesis itself (Healy, 
2002; Insel, 2010). Then, in 2002, the possibility of a neurodegenerative disease 
was raised (Hyman, 2002), but later Hyman, (2008) abandoned this idea due to 
the findings that there were no simple genomic disorders in psychiatry. As it 
stands now, the most prevalent model within  research suggests rethinking 
schizophrenia as a neurodevelopmental disorder, with psychosis as a late 
preventable stage (Insel, 2010). While theoretically this is how the term 
“schizophrenia” is understood within the research literature, schizophrenia 
remains contested within the research and theoretical, literature in psychology and 
psychiatry (e.g., Breggin, 1991; Boyle, 1990, 2002, 2007; Hallam & Bender, 
2011; Laing, 1960; Larkin & Read, 2008; Moncrieff, 2013a,b; Read 2004a,b,c; 
2005b; Read et al., 2006). As Hallam and Bender (2011) state: “After 50 years of 
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research, a theory to account for the symptoms of ‘schizophrenia’ has yet to 
emerge and may never do so if the concept itself is faulty” (p.224).  
It seems the diagnosis of schizophrenia came about within the discipline 
psychiatry with its classification systems, which classified “symptoms” into 
disorders, which suggest an underlying “disease” (Hallam & Bender, 2011).  This 
practice mimics much of mainstream medicine and poses that those diagnosed 
with schizophrenia be treated in much the same way as a physical disease, such as 
diabetes, might be treated within medicine. Indeed, the diagnosis of schizophrenia 
is viewed as being on the “severe” spectrum of “mental illness”, therefore 
implying a posed risk to “self” and “others,” and this big label carries with it some 
rather heavy duty medication regimes.  
So firstly, it must be questioned why the label “schizophrenia” is still 
being used alongside its prescribed treatment regimes, even though it is heavily 
contested. Moncrieff (2013b) acknowledges that even within mainstream 
psychiatry “. . . that the label is applied to people with a variety of different 
problems” (p. 13). But the label “schizophrenia” is rarely challenged within many 
inpatient psychiatric facilities and the diagnosis along with the medication 
regimes are used routinely, while patient coping attempts are overlooked.  
Secondly, as Hallam and  Bender (2011) also note, because  the “cause” of  
“schizophrenia” remains unknown, the likely assumption is that its origin is 
somehow genetic and, therefore, no therapeutic work is offered to such patients. 
What is known about those diagnosed with schizophrenia is that  around 25 per 
cent of  all those diagnosed with schizophrenia recover entirely and remain 
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recovered for good (Shean, 2010). Therefore, for some diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, the entire experience resolves.   
There is substantial evidence suggesting that environmental causes such as 
childhood trauma and family have a significant impact on those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia and there are evidence-based practices for suitable treatment of 
such causes (Shean, 2009, 2010).   Moreover, with the inconclusive findings 
about the symptoms of a diagnosis of schizophrenia, it is unhelpful to cast an 
impression that this diagnostic criteria is at all credible, and at the minimum, those 
presenting with symptoms that fall into this “so-called diagnostic category” 
should be provided with the same care and available therapeutic treatments as 
others. Unfortunately, to date, the appropriate care and therapeutic treatment are 
often lacking and medication is the first port of call, and may be all that is offered 
to most patients to help them “cope.”  As Moncrieff (2013a) claims, people have 
been using psychoactive substances since the beginning of time to stop pain and 
suffering. It has only been in the last few decades that people have been 
“persuaded” that taking psychiatric medications is a “remedy for an underlying 
disease” (Moncrieff, 2013a, p. 19).  
Within inpatient psychiatric populations, medication compliance is a 
constant tension, particularly in relation to those diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
But even beyond this diagnostic category, medication compliance has become the 
major driving force in many inpatient psychiatric facilities in Western Australia in 
terms of patient management, while the expressions of patients’ attempts at 
coping with their “illness” go unnoticed or are seen as combative. Perusal of any 
inpatient medical file (or outpatient for that matter), especially of a patient 
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diagnosed with schizophrenia, reveals daily records of noted “medication 
compliance.” 
Compliance with medications also weighs heavily on patients’ minds, as 
seen in Hallam and Bender’s (2011) description of the patient David. David’s 
awareness of and frustrations with the side-effects of  the chlorpromazine he is 
required to take whilst an inpatient. Patients are constantly weighing up the pros 
and cons of taking their medications. The pros usually being: to please doctors, 
possibility of an early discharge and the thinking that if they could only take the 
medication “long enough” and “consistently,” (over several months is the 
specified date on the deport fact information sheet for patients (see “Sane 
Australia: Antipsychotic Medication,” 2010),  they may realise the “true benefits” 
of the medication in the “hope” that medication may eventually cure them “one 
day.” On the other side of the dilemma is “weighing up” the “cons,” which consist 
of mainly the well-documented side effects of taking antipsychotic medication. 
This decision is a constant challenge for patients diagnosed with schizophrenia 
and is problematic when there are known alternative evidence-based treatments 
such as counselling and CBT (see Shean, 2009, 2010).  
Another additional problem here is that in Australia, if the patient happens 
to be sectioned under the Western Australia Mental Health Act (1996), they 
become “involuntary” and lose all of their decision making when it comes to 
treating their illness. They are required by law to take their medications, which 
has further implications as to whether or not they will be discharged from the 
inpatient psychiatric facility, because “usually medication compliance helps.” 
Sometimes patients are monitored by a community nursing team, which changes 
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from time to time and involves being administered depot medications during 
home visits. Although with most depot injections now, patients are required to 
attend the hospital or clinic for the injection to ensure “medication compliance.”  
The administration of depot medication as a form of medication compliance is not 
for this literature review, although it is important to document, as it involves the 
powers of the authorities and the complete loss of control patients have over their 
treatment regime and access to alternative mainstream treatments.   
In Western Australia an involuntary status is hard to shift and requires 
third and fourth opinions of psychiatrists. The process can be quite a lengthy and 
traumatic one for a patient, who is usually already suffering a great deal.  The 
psychiatrist is often faced with the responsibility of making a decision, which 
involves assessing the “risk” factors for both the “patient” and “society.” This is 
never a straight forward process and an unfortunate position for a psychiatrist to 
be in, with many negative ramifications of wrong decisions (see Brown, 2012).  
The fallout from such occurrences, according to Rose (1996), is really of 
psychiatry’s own doing. Rose claims psychiatry saw itself as a “know how” of 
conduct of the 19th century and, as such, was “intrinsically bound to changing the 
ways in which human beings have tried to govern themselves”(p. 3). Psychiatry 
developed systems and judgements about conduct and techniques for acting upon 
behaviour to “improve” human behaviour. In addition to psychiatrists are the 
many allied professionals or psy-professionals, as they are sometimes referred to 
(see Newnes, 2013), such as clinical psychologists, social workers, nurses, 
occupational therapists, general practitioners and so on, who also act as advisors 
of mental health and who can also act to maintain the status quo (Newnes, 2013).  
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Rose (1996) argues that the development of the psy-complex has greatly 
broadened the range of available mechanisms and sites for the social regulation of 
disorder. Rose states that this had led to the profession being “caught up within a 
culture of blame, in which almost any unfortunate event becomes a ‘tragedy’ 
which could have been avoided and for which some authority is to be held 
culpable”(p.4). This then places political expectations upon the professionals 
working in the mental health field and has all sorts of implications, for instance, 
the need to work within a model of risk assessment and to judge patients 
accordingly.  
A literature search in the area of psychiatry reflected that many studies 
strongly advocate for medication compliance by those diagnosed with  
schizophrenia, with most of these studies purporting that medication 
“noncompliance” is a severe problem, causes a “relapse of symptoms” (see 
Rettenbacher et al., 1999) and needs to be addressed (Fenton, Blyer, & Heinssen, 
1997; Gardiner & Hill, 1994; Rettenbacher et al., 1999).  Some studies often 
report recruiting relatives to “ensure medication compliance” (see Rettenbacher et 
al., 2004).  However, what is absent in these studies is the patients’ experience 
regarding the many reasons they chose not to take their medication. One such 
reason for non-compliance recognised in the literature is the side-effects of typical 
anti-psychotics (such as obesity, cardiovascular disease, type II diabetes, 
decreased life expectancy, blurred vision, dry mouth, trembling, constipation, 
brain damage,  and tardive dyskinesia (loss of control over movements of the 
mouth, tongue and sometimes other parts of the body), which have been clearly 
documented by researchers and clinicians and are a serious threat to patient well-
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being (Breggin, 1991, 2008; Healy, 2013; Moncrieff, 2008, 2013a,b; Ozbilen, & 
Adams, 2012; Reynolds & Kirk, 2010; Tschoner, 2007).  
One of the main arguments for the use of antipsychotic medication has 
been that they reduce the “symptoms” of psychoses, such as paranoia, confused 
thinking, delusions, and hallucinations. On many patient fact sheets (see: “Sane 
Australia: Antipsychotic Medication,” 2010),  taking an antipsychotic is seen as 
quite a simple process, comparable to people who take medications for asthma, 
diabetes, and high blood pressure. But research has shown that antipsychotics do 
not usually improve the quality of life for patients in most cases, and the side 
effects of the drugs can be a source of distress.  Puscher et al. (2006) investigated 
adherence to medication and quality of life in people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. The authors used a multicentre randomized control trial with over 
409 subjects. They found no direct relation between medication adherence and 
quality of life. Their conclusions suggest, rather than focus on medication 
adherence researchers, clinicians should be focusing more on symptomatic 
impairment, global functioning and medication side effects. Existing medical 
research over the last decade has little to show in the way of “miracle cures” or 
solutions to some of the many side-effects antipsychotic medications carry.  
Almost completely overlooked are the causal factors behind “symptoms” 
to psychoses in those diagnosed with schizophrenia, which Johnstone (1999, 
2011) and Read (1997) refer to as the trauma (sexual abuse and physical abuse, 
and deprivation/neglect). Johnstone (2011) argues that those presenting with 
“symptoms” of schizophrenia should be offered the same sorts of psychological 
therapies, which are afforded to others, who do not present with similar symptoms. 
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Again, the researchers have also neglected to include the meaning behind the 
experience of the “illness” many of these people are managing with daily. 
Fortunately, there are professionals out there in the medical field (Breggin, Healy, 
Moncrieff) who are revealing the truths about medications and their side effects, 
and these people are gathering quite a momentum. Moncrieff (2013a) highlights a 
disturbing fact in that antipsychotics, which were once reserved for only the more 
severe cases, are now prescribed to treat minor ailments, such as sleep disturbance 
and depression.  Moncrieff refers to the increased dispensing of antipsychotic 
medication as “the newest opium of the people” (p. 21). 
Boyle (2002) notes that the need for schizophrenia to exist is important in 
psychiatry, because it drives medication regimes. Boyle believes this is due to the 
never-ending quest to find a cure for this “complex disorder,” while in the 
meantime, acknowledging that “its signs and symptoms may change.” Boyle 
states that it is evident within the framework in which schizophrenia is understood 
that there is still a reluctance to consider that the medical profession is 
pathologising psychotic behaviours and experiences and not seeing them as 
relational. Despite the fact that psychotic behaviours and experiences appear in 
social and interpersonal contexts, and “that their form and content are given 
meaning by those contexts” (p.316). It is not surprising that the relational meaning 
of behaviour is bypassed in mental health settings, given that the first line of 
treatment for those who are diagnosed with schizophrenia is medication. 
According to Boyle (2002), the application of medication to reduce symptoms 
began simply because nobody knew how to produce a cure.  
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Hallam and Bender (2011) describe a vivid example of how these 
scenarios play out in their book, David’s Box: The journals and letters of a young 
man diagnosed as schizophrenic, 1960-1971.  They discuss the harrowing details 
of David’s life and family history, in particular the loss of David’s mother who 
committed suicide, which nobody talked about in David’s family.  David was 
provided with neuroleptic medication as treatment, despite the fact that family 
therapy was very much in use in the 1960’s and acknowledged the links between 
unhealthy family dynamics of persons diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
Undoubtedly, the continued pathologising of psychotic behaviours in the absence 
of relational meaning is preposterous, given the amount of alternatives and theory 
that exist in relation to the treatment of those diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
The mental health field has created many sophisticated treatment 
strategies with a base of clinical knowledge which have inadvertently neglected to 
take into account the personal resources and meaningful strategies used by people 
diagnosed with mental illness to sustain coping ability and strength (Tepper, 
Rogers, Coleman & Maloney, 2001).  
Literature Review in Those Diagnosed with a Mental Illness  
This section will review those studies carried out on coping in those 
diagnosed with a mental illness and, in parts, will specifically focus on those 
diagnosed with schizophrenia as this sample has been the focus of many research 
articles on coping. While comparisons will generally try to be made with how 
coping in psychiatric patients differs from coping in the wider community, it 
needs to be mentioned that the two samples are dealing with a very different set of 
life circumstances. Most inpatients and community psychiatric patients, just by 
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being diagnosed with a so-called mental illness, face a set of challenges and 
adversities that they need to manage and navigate – e.g., schizophrenia and the 
stigma, medication regimes and side-effects. Therefore, a comparative analysis is 
near impossible, because, these are not situations generally people living in the 
community are facing on a daily basis.  
Religion as a Coping Mechanism 
This section will highlight where my position on religious coping differs 
to a number of theorists and researchers in that they do not consider the functional 
utility of religious coping for those diagnosed with a “mental illness.” As 
discussed several times throughout this thesis, coping within those diagnosed with 
a mental illness focuses heavily upon what the person is not doing rather than 
what they are doing. The types of coping often reported in the literature are more 
a descriptive portrayal of the coping response (e.g., particular coping strategies) 
rather than an evaluation of the functional utility of the type of coping an 
individual uses.  By functional utility of  coping, I mean its ability to adequately 
provide for its intended purpose – e.g., does the particular coping do and achieve 
what the individual intended it to? There are already a myriad of descriptive 
“coping strategies” that researchers have identified. However, as described earlier, 
unless an individual’s overall coping is understood within their context, the 
entirety of  an individual’s coping may be bypassed.  
Sullivan (1993) carried out a large qualitative study, which investigated 
religious types of coping. He investigated the relationship between spirituality and 
those diagnosed with a “severe mental illness” with 40 participants who were 
consumers of mental health services. Sullivan found that half of the psychiatric 
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outpatients perceived their spiritual beliefs and practices as crucial to their 
psychiatric improvement.  The author reported that spirituality served as an 
effective buffer against negative life events, was a source of social support for 
some and provided a sense of meaning and coherence to their lives. Therefore, 
religious coping provided both a coping strategy for an individual and an 
additional functional utility.  
Therefore, if religious coping features within the coping repertoire of an 
individual, it could well serve as both a coping strategy such as praying to God, 
and attending church, and have a functional utility. That is, it could be seen as a 
way of problem solving, or the incorporation of  the congregation as a source of 
social support akin to a surrogate family. As Sullivan (1993) suggests: 
 “… the role of spirituality as a framework can help people understand 
 various life events such as death and provide meaning in one’s life” (p. 
 128).  
Seen in this way, religious coping provides an interpretive framework for the 
individual to make sense of their existence, and this, in itself, is a way of coping. 
To elaborate on this point further, Sullivan suggests that when religion/spirituality 
is seen as a “coping process,” it can potentially lift individuals of their burdens in 
that a higher power is employed for guidance and assistance in times of need. 
Sullivan claims that in his study coping strategies such as “prayer” were a crucial 
part of the patients lives, which by its utilisation offered functional utility, as seen 
in the excerpt below: 
 “I can pray and ask the Lord to get rid of the voices and to help me relax” 
 (p. 129).  
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Therefore, an individual’s spiritual/religious life might be a very important 
variable to consider in coping with day-to-day activities and might determine 
what helps an individual.  
Gettis (1987) in his article, The Jesus Delusion: A Theoretical and 
Phenomenological Look, reviewed the writings of  Karen Horney and Alfred 
Adler, which emphasised that the Jesus delusion was more than just “craziness.” 
Gettis suggests that so-called delusions offer solutions to an individual’s problems 
and can provide relief from negative emotions and engender feelings of positive 
emotions, such as joy and importance. But, it is not always the case that religious 
beliefs are seen as helpful within a psychiatric framework. More often than not, 
they can be misinterpreted as symptoms of the so-called disorder of schizophrenia, 
as opposed to a series of behaviours with functional value. 
Many researchers and theorists have conflicting views about the role 
religion serves in those diagnosed with mental illness. Some even go as far as to 
suggest that religion “detracts” and “worsens” those patients who become 
preoccupied with religious thoughts. While some research has provided evidence 
for religion as a positive coping  strategy for some people diagnosed with a 
mental illness, many patients’ attempts at using religious coping are still 
misdiagnosed as “symptoms of a disorder.” This is particularly evident for people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. Szasz (1974) wrote on this state of mental health: 
“If you talk to God, you are praying, If God talks to you, you have schizophrenia. 
If the dead talk to you, you’re a spiritualist; If God talks to you, you are a 
schizophrenic” (p.113). Within the area of mental health the images and thoughts 
and the role of spirituality are seldom viewed positively or seen as being seen of 
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importance (Sullivan, 1993).  Sullivan states that this can be due to the very 
individualized nature in which people describe their faith and practice. This 
perspective then implies very different functional utility for people, but this view 
is seldom considered within psychiatric frameworks.  
The roots of the intertwined nature of religion and “madness” revert back 
to the  identification and prosecution of witches in the 1400s (see Karaemer and 
Sprenger’s account cited in Read, 2004. p. 13).  The manual, Malleus 
Maleficarum (1486), was used to achieve this purpose, and the questions it 
contained, and subsequent information gathered, over time became known as 
“truths,” and its effects were long lasting, not unlike diagnostic manuals today. I 
refer to this briefly to re-iterate a necessary and related point, also made by 
Moncrieff (2008), namely that, if there are no equally powerful groups to 
challenge so-called “truths,” then false knowledge eventually becomes established 
as real knowledge.  
Another account, illustrated by Yap (1960), refers to the term “Possession 
Syndrome” in the mix of generating an accurate diagnosis of a presenting issue. 
Yap carried out an analysis of 66 Hong Kong Chinese in-patients who were all 
“showing symptoms of possession in varying degree” (p.114). Interestingly, and 
reflective of the time, the characteristics predisposing to “possession” were being 
female, being divorced and female, being widowed and female or being a 
concubine, along with being illiterate and from low occupational background and 
low social status. Yap detailed that many of the cases of “possession syndrome” 
were people suffering from “pseudo-psychotic hysteria,” symptoms that were the 
result of real environmental difficulties, different cultural backgrounds, and the 
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belief or absence of belief in possession, and other sources of evil. What is 
interesting about this older study is that although it investigates the “phenomena 
of possession” and puts a diagnostic angle to the presenting complaints, Yap took 
into consideration the many variables (behaviour, contextual cultural), which 
influenced the phenomena of “possession”. He reported on the outcomes of the 
study explicitly so they reflected behaviour and cultural context, something that is 
missing in much of the mental health literature to date.   
McAll (1971) also acknowledged the role of spirituality and makes 
mention of case studies which detailed accounts of people becoming “freed” from 
their apparent “madness” through exorcism or religious beliefs. Unfortunately, 
today in the area of mental health, if you are not coping and happen to be admitted 
to a psychiatric facility and you speak of the Bible and God in ways which others 
may term “religiose,” you may be viewed as displaying a symptom of 
schizophrenia.  
Most of the studies investigating religious coping in those diagnosed with 
a mental illness are of samples comprising mainly those with diagnoses of 
schizophrenia. However, individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, major 
depression, have been found to use more religious forms of coping over other 
forms of coping and this has been mainly attributable to their overall loss of hope. 
Over the past few decades an increasing number of research studies have explored 
the relationship between the role of religion, spirituality and mental health.  
The use of religion as a way of coping is not a “new” phenomenon, as 
documented above. Recent research has demonstrated that religious belief can be 
an adaptive coping mechanism for people diagnosed with mental illness (Ano & 
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Vasconcelles, 2004; Bergin, Masters, & Richards, 1987; Crossley, 1995; Koeing, 
2009; Pargament, Koeing, Tarakeshwar, & Hahn, 2004; Ruchita, Parmanand, 
Dandeep, Kumar, Malhotra & Tyagi, 2011; Phillips & Stein, 2007; Smolak, 
Gearing, Alonzo, Baldwin, Harmon, & McHugh, 2013; Sullivan 1993). A few 
studies highlighting the literature on the use of religion as a coping strategy are 
discussed below.   
Certainly, there are supporters of the position that religion contributes to 
schizophrenia, such as Borras et al. (2007). They examined how religious beliefs 
and practices impacted medication compliance and illness representations in those 
diagnosed with chronic schizophrenia. In a sample of 103 stabilized, diagnosed 
chronic schizophrenia patients (87 men, 13 women, and 3 unknown gender), 
several religious groups were represented: 58% were Christians, 2% Jewish, 4% 
Muslim, 14% Buddist, 14% belonged to “minority religious movements,” and 
19% had no religious affiliation.  The authors reported that two thirds of their 
sample considered spirituality as an important part of their everyday life, although 
the patients who reported religious representations of patient illness were “less 
compliant” to medication adherence. Borras et al. discussed these findings as 
“problematic,” in the context of adherence to medication treatment regimes. This 
was mainly because the use of religion and spirituality shaped patient attitudes, 
they believed, in an “unfavourable” way towards the use of medication. However, 
the very efforts patients used to manage their difficulties were ignored. A more 
worrying conclusion made in the Borras et al. study was their recommendation 
that clinicians develop a “shared representation of illness” to increase medication 
compliance.  
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Tepper et al. (2001) carried out a study to examine the prevalence of 
religious coping among people diagnosed with “persistent mental illness” and to 
gain a preliminary understanding of the relationship between religious coping, 
symptom severity and overall functioning.  A total of 406 individuals diagnosed 
with a mental illness, who were patients at 1 of 13 mental health facilities in Los 
Angeles, completed a survey consisting of the Religious Coping Index, the 
Symptom Checklist 90-R (SCL-90), the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) 
and a 48-item demographic questionnaire. The results revealed that more than 80 
per cent of the participants used religious beliefs or activities to cope with daily 
difficulties or frustrations, highlighting, yet again, that religion is a well-utilised 
strategy for people diagnosed with a mental illness. 
Ruchita et al. (2011) measured spirituality/religiousness and its relation to 
coping skills in patients with diagnoses of “residual schizophrenia”. The study 
was a cross sectional design with 103 patients who were assessed on the positive 
and negative syndrome scale (PANSS) and the Ways of Coping Questionnaire, to 
gauge their repertoire of coping skills, and then on the WHO Quality of Life-
Spirituality, Religiousness and Personal Belief Scale (WHOQOL-SRPB) to assess 
religiousness and spirituality. The results showed positive reappraisal as a coping 
strategy had significant positive correlation with all facets of WHOQOL-SRPB. 
Positive re-appraisal was a dimension described by the authors as giving positive 
meaning to a situation by focusing on one’s personal growth experience. The 
results indicated that a spiritual, religious or personal belief system is associated 
with active and adaptive coping skills in people diagnosed with “residual 
schizophrenia.”  
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Finally, Curlin, et al. (2006) reported on a study in which they interviewed 
49 health care providers from 6 faith-based and 4 secular community health 
centres to explore the way their own religious beliefs transferred over to the 
community members from minority patient populations. The results revealed that 
having an understanding of religious content helped the staff relate better to 
patients and understand patient behaviours. Such positive associations between 
religious understanding and relations with patients lend support to Lamba and 
Ellison’s (2012) emphasised that psychiatrists must take the findings that religion 
can have positive mental health effects seriously.  
Coping in Psychiatric Patients  
Overall, as detailed above, there has been very little research detailing the 
complexities of what coping may be for those diagnosed with a mental illness. 
Certainly, given the many problems with diagnostic formulations, many of the 
existing research findings are questionable. This next section to follow will 
review the literature which helps to shed light on studies which are mostly 
qualitative in nature and also help to highlight the ways in which coping research 
has failed to address the overall experience of what coping may be for individuals 
diagnosed with a mental illness. The two areas, which will be highlighted here, 
are: “coping with mental health services” as much as “coping with 
distress/unusual experiences.”   
To date, there have been relatively few qualitative studies on coping in 
those diagnosed with a mental illness, despite the fact qualitative data can reveal 
more information about context, meaning and the coping process (Tischler, 2009).  
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Utilising qualitative forms of investigations enables the “humanity” in coping to 
emerge and helps researchers grasp the various individual factors associated with 
coping, as this information is lost in the categorization of coping as adaptive or 
maladaptive. To generate more meaningful research, Tischler suggested the use of 
qualitative methodologies in marginalised populations. The approaches 
commonly used in qualitative research in those diagnosed with a mental illness 
have ranged from assessing certain outcomes and interventions of programs (e.g., 
Barnett & Lapsley, 2006; Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2006), to patient views and 
satisfaction with mental health services (e.g., Goodwin, Holmes, Newnes & 
Waltho, 1999; Turner & Newnes, 1993). Others have conducted qualitative 
investigations into the types of major life and chronic stressors that people with 
severe mental health issues face (e.g., Robilotta et al., 2010). However none have 
actively addressed using a qualitative approach to what the experience of coping 
might be for those diagnosed with a mental illness.  
 Coping with Distress and Unusual Experiences 
It seems fitting to begin this section with an excerpt from a man who 
really summed up what exactly “the origins of unhappiness” might be as he 
offered a more appropriate answer to the understanding of “distress.” David Smail 
(1993) in the introduction to his book The Origins of Unhappiness- A New 
Understanding of Personal Distress, Smail outlines why there really are no 
simple solutions and encourages:  
“Instead of looking inward to detect and eradicate within ourselves the 
 products of ‘psychopathology’, we need to direct our gaze out into the 
 world to identify the sources of our pain and unhappiness” (p.1).  
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Smail (1993) believes the current systems focus too much on “symptoms of 
illness”, “faulty cognitions,” instead of investigating what could be wrong with a 
social world which gives rise to these forms of suffering. He explains that 
individuals may from time to time conduct themselves “pathologically,” however, 
at their outset they remain “innocent victims of social pathology rather than 
harbourers of some kind of psychological abnormality” (p.1).  
 As Moncrieff, Dillon and Rapley (2011) state “Madness, misery and 
distress are experiences that – as far as we can tell – human beings have always 
faced” (p. 256). However, over the last 200 years coping with distress and/or 
unusual experiences is now a mutual shared experience with medical expert 
specialists knowing best. This is, of course, much worse for those people who are 
diagnosed with a mental illness, as opposed to the wider community, because with 
an involuntary admission to hospital,  an individual forfeits their right to moderate 
or cope with the behaviour in a way they choose to and often a way which is 
helpful to them.  Having so-called expert opinion make judgement on what is 
deemed “normal” has impacts on the understanding of self. This notion of 
“normal” is also heavily intertwined with expert opinions weighing up the risks as 
potential danger that needs to be managed (by means of medications or therapy) 
all in the name of social security (Rose, 1996). This is to say that currently it is 
perceived by many that distress and unusual experiences are best understood 
within a “specialist body of knowledge” (Moncrieff et al., 2011, p. 257). As 
discussed earlier, the notion of  “threshold” sparks debates on what actually 
constitutes an unusual experience or what levels of distress are clinicians using to 
gauge how one is coping. A case in point is psychosis. Psychotic symptoms in 
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clinical samples have been shown to occur on a continuum (Straus, 1969). Straus 
formed this conclusion after collecting data from interviewing “119 acute 
psychiatric patients” for the World Health Organization International Pilot Study 
of Schizophrenia. He states “. . . evidence relative to the rating of delusions and 
hallucinations describes continua of experiences, not discrete phenomena.” (p. 
581). Straus (1969) further argued: 
“conceptualizing hallucinations and delusions as points on continua rather 
 than as discontinuous entities also allows for more accurate evaluation of 
 the vicissitudes of these symptoms in a given patient over a period of 
 time”  (p. 581).  
This focus, however, has not been the case in psychology and psychiatry, being 
heavily influenced by individualistic accounts of paranoia and other forms of 
distress (Cromby & Harper, 2009). But as Cromby et al. (2013) note: “…we use 
‘distress’ as a generic term to refer to all the phenomena and experiences that are 
sometimes called ‘psychopathology’ or ‘mental illness’”(p. 9). This way of 
conceptualising distress is problematic because it overlooks the role of the 
environment, social context of the individual and again brings the focus back onto 
the individual, and something within them that may cause this distress. In 
psychiatric settings this can sometimes have the adverse effect of interpreting 
individual’s talk of distress/unusual experiences as nothing more than “symptoms 
of an illness” (Cromby et al., 2013). Much of the actual experience of the 
individual is neglected and overlooked, rather than being a process where 
attention could be drawn to noticing the links between peoples distress and the 
circumstances of their situations. These approaches have impacted on how an 
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individual’s coping is understood within both the psychiatric framework and, to a 
large degree, also in the wider community. A better way to understand distress 
would be to look at patterns of activity and experience, which are helpful or not 
helpful to the individual in the individual’s social and cultural context. Finally, it 
is not just the actual experiences and accounts, but the meaning they have for the 
individual. As Smail (1993) suggests, this level of understanding lifts any 
“abnormality” connotation and helps an individual to understand his or her own 
experience as valid.  
As discussed previously, a diagnosis of schizophrenia, or depression for 
that matter, is really quite an unreliable description of people’s problems and 
experiences. Understanding each person in terms of the unique influences on their 
development and, especially, their relationships with other people provides further 
insight into how people might deal with difficulties in their lives. Researchers 
(e.g., Bracken & Thomas 2005; Double, 2006; Kinderman et al., 2013; Moncrieff, 
2008; Summerfield, 2005; 2012a) have also emphasised the importance of 
recognising meaning in order to understand psychiatric disturbance and to aid 
recovery.  Kinderman et al. (2013) suggested that focusing on and trying to 
understand peoples’ “problems in living” (Szasz, 1960) in the same way as bodily 
diseases excludes the individual “meaning” in peoples’ responses and experiences. 
This focus on bodily disease prevents people from developing the insight into 
how they might apply their own coping resources to dealing with their difficulties.  
An example of a study that detailed patient accounts of their problems was 
a study by Estroff, Lachicotte, Illingworth and Johnston (1991). They carried out 
a qualitative, longitudinal investigation of 169 people diagnosed with severe 
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persistent mental illness from two large psychiatric hospitals. The sample (53% 
female) was relatively young, with the mean age being 28, and 80% of the sample 
falling within the 18-35 year age bracket. The researchers aimed to describe how 
and why some of these individuals became formally designated as disabled (i.e., 
became recipients of disability income), while others did not. They hypothesised 
that an individual’s self labelling and ideas about illness might influence their 
willingness to occupy a sick role and, thus, contribute to different outcomes over 
time. Their findings reflected that patients’ understandings of their problems, 
more than a formal psychiatric diagnosis, have a strong influence on their views 
of themselves. In addition, the authors concluded that self-labelling was 
influenced by many factors that were mainly contextual, experiential and 
sociocultural in nature. This study represents a strong example of a way to 
research how one copes.  
The value of qualitative investigation into those diagnosed with a mental 
illness is further emphasised in the work by Harper (1996; 2013). Harper (1996) 
took a deconstructive approach to previous qualitative investigations of those 
diagnosed with schizophrenia and highlighted how the phenomena of paranoia 
came about. Paranoia is often seen as an associated symptom of the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, personality disorder and delusional disorder in the DSM-IV. 
Harper discussed how, even though his belief in paranoia was suspended, this did 
not reflect that he did not believe in the reality of emotional suffering. Certainly 
within mental health settings, there is an assumption that if you deviate away from 
traditional medical protocols, then you will possibly “miss” vital information. 
Harper pointed out that “distress is always mediated through concepts which are 
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historically and culturally contingent” (p.425). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
other researchers have concluded that the approach of diagnosing delusions is not 
particularly reliable or valid (Bell, Halligan,  & Ellis, 2003, 2006).   
Harper (1996) also discussed reification of form over meaningless content 
and that the classification systems of the DSM-IV paid little attention to the 
“content” of the phenomena and more attention to their “form,” transforming 
behaviour into “symptoms.” According to Harper, this transformation frequently 
occurs within mental health inpatient facilities. As a consequence, patients’ 
interview content, that is, what is talked about in the course of a diagnostic 
interview, becomes rearranged into a belief, which, in turn, may be converted, if it 
meets certain diagnostic criteria, into a ‘delusion.’ As such, Harper advocated that 
discursive approaches are one way of overcoming some of the problems within 
this area of mental health, because such approaches are non-individualistic. Such 
approaches look at the discourse used, by whom, what interests are involved and 
the positioning of the individual within these interests. In focusing on what is 
actually said (the discourse) and on the possible functions of what is said, and not 
making the focus entirely about the individual, a discursive model bridges the 
pathological/normal divide. This approach then puts certain texts, like that of 
paranoia, in a forum that is culturally available to many, rather than only to a 
minority of  so-called “abnormal” individuals. This type of approach is one 
solution to the current problems facing mental health systems within western 
societies.  
An example of bridging the pathological/normal divide is a study carried 
out by Wise (2004) on CBT, psychosis and attributions of irrationality. Wise 
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claimed that contemporary psychiatry and psychology view voice-hearing as a 
symptom of psychotic illness. This view is thought to be maintained and 
perpetuated by the collusion of professionals who pay attention to the lived reality 
of the voice-hearers’ experience. When Wise analysed the transcripts of voice-
hearers, it was found that these individuals presented as “rational people” and 
were “rational conversationalists.” Through the transcripts, a degree of  
“privilege” can be seen, which is locally afforded to a professional version of one 
of the participant’s voice-hearing experiences. Wise suggested that, through a 
close analysis of actual therapy talk, diagnosed ‘schizophrenic’ patients might be 
seriously underestimated by their professional ‘helpers,’ both in their ability to 
interact socially and in their cognitive capacities.  
A recent study by Ziolkowska (2011) investigated the discursive 
representation of mental health problems during the first psychiatric interview. 
The author aimed to analyse patients’ and doctors’ discursive representations of 
mental health problems during this first interview. Sixteen psychiatric interviews 
were recorded over a 12-month period within three psychiatric hospitals in Poland. 
Each interview was the first encounter between the doctor and patient and was 
recorded by a separate doctor. The interviews were transcribed and the analysis of 
the representations of mental health problems was conducted on the part of the 
interview where the main complaint and the history of the present illness were 
discussed. The results demonstrated that the doctors constructed illness 
manifestations mainly in terms of existence and possession, e.g., the existence of 
medical symptoms and personality traits, whereas patients constructed illness 
manifestations in terms of action, as dynamic and contextualised processes. 
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Ziolkowska reported “Doctors’ static picture of illness manifestations eliminates 
the possibility of exploring the complicated relationship between patients’ and 
their problems” (p. 123). This finding supports Boyle (2002) assertion that too 
often the patients’ experience is seen through a diagnostic medical paradigm, as 
opposed to being seen in the contexts in which they occur.  
Coping With Mental Health Services 
It is of no surprise that dissatisfaction with mental health services that has 
arisen over the years. Hudson (1999) states: 
“The late 1950s and the 60’s saw a strong civil and human rights 
 movement emerging and growing in many countries and the movement 
 was appalled at the often inhumane and corrupt psychiatric services. In the 
 60’s and 70’s  inmates of the psychiatric hospitals emerged from their 
 incarceration with horrific individual testimonies of the conditions, the 
 barbaric treatments, the brutality…” (p. 136).  
As discussed previously there are now the service user movement, which 
has brought about patient advocacy groups and it is now common practice to have 
patients’ councils. While overall there have been some major shake-ups and 
positive shifts within mental health systems, there are also other sets of 
circumstances relating to mental health services that patients have to “cope with,” 
such as long waiting times, a number of medical appointments, the negative 
attitudes sometimes displayed towards those who are diagnosed with a personality 
disorder (Cromly et al., 2013) and the stigma of attending such services.  Along 
with these, some patients feel that their treatments are not working, e.g., 
medication and its adverse effects, which they also have to cope with.   
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Within mental health systems there are people who receive treatment from 
psychiatrists or clinical psychologists who, indeed, do not want this. Either their 
behaviour is distressing for others around them or their behaviour breaks the law 
in some way, leading them to receive treatment they otherwise did not want. Not 
always is there malice behind the identification of distress by others. Some are 
attempts to keep the person safe from themselves and/or others. Nevertheless, 
once an individual becomes part of the mental health system, they do lose a 
certain degree of power and autonomy, which produces another set of problems. 
To follow are a set of studies and their important findings which look at patient’s 
views of mental health services.  
A good representation of the views of inpatient service users is presented 
by Goodwin et al. (1999) who examined the views of 110 patients in adult 
inpatient psychiatric services in a large rural county in England. Over a 4-year 
period, semi-structured interviews reflected 13 themes detailing the prominent 
issues for inpatient service users.  These themes reflected that the hospital 
environment had an influence on patients’ psychological well being and that both 
the formal and informal methods of the hospital system employed to control 
patients made patients feel powerless. The patients also reported that hospital 
policies had an impact on their well-being, with patients reporting that they 
appreciated being able to do basic things which were not usually permitted, such 
as taking a phone call in the nurses’ office.  One theme reflected the patients’ 
appreciation of staff that took the time to talk and listen to their concerns, 
although the patients preferred more formal forms of talking, as in counselling. 
Basic codes of conduct, such as respect, caring, and sympathy, were reported to 
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help patients’ sense of well-being. Many negative themes reported by patients 
centred around: feeling imprisoned within the hospital; a lack of information 
regarding their own treatment by helping professions, including their medication; 
a lack of informed consent; a lack of information about the effects of medication; 
and lack of practical help.   
The findings suggested that service users’ dissatisfaction outweighed the 
favourable components of their experience and their overall satisfaction with the 
institution. Goodwin et al. (1999) raised a concern which is relevant today within 
psychiatric hospitals in Western Australia, namely that, the intentions which 
create policies for psychiatric facilities are rarely the practice experienced by 
psychiatric patients. On the basis of these findings, the researchers advocated for 
more humane and caring practices within psychiatric institutions. However, they 
acknowledged that even with the best intentions of procedures and practices, this 
was still perceived by some service users as “coercive.” 
The strengths of the Goodwin et al. (1999) study lay in the more humane 
nature in which the research questions were based and the methodology used. One 
of the advantages of this study was that the authors controlled for bias, which 
arises if interviews are carried out by people directly involved in patient care and 
treatment.  The interviewers were trainee clinical psychologists and psychology 
undergraduate students. The confidential treatment of patient information in the 
study was also very important, as often patients can shy away from answering 
difficult questions, if they believe that information will go back to their 
psychiatrist or treating team. Importantly, the methodology of qualitative 
interview in this study afforded the patients flexibility in their responses.  
 89 
While it is no surprise that patients were disenchanted with psychiatric 
services, other issues raised by Goodwin et al. (1999) over 13 years ago are still 
relevant, namely, the “slow-turning wheels” of the health service, concerns about 
privacy, and lack of information in relation to medication. Goodwin et al. reported 
that the patients in their study were not informed about the full effects of their 
medication and not provided with an understanding of their rights within such 
systems, a finding which is alarming. Many years later, things are still the same 
within most mental health facilities in Western Australia, despite best research 
efforts highlighting the issues patients have raised.  
What may seem to be progress, such as informing patients about the 
various medications they are to be placed on, including side effects of medications, 
some of which increase the tendency to suicide (see Busch et al., 2010, Creaney, 
Murray & Healy, 1991; Healy & Aldred, 2005), may not really be progress. 
Currently, most patients can recite verbatim the names of the medications they are 
on and the side effects they suffer. This, in part, is due to two main reasons, firstly, 
the ease of accessible information via the internet and through service-user groups, 
and secondly, the increase in knowledge along with the “medicalization” of  their 
language around what constitutes a mental illness. For example, what is 
astounding within current dialogues of some patients (a point raised later in the 
case studies) is the language employed by patients, which is learnt through being 
a long-time psychiatric inpatient. 
Many patients can recite verbatim the names of prescription medications, 
although few have “real knowledge” about the effects of such medications or 
reasons as to “why” they are taking them. They have only their personal 
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experiences of side-effects, which vary from person to person.  The questions 
must be asked: Is having more knowledge about medications progress? Is this 
change? Or are we just producing better informed, more aware service users, with 
exactly the same problems and “enabling” sickness roles and “illness” models, 
much the same way we were 40 years ago?  
An example of a qualitative investigation into both patients’ experiences 
of mental distress and their experiences of mental health services was carried out 
in New Zealand by Barnett and Lapsley (2006). Forty young adults, between the 
ages of 18-29, were administered an interview schedule developed by the 
researchers. Although the report claimed to cover the broader spectrum of mental 
health, it focused primarily only on the phenomena of psychosis, in particular, 
“first episode psychosis” and recovery groups associated with this particular 
diagnosis.  
 Although consistent with discursive interpretations of  those diagnosed 
with a mental illness,  Barnett and Lapsley (2006) noted “a problem” in their 
recruiting process, in that some service users who were diagnosed with “non-
psychosis” diagnoses reported seeing themselves as just experiencing an array of 
personal and social difficulties, rather than “suffering a mental illness.” The 
authors acknowledged that it would have been better not to use the term “mental 
illness,” as this imposed a conceptual framework over young adults’ mental health 
experiences. This is a good point and is interesting in that it provides some insight 
into how these people saw themselves and their difficulties and how they were 
reluctant to categorize these difficulties on an abnormal spectrum.  
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Barnett and Lapsley (2006) used a combination of a thematic analysis and 
the NVivo qualitative data analysis software, a technical aid for conducting 
qualitative analysis, to identify themes in the study. The patient narratives 
demonstrated a range of childhood and teenage experiences of adversity and 
trauma that occurred prior to the development of the mental health problems. 
These narratives also reflected key themes under this broad category, such as: lack 
of a safe family atmosphere, feeling unsafe at an emotional level, parents with 
drug and alcohol issues, loss and abandonment issues, school and peer difficulties, 
and use of drugs and alcohol to cope with problems.  
Another area relating to mental decline and subsequent help-seeking and 
mental health crises also emerged. The key themes here were: a sustained build up 
of emotion from childhood; traumatic stressful life events compounding the 
earlier experiences; and a series of significant life events in close succession.  The 
crises leading to an inpatient admission was another area identified that reflected 
the following key themes: negative experiences of the inpatient environment; 
describing nursing staff in acute units; associating with other service users in the 
unit; safety for women, sexual harassment and sexual abuse in acute units; 
treatments with a focus on medication and the absence of talking therapies; the 
need to be somewhere; leaving hospital and returning. In summary, Barnett and  
Lapsley reported that the participants had developed narrative relationships with 
mental health services that were ostensibly designed to help them on the road to 
recovery. This first inpatient experience gave an initial flavour, often a “sour 
one,” to their subsequent understanding of services, their understanding of what it 
meant to have a mental illness and their role as service users.  
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Barnett and Lapsley (2006) also examined the ways in which the 
participants experienced, tried to make sense of and found their way around 
mental health services. The researchers described that around 25% of participants 
reported merely surviving day-to-day following their experiences with mental 
health services, around 50% reported moving forward, taking concrete steps, but 
many were suffering the residual effects of the disruption that the experience with 
mental health services had caused in their lives. Finally, 25% reported  living well 
in the presence or absence of a diagnosed mental illness. This study also revealed 
two strikingly important aspects of mental health services and recovery, namely, 
the voice of the consumer and the significant impact of mental health services on 
the service user. The notable conclusions from the study were that, firstly, some 
patients chose to identify with problems in living, rather than as having a 
diagnosable mental illness, and, secondly, that the contact with a service was not 
pleasant, because the disruption was felt for some time after their contact.  
What is evident throughout the qualitative studies reviewed is that there 
are similar themes in all the qualitative research conclusions. Specifically, 
“problems in living” as noted by Szasz (1960) as being the causal factor patients 
report as contributing largely to their difficulties, and that patients usually prefer 
to identify with “problems in living” rather than a diagnosis of mental illness; the 
admission to a mental health facility was traumatic in nature and there were long 
lasting emotional reverberations of an admission, and fear around medication and 
its ineffectiveness.  
Beyond initial first contact there is another issue which plagues the mental 
health services for those people who have had prolonged contact with services. 
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This is the development of “psychiatric patienthood,” which is the experience of 
being a patient, which can take on an identity of its own. Psychiatric patients who 
have had a number of hospital admissions and received numerous amounts of 
medications can sometimes become fixated in ‘psychiatric patienthood.’ 
Summerfield (2001a), in his article The Man who had 42 Psychiatrists – and 
Rising- a Memorable Patient, discussed the difficulty of shifting paradigms for 
patients who were very embedded in ‘psychiatric patienthood.’ He described a 
case study and the difficulty associated with trying to help a client move away 
from psychiatric patienthood to coping as “an ordinary citizen,” concluding that, 
for most long term service users, this paradigm shift is difficult. Even while 
trialling the new paradigm for a while, it seems psychiatric patienthood is a well-
conditioned phenomena, with most patients eventually returning to “psychiatric 
patienthood.”  
The Meaning of Coping in Psychiatric Patients 
While these qualitative studies have highlighted the difficulties which face 
those diagnosed with a mental illness, there has been little direct research on how 
these people “cope” and the meaning of coping for them. Boyle (2011) suggested 
that it is important to consider the impact of peoples’ life experiences and their 
unique environments, which are a known major cause of emotional distress.  
According to Boyle, psychology and psychiatry must give credence to “context” 
in the role of peoples’ lives. Individual factors also need to be taken into 
consideration, as people differ in how much pain they are prepared to feel and, 
subsequently, what requires their coping efforts.  
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Regrettably very little progress has been made in these areas to date. In the 
context of drug taking, in particular taking an antidepressant medication, Rowe 
(2003) made a valid point and one that is familiar in many clinical presentations: 
There is no pill which can change the memories of an unhappy childhood 
into memories of a happy one; or turn an unhappy marriage into a happy 
one; or fill the person who takes the drugs with a permanent, unshakable 
self-confidence. . . . make the person you love love you; or create a secure 
peaceful world; or banish death (p. 223).  
Rowe further explained that a reduction in awareness, such as taking an 
antidepressant medication can provide time and space from the issue/s at hand, 
however, such action will not solve the actual problem. Only the person in their 
complete state of awareness, and with their insights, can cope with and solve their 
difficulties.  
The systemic infrastructure surrounding the term mental illness in the 
guise of “help,” e.g., the forever expanding world of  psychiatric and 
psychological therapies (Pierre, 2012), places more emphasis on vulnerability and 
less on the strengths of an individual, and, in this way, can be harmful to personal 
coping attempts. While this is not the case for all patients, there are individuals 
becoming more reliant upon such services and possibly for the wrong reasons. 
There has been a significant increase in the number of people diagnosed with 
depression, however, it is unknown exactly how many of these people are actually 
depressed. Within Western Australian psychiatric systems, mainstream 
‘psychology thinking’ is, in some cases, as ‘medical model’ as mainstream 
psychiatric thinking. Both, in practice, see the mind as if it were an organ, which 
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can reveal itself through a technical intervention.   Boyle (2011) in her review on 
psychiatry and psychology believes that both disciplines are responsible in 
converting distress and problem behaviour to ‘symptoms’ and ‘disorders’ and she 
believes that this is one of the purest avoidance strategies within psychiatry. Boyle 
does not exempt psychology from this process either and holds psychology 
accountable for its great many ‘intra-psychic’ approaches, which usually 
characterise people using mental health services with ‘abnormalities’.  
There are certain individuals who have endured considerable distress, for 
which the utilisation of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) would be 
insufficient to assist the patients’ concerns in its entirety. Aspects of the CBT 
approach, in particular its “change your thinking” approach, implies at a level that 
by changing thoughts, a myriad of problems in one’s life may be overcome 
(Elderman, 2013). This approach, to a certain extent, may render the most 
distressed patient powerless in their own process and often, when therapy fails to 
assist, from clinical experience, it can also leave patients disheartened and with 
thoughts of “failure.”  There are aspects of CBT that are useful, such as reframing 
ones thoughts and situations in order to help understand triggers for various 
feelings, and the behavioural aspects of engagement in more pleasant activities. 
Although CBT as a stock standard inpatient therapeutic tool alone, again focuses 
on the individual and not so much on the context of individuals. The reality is that 
for many people who have suffered childhood trauma, or people from war torn 
countries seeking refuge, CBT approaches alone in some cases will not offer 
suffice explanations, as such people have endured a journey that alters mind, body 
and spirit.  
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Boyle (2011) believes the CBT approach fails in its persistence to focus 
on the present, particularly in the framework of “triggers” which bring about the 
negative experience for a person. This lack of emphasis on the “past,” and the 
historical context of presenting problems, does not fully acknowledge distress.  
The psychologising of everyday problems into major mental health 
problems is not promotive of coping. For example, in Australia, accessing 
“psychological help” has never been easier through the “Better Access” schemes, 
whereby people can receive discounted psychological intervention via their 
general practitioner. Through a Mental Health Care Plan, for up to 10 
government-subsidised psychological sessions per calendar year (originally up to 
18 per calendar year, but in 2013 was cut to 10), people can enjoy a myriad of 
cognitive behavioural interventions to help them overcome many “disorders.” 
Australia is not alone in providing such access. In the United Kingdom there was 
the Layard (2006) initiative to increase access to psychological therapy, because 
anxiety and depression are now seen as the major causes of misery in the United 
Kingdom today, without there being any real investigation into the real causes of 
misery for people.  
Summary 
In summary, I will now bring clarity and state what can and cannot be inferred 
from the literature as it exists.  This thesis aims to shed light and knowledge to the 
area of “coping” in those diagnosed with a mental illness. This area to date has 
been under researched within psychology and psychiatry.   
Firstly, in relation to coping theory, it is well recognised in the many 
research studies evaluated for this PhD that Lazarus’s theory (1966, 1999) is the 
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so-called grandfather of the coping literature and his position is still current in the 
coping literature. His  position still considers that coping thoughts and actions 
under stress must be measured separately from their outcomes, in order to 
examine independently their adaptiveness or “maladaptiveness” for the individual. 
This is the same position the current thesis holds. This PhD considers the context 
of coping, which sits comfortably within Lazarus’s theory, in that whether a 
coping process is good or bad, adaptively speaking, depends on the particular 
person, the specific type of encounter in the short or long run, and the outcome 
modality being studied, for example moral, social functioning or somatic health.  
This thesis aims to demonstrate that there may be no universally good or bad 
coping process, though some might more often be better or worse than others. 
Measuring coping attempts as a success or failure is problematic within 
psychology and psychiatry and does little for individual improvement in 
functioning. Measuring an individual’s failures may inadvertently convert patient 
distress or “unusual experiences” into “symptoms of a disorder” rather than as 
behaviours occurring as a reaction to living circumstances, relationships, etc. 
Therefore, the environment plays a large role and coping is best seen within its 
context, as opposed to occurring within the individual. 
The way coping has been researched and understood in the past has been 
problematic in the area of mental health, and is not fully understood and realised 
within the professions of psychology and psychiatry, with current research yet to 
enable researchers to move forward in understanding psychiatric patients’ 
accounts of what coping means to them. There is only one known study by Cohen 
and Berk (1985), which attempted to look beyond the current medical paradigm in 
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terms of exploring the methods patients employ to control distress. When research 
is evaluated from both community and psychiatric samples,  it appears that the 
research in the community samples has focused on the differences in coping 
strategies, in particular with university populations. By contrast, coping literature 
in psychiatric populations has focused on what those people diagnosed with a 
mental illness are not doing. In particular, those diagnosed with schizophrenia 
have dominated this research section, yet there is ambiguity in research findings 
(see Cohen & Berk, 1985). Religion as a type of coping strategy has been mostly 
overlooked and portrayed rather negatively in many mainstream psychiatric 
settings and the literature. It is proposed in this thesis, that the incorporation of 
religion as a coping strategy may be effective for psychiatric patients, and, indeed 
the wider community, because it provides an interpretative framework for a 
person to make sense of their existence, and this, in itself is a way of coping.  
“Coping” as it stands within psychiatry and psychology, in terms of those 
diagnosed with a “mental illness,” is a set of “symptoms” of an “illness” and 
involves “treatment.” This approach is not helpful or, in fact, even useful, if the 
context of the presenting problem is not acknowledged and understood.  As 
detailed previously in this chapter, this view of coping within a psychiatric 
population is heavily connected to the medicalization of everyday problems and 
the large role the “medical model” plays within psychiatry. Individuals are “seen” 
within this “medical framework” and, thus, symptoms are seen as occurring 
“within the individual” with much focus on the “abnormal, ” without reflection 
into the social environmental and familial contexts. The “hardest hit,” so to speak, 
are those who end up with “big” diagnoses, such as “schizophrenia” and  
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“psychoses,” because they are treated predominantly within a medical framework.  
This approach bypasses the meaning of coping for an individual, which ultimately 
invalidates their entire experience. There is little attention within the literature on 
coping regarding how psychiatric patients cope with unusual or distressing 
experiences and also how they cope with being a patient within the mental health 
services of Western Australia. These points need serious re-examination, because 
the meaning of the coping experience as it stands, both theoretically and 
practically, does not do justice to the complexity of what coping might be for 
psychiatric patients. A truer understanding of the many meanings and themes 
around coping, therefore, needs to be explored.  
In the research evaluated it is difficult to get a single view or approach to 
the meaning and measurement of coping in a psychiatric population.  What we 
can infer from the literature reviewed thus far is that the term ‘coping” has been 
used in many different ways and it does not lend itself well to drawing 
comparisons from study to study. However, this deficit also has been seen in the 
nature of coping research, primarily due to the inconsistent use of the term 
“coping,” and the ways in which the dimensionality of coping has been measured 
and analysed.  
There is an extensive amount of research within psychiatric populations 
devoted to “those diagnosed with schizophrenia” of which all studies are, by 
definition, fundamentally flawed, given that as others have concluded, all 
psychiatric diagnoses are moral judgements (pace Szasz). Many of the ‘coping 
strategies’ per se have been construed rather negatively in those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia without any thought given to the functional utility of these 
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strategies in the context of their environments.  One can not infer a coping 
strategy is ‘maladaptive’ or ‘unproductive’ without reference to the environment 
in which it is used and the outcome for the individual.   
To date there is no clear data on what constitutes coping in a psychiatric 
population or a clear set of functional ‘coping strategies.’ This is possibly due to 
the problems of coping being a multi-referential lay construct. Boyle (2002) 
viewed the label schizophrenia in the same way and cautions about the problems 
associated with using lay concepts in the way in which they were not intended. 
Coping is one of these, especially as the familiarity of this word means that it can 
mean different things to different people. However, for the researcher, it may, as 
Boyle (2002) states, “blunt our critical faculties” (p. 8),  when it comes to 
assessing the construct.  
While possibly not as problematic for understanding coping in the wider 
community, it is within the area of mental health that, clinically, many patients’ 
attempts at coping are going unnoticed and, instead, coping efforts are being 
misinterpreted or ignored. The verdict from inpatient mental health service users 
of hospitalised therapeutic assistance is not at all complimentary. The evidence 
has established that psychiatric patients find the healthcare system less than 
supportive of their 'coping' efforts. Moreover, there is considerable evidence of 
the stigmatizing effects of being a "psychiatric" patient in the first place. In 
searching for a way forward we need to relinquish the diagnosis and labelling 
associated with “poor coping.”  A more sensible approach might be to ask people 
about the sorts of things they find difficult to manage in their lives, and then, 
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based on this information, work backwards to understand the “meaning” and then 
provide, if necessary, the required “help.”  
Throughout this chapter, an attempt has been made to convey the concept 
of coping as multifaceted. Moreover, the emphasis has been that in order to fully 
understand what the concept of coping means for those diagnosed with a mental 
health disorder, coping within these contexts around the term “mental illness” 
needs to be understood. The concept of “coping” or “not coping” has been 
understood by various people to mean different things, as evidenced by the way 
religious coping is viewed in those diagnosed with schizophrenia. What is clear 
across the literature on coping is that the understandings of what coping means to 
the profession are dependent upon the prevailing ethos of the times. Other 
influencing factors are vested in the bias of the profession as it is shaped by 
culture, politics and economics (Smail, 1993). What is also evident throughout all 
the historical literature is that if information is relayed over and over for a period 
of time, regardless of its reliability and validity, it forms a “truth,” and these truths 
get woven into the fabric of society and form part of the way we live, unless 
severely disputed. As Summerfield (2004) noted, the Western version of the self 
has gone from one of resilience and strength to one of vulnerability and requiring 
help.  
It would seem that the assumptions that psychiatry and psychology make 
about “coping” do not do justice to the complexity of what coping might be. In 
the literature there are those who heavily contest the use of a diagnostic paradigm 
and heavily contest diagnoses, especially schizophrenia. The actual daily 
experience of being a patient is largely absent from mainstream psychology and 
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psychiatry. The central question I put forward in this thesis is whether it makes 
sense to measure coping, and, if so, whether it can be measured in a way that adds 
meaning to coping for these patients. What we have seen so far that is built into 
the current measurement of coping is a set of very difficult and very problematic 
assumptions about “mad” people and their lives. These assumptions beg the 
questions: Are there more constructive ways to think about coping in those 
diagnosed with a mental illness? And how can we better understand the social and 
cultural factors contributing to the concept of coping? Can we find ways of 
helping that do not implicitly accept medicalised explanations of the reasons 
contributing to poor coping in those diagnosed with a mental illness?  
Investigations into the meaning and measurement of coping for those 
diagnosed with a mental illness have, to date, not asked individuals genuinely 
how they are coping and what coping means for them. Questions such as, “What 
things do you find the most difficult to deal with in your life? Are there any 
particular situations that you find difficult to manage? What sorts of things do you 
do to manage difficult situations? When do you use the (various) approaches you 
have described and which works best? And when do the other approaches work 
best?” As Boyle (2002, 2011) strongly urges, “Stop with the avoidance 
strategies,” i.e., ignoring context and converting distress into symptoms of 
“disorders,” and start to ask people genuinely how they are coping and what 
coping means for them. This clarion call has provided the impetus for the current 
thesis.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Measurement of Coping 
Preamble 
There are many issues to consider when measuring the concept of coping, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. For example, how coping is defined determines 
what type of coping is measured, e.g. a coping strategy vs a coping style. The 
measurement scale is also of importance, because a scale with a number of 
response options is likely to capture a range of coping, as opposed to forced-
choice response sets whereby coping strategies could be missed. Coping can also 
be measured in relation to a specific event versus coping with a situation in 
general. In summary, the literature details various studies that have used very 
different coping scales and methodologies, which make statistical comparisons 
difficult. However this could also reflect the very difficult nature of measuring a 
concept like “coping.” 
This chapter aims to address some of the issues in the measurement of 
coping and the way coping has been measured (breadth, dimensionality, 
variability and generality of coping measures), what constitutes good validity, 
along with a review of the major coping scales currently used presently within 
psychology and psychiatry.  
Important Issues in the Measurement of Coping 
The measurement of the concept of coping mirrors the theory of coping, 
and, thus, two major approaches have led the way. Steed (1998) in A Critique of 
Coping Scales (1998) refers to two major debates in the assessment of coping. 
The first is whether coping should be conceptualised as a trait-like personality 
 104 
characteristic or as  state-like response to a specific stressor. The second is over 
the use of general scales, as opposed to situation-specific scales, to measure the 
construct of coping.  
Both approaches carry with them assumptions about the different ways 
coping is thought to occur, with the trait approaches towards coping tending to 
assess coping traits and trait styles rather than processes. Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984) define coping traits as: “…properties of persons that dispose them to react 
in certain ways” (p. 139). For example, researchers who have measured coping 
from a trait perspective have used measures such as the NEO-Five Factor 
Inventory (FFI) to assess personality related to health outcomes. As discussed at 
length in Chapter 2, the problems with intra individual approaches is that they do 
not taken context into consideration. As the literature currently stands, the most 
extensively used measure of coping (e.g., WAYS) is based upon Lazarus’ theory 
of stress and coping.  
Researchers in the coping field urge those measuring coping to consider 
issues such as  stability, generality and dimensionality (Schwarzer & Schwarzer, 
1996).  Stability refers to the consistency of an individual’s coping behaviour over 
time. Generality refers to assessing whether people apply the same strategy when 
they face different situations. Dimensionality refers to the way coping strategies 
are grouped on the basis of purpose, meaning or functional value, for example, the 
way coping has sometimes been referred to as either problem-focused or emotion-
focused (Billings & Moos, 1984; Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). The dimensionality 
of coping has been acknowledged by several authors (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, 
Lazarus, 1966, 1999, 2000. Lazarus (1966) discusses the multidimensional nature 
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of the coping concept and concludes that there are many aspects to measuring 
one’s coping behaviour, which underestimate the complexity and variability of 
coping efforts. Steed (1998) also acknowledges the difficulties with creating 
discrete categories for coping and the disagreement occurring within the literature 
over the optimal number of categories. 
Steed (1998) also recognises that choosing a scale for a specific study is 
difficult and the researcher is faced with a number of coping measures from which 
to choose and whether to choose specific or general measures of coping.  Specific 
scales  are designed for specific types of stressful situations, such as trauma, 
marriage, parenting, finance (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978), and are less likely to be 
applicable to a variety of situations. For this reason the use of general measures is 
preferable. The advantages of general measures are that they allow the 
comparison of a number of coping strategies across various stressors. However, 
the reality is that neither a specific nor a general scale is likely to capture the 
whole coping repertoire and some coping strategies may be missed. Currently, 
researchers (e.g., Frydenberg & Lewis, 1994; 1997; Schwarzer & Schwarzer, 
1996) widely concur that individuals may generalise their coping strategies across 
situations to a certain degree and possibly reapply these strategies at a later 
occasion. However, individual differences play a large role when generalising 
coping responses.  
The variability in the measurement of coping and gaps in the research on 
coping make it difficult for direct comparisons between studies to be made 
(Endler & Parker, 1990; Felsten, 1998; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Keyes, 
2007; Ptacek, Smith & Dodge, 1994). Indeed, the methodological shortcomings of 
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most coping scales reflect more basic underlying conceptual problems regarding 
the coping construct (De Ridder, 1997).  For example, coping checklists 
encompass too narrow a conception of coping, resulting in incomplete and 
distorted measurement of coping (Coyne & Gottlieb, 1996). Therefore, a 
combination of both qualitative and quantitative measurement is likely to more 
effectively measure coping overall, than reliance on a single scale.  
“Good validity” of a Coping Scale 
A coping scale is valid if it measures what it is intended to measure in the 
specific study. Given that self –report measures have been used widely in the 
measurement of coping, the extent to which such measures predict actual coping 
behaviour has been investigated. Research has shown that there is a moderate to 
high probability that coping style scores accurately relate to the use of behavioural 
strategies in response to both physical and psychological stressors (Miller, 1987; 
Steed, 1998).  But, existing coping measures differ in a number of important ways.  
Any particular instrument generally reflects how coping is defined, the theoretical 
assumptions employed and whether the coping that it is attempting to assess is in 
relation to a particular stressor or not.  Generally, the instruments developed 
reflect the complex nature of the measurement of coping and the validity of a 
scale is study specific and therefore, must be considered each time the particular 
coping scale is chosen for a new study. This ensures “good validity” of a coping 
scale.  
An Overview of Coping Scales 
Designing coping scales to measure every element of the coping repertoire, 
which is multidimensional, multi-layered and individual is a difficult task. Despite 
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this, there has been a surge in new coping instruments, reaching almost saturation 
point. This thesis used the definition of coping as a process and, therefore, only 
scales that also were based on this definition will be reviewed in this chapter.  
Choosing a scale to measure coping can be difficult and researchers face 
many problems with this decision.  Steed (1998) recommended choosing scales 
that minimise some of the problems commonly encountered with coping scales. 
Specifically, Steed suggested that items should be evaluated for content confound, 
and possess equal numbers of cognitive and behavioural items, consider the 
possibility of ceiling effects, use more than one response format and that 
researchers should define the coping period when writing instructions for 
respondents. As discussed, when conceptualising coping as either problem-
focussed or emotion-focussed, it is important to take into account that less 
threatening stressors may reduce emotional distress and, similarly, when 
emotional arousal is managed well, the individual’s resulting efforts at problem 
solving will be smoother. Steed (1998) suggests that a particular coping strategy 
may carry out further functions, that is, it may serve to fulfil varying functions for 
other individuals in the same situation, or varying functions for the same 
individual over time. In effect, Steed suggests that it is the individual involved 
who determines the functional nature of coping and inevitably, this poses a 
challenge for the measurement of coping based solely on quantitative scales.  
As with most concepts such as “quality of life,” “stress,” and “coping,” a 
number of instruments have been designed to measure them. In the last 20 years 
there has been a profusion of scales developed to measure coping. More recently 
(2010-2013), there has been a surge in coping inventories designed to measure 
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specific aspects of coping in those diagnosed with schizophrenia. An example of 
one such scale is the Heidelberg Coping Scale for Delusions, designed to measure 
individuals coping with a symptom under the label of schizophrenia. Just to 
demonstrate how awry this has all become, two tables below will demonstrate the 
entirety of coping instruments in the literature to date. The list, is of course, not 
all-inclusive, however this review has concentrated on the major coping scales 
used in the area of mental health. Cohen (see Monat & Lazarus, 1991, p. 231) 
provided a historical table, which allows the reader to see which measures were 
developed and used prior to 1991. These measures are presented in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 
Coping Scales From 1959 to 1986 Adapted from Cohen (1991; cited in Monat & Lazarus, 1991). 
Scale Reference 
Coping-Avoidance Sentence Completion Test 
Rorschach Index of Repressive Style (RIRS) 
 
Repression Sensitisation Scale 
Modified Repression-Sensitization Scale 
Defense Mechanism Inventory 
Goldstein (1959) 
Gardner et al.(1959);  
Levine and Speivack, (1964) 
Byrne (1961) 
Epstein and Fenz (1967) 
Gleser and Ihilevich (1969) 
Cohen Avoidance-Vigilance Interview Cohen and Lazarus (1973) 
Denial Scale 
Coping-Defense Measure 
Repression Style Index 
Ways of Coping Questionnaire (WAYS) 
Coping Measure 
Coping Flexibility 
Assessment of Coping Modes 
Hackett and Cassem (1974) 
Joffe and Naditch (1977) 
Weinberger, Schwartz, and Davidson (1979) 
Folkman and Lazarus (1980) 
Billings and Moos (1984) 
Kemeny (1985) 
Cohen et al. (1986) 
  
 
A summary review of the literature over the last two decades revealed the 
following additional coping scales, shown in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 
Coping Scales From 1986 to 2013 
Scale Reference 
The COPE Inventory (COPE)  Carver, Weintraub, and Scheier (1989) 
Multidimensional Coping Inventory (MCI) Endler and Parker (1990) 
Religious Coping Activities Scale (RCAS) Pargament (1991) 
The Adolescent Coping Scale (ACS) Frydenberg and Lewis (1993) 
Coping Styles Questionnaire (CSQ) Roger, Jarvis and Najarian (1993) 
Ways of Religious Coping Scale (WORCS) Boudreaux, Catz, Ryan, Amarai-Melendez, 
and Brantley (1995) 
Coping Scale for Adults (CSA) Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) 
Religious Coping Scale (RCOPE) Pargament, Koeing, and Perez (2000) 
Coping With Surgical Stress Scale (COSS) Walter (2000) 
Depression Coping Self-Efficacy Scale 
(DCSES) 
Brief Resiliency Coping Scale (BRCS) 
Perraud (2000) 
 
Sinclair and Wallston (2004) 
Coping Attitudes Scale (CAS) DeJong and Overholser (2007) 
Paediatric Cancer Coping Scale (PCCS) Wu, Chin, Chen, Lai, and Tseng (2010) 
Adolescent Religious Coping Scale Bjorck, Braese, Tadie, and Gililland (2010) 
Youth Coping in Traumatic Times (YCITT) Paasivirta et al. (2010) 
Perceived Ability to Cope With Trauma 
(PACT) 
Bonanno, Pat-Horenczyk, and Noll (2011) 
Mindful Coping Scale (MCS) Tharaldsen and Bru (2011) 
Heidelberg Coping Scale for Delusions Ruckl et al. (2012) 
Problem-Focused Style of Coping Scale (PF-
SOC) 
Chang, Lan, Lin, and Heppner (2012) 
Meaning Focused Coping Questionnaire  
(MFCQ) 
Gan, Guo, and Tong (2013) 
Student Coping Scale Boujut (2013) 
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The above coping scales in Table 3.2 reflect the recent contributions to the 
measurement of coping in the literature, for example, The Meaning Focused 
Coping Questionnaire (MFCQ). A review of the MFCQ’s factor analytical results 
suggests that the scale measures a dimension that the authors consider to be 
coping but is, in fact, different from coping, that is, the way an individual 
evaluates a situation and reconciles their beliefs and goals in relation to that 
stressful situation. This scale appears to be measuring something other than 
coping, as constructed by theories of coping within the current psychological 
literature (Folkman & Lazarus, 1984; Lazarus, 1966).   
In addition to the psychological and psychiatric scales, a number of other 
scales with low psychometrically measured reliability, have been devised to 
measure coping over the last two decades, particularly in the area of nursing such 
as: Depression Coping Self-Efficacy Scale (DCSES), (Perraud, 2000; Carpinello, 
Knight,  Markowitz, & Pease, 2000); and the Brief Resilient Coping Scale 
(BRCS), (Sinclair & Wallston, 2004).  These scales appear to have good face 
validity. However, on further examination, they are fraught with confounds. For 
example, the DCSES, which reports to assess depression, coping and self-efficacy 
levels, relates them to levels of depressive symptoms and global functioning, 
during and after treatment. Perraud (2000) developed the DCSES, to measure the 
coping self-efficacy of depressed psychiatric patients. The author states that item 
development “. . . arose from an extensive review of the literature and a survey of 
nurse experts for identification of coping actions for depressed patients.” (Perraud, 
2000, p. 276).   This approach to item development is concerning, as members of 
only one allied health profession, i.e., nurses, were surveyed for their input into 
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identification of “coping actions.”  Another concerning factor is the potential 
procedural confounds associated with the use of a variety of procedures to elicit 
patient responses, including administering the scales by interview. While the 
authors suggested that their analyses supported the use of the DCSES to measure 
coping self-efficacy of depressed psychiatric patients, there is insufficient 
evidence in their paper and subsequent to this paper to support its reliability and 
validity.  
Coping Scales and Their Literature Review 
The more extensively used measures of coping are based upon Lazarus’ 
theory of stress and coping which has enabled coping scale development to be 
guided by theory, as opposed to measuring random coping strategies someone 
thought “may” have been useful, e.g. see above criticisms of the DCSES. The 
more popular coping scales used in health setting and mental health settings have 
been: The Ways of Coping Scale (WAYS-Revised), Folkman and Lazarus, 1988; 
The COPE Inventory, (COPE), Carver, Weintraub and Scheier, 1989 and the 
Coping Response Inventory, Moos, (1992).  
The COPE Inventory (COPE), by Carver, Weintraub and Scheier (1989) is 
a measure of coping designed to assess “ineffective” and “effective” coping. It has 
been used in many health-related settings. It was developed based upon both 
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) stress and coping model and also partly from the 
researcher’s own model of behavioural self-regulation. The full COPE is a 60-
item instrument with 4 items per scale. This scale has been reported to be 
problematic in inpatient settings because of the time taken to complete it and, 
therefore, much development has gone into briefer versions of this scale. Carver et 
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al. (1997) reported that the “impatience” noted by patient respondents to the full 
COPE scale prompted the scale developers to reduce the scale to 3-items per scale 
(Carver et al, 1993), and then to its current 2-item, 14 scales questionnaire. The 
data reported on the 2-item scale is from a sample of community residents who 
were participating in a study on response to the natural disaster Hurricane Andrew. 
This sample consisted of 168 participants (66% female, 40% non Hispanic whites, 
34% African Americans, 17% Hispanics and 5% Asian) who were recruited from 
the community that had been seriously affected by the hurricane, therefore, a 
convenience sample as opposed to a random sample. This sample did have the 
added advantage of being a non-student sample under a great deal of stress.  The 
Brief COPE was administered to this sample on 3 occasions (first, between 3-6 
month’s, second, after 6 months, and third, 1 year later).  The Brief COPE scale 
proved to be somewhat reliable and, despite having only 2 items per scale, items 
reportedly met or exceeded the 0.50 regarded as minimally acceptable for item 
reliability. An exploratory factor analysis with an oblique rotation to permit 
correlations among the factors was carried on the small sample of 168 
participants; it yielded nine factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, which 
together accounted for 72.4% of the variance in responding. The four a priori 
scales formed factors: Substance Use, Religion, Humour and Behavioural 
Disengagement. The use of emotional support and use of instrumental support 
formed a single factor. The authors note that this scale in this form is a good tool 
to be used mostly with coping in naturally occurring settings with time demands.   
The Coping Response Inventory (CRI) by Moos (1992) has two main 
conceptual approaches to classify coping responses. The first approach is the 
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focus of coping, which is the person’s orientation and activity in response to a 
stressor. The second approach is the method of coping that the person employs, 
e.g., cognitive or behavioural efforts. Both of these approaches combined make up 
the CRI. The CRI organises coping into eight dimensions. The first four 
dimensions measure approach coping and the second four measure avoidance 
coping. The first two indices in each domain reflect cognitive coping efforts; the 
second two indices in each domain reflect behavioural coping efforts. Each of the 
eight dimensions consists of six items and respondents select a stressor to focus 
on and rate their reliance on each of the 48 coping items on a 4-point scale from 
“fairly often” to “not at all.” The CRI has been used in investigating coping 
behaviours of problem drinkers (Moos, Brennan, Fondacaro, & Moos, 1990). 
Outcomes of the CRI are most useful for a specific type of situation and where 
coping with that particular individual life stressor is measured and focused on. 
Moos (1995) describes the framework of the CRI as a dialectical view of change 
necessary for human development, taking the view that life crises are 
confrontations that can challenge an individual and provide an opportunity for 
growth. Holahan and Moos (1990) demonstrated that indeed some individuals 
show an increase in personal and social resources, possibly due to positive 
feedback from effective coping with stressors. Given the different theoretical 
orientation of this scale and its applications to more individual specific stressors, 
it is more suited to a longitudinal study design in that repeated administrations 
may yield richer data. For these reasons, it was not used as a measure of coping in 
this thesis.   
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The WAYS of Coping Questionnaire (WAYS, Folkman & Lazarus, 1988) 
is a popular and widely used measure and can be administered via self-report and 
also by an interviewer (e.g., De Ridder, 1997; Parker, Endler, & Bagby, 1993). 
This scale reflects Folkman and Lazarus’ transactional theory of stress and coping 
and is meant to be used in relation to a person’s particular, specific stressful 
encounter. The person then reports all coping efforts in relation to this encounter 
and these are then categorized into either emotion-focused or problem-focused 
efforts. The WAYS can be purchased on Mindgarden.com and the website details 
its application and uses:  
The WAYS can help counselors work with clients to develop practical 
coping skills by evaluating their process, their strengths and weaknesses, 
and providing models of alternative coping mechanisms. The WAYS is 
excellent for research on coping  . . . (see “WAYS:Mindgarden.com.” n.d.). 
The interpretations of coping in this way, is that especially in mental health 
clinical settings, people’s weaknesses are more prone to be converted into 
diagnoses. Therefore, an individual’s “coping” is reflected by “the scale” and 
experts’ interpretation thereof. The measurement of coping in this way is 
problematic in it involves categorising coping efforts as adaptive and maladaptive. 
As discussed earlier, this view of “not coping” and judgements on coping efforts, 
especially in the area of  mental health, is troublesome in that it allows for 
misinterpretation of an individuals attempts to manage difficulties in their life. As 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) state,  “all other sources of data have most of the 
same drawbacks as self-report regarding the validity of inferences about 
psychological process” (p. 322).  
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Parker, Endler, and Bagby (1993) sought to evaluate the replicability of 
the Ways of Coping Questionnaire (WAYS) by using confirmatory factor analysis 
with a large sample of subjects coping with a homogeneous stressor. The authors 
claim that the population (a college sample) and the stressor (preparing for an 
upcoming exam) were identical to those selected by Folkman and Lazarus (1985) 
for their study. Two separate studies were conducted. The first study involved 530 
college students who completed the WAYS before a mid term exam. Six different 
theoretical models, corresponding to the various dimensions of coping as assessed 
by the WAYS, were tested for goodness of fit again using confirmatory factor 
analysis. The authors reported that none of these coping models were good 
representations of the data, with the oblique versions representing a better fit than 
the orthogonal versions. The parameter estimates for the relationships among the 
factors for the six-factor 42-item model were quite high across the models (from 
0.27 to 0.86, with a mean of 0.56) and for the eight-factor 42-item model (0.08 to 
0.86, with a mean of 0.50). The eight-factor 52-item model parameter estimates 
ranged from 0.12 to 0.84 with a mean of 0.58). All provided “weak evidence” for 
the multidimensionality of coping processes.  The authors contended that, based 
on these results, their findings suggested that the relationship among the various 
factors on the WAYS is a problematic feature of the scale. They argued that the 
parameter estimates in several cases were “unacceptably high,” contradicting the 
theoretical assumptions underlying coping dimensions proposed by Folkman and 
Lazarus (1984). For example in the 42-item eight-factor model, problem-focused 
coping was related to an emotion-focused coping dimension (emphasising the 
positive coping strategy).  
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A second study by Parker et al. (1993) aimed to derive a replicable set of 
coping dimensions, using a series of exploratory factor analyses with the data 
collected in study one. A 4-factor model was derived and then tested for 
goodness-of -fit with a separate sample of 392 college students who were also 
embarking on exams. This 4-factor model proved to also misrepresent the data. 
The parameter estimates for the relationship among factors for the oblique 4-
factor model offered some empirical evidence for the multidimensionality of 
coping responses assessed by the 38 critical items (estimates were low to 
moderate, 0.14 to 0.64, with a mean of 0.35). These findings suggest little 
empirical support for the WAYS models proposed by Folkman and Lazarus (1985, 
1988). The authors suggest that “. . . the failure of the WAYS factor structure to 
be replicated in samples confronting a homogeneous stressor should be of 
considerable concern to researchers in the coping area” (Parker et al., 1993). This 
study draws attention to two main issues again, firstly the use of factor analyses to 
identify the dimensionality of coping scales, an approach that has been heavily 
criticised (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980, 1985, 1988; Steed, 1998). Secondly, while 
the authors made every attempt to replicate the exact study, the samples were 
different and responded differently. While Parker et al. (1993) raise some 
concerns about the construct validity of the WAYS, these results, when 
interpreted within the broader literature on the measurement of coping, can be 
understood.  
A reliability generalization study on the WAYS by Rexrode, Peterson and 
O’Toole (2008) also reported negatively on the WAYS.  Their study found that 
the range of reliability coefficients reported across studies was wide. Rexrode et al. 
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(2008) reported that “only 61% of the WAYS articles used in this study attributed 
reliability to the scores rather than the actual instrument, and another 39% of the 
studies did not report reliability” (p. 270-271). These results emphasise the need 
for researchers to report the reliability of the WAYS subscale scores more 
accurately in their samples.  
The scale chosen for this thesis was the Coping Scale for Adults (CSA). 
There were three main justifications for choosing the CSA as the measurement 
instrument over other coping scales in this study. The first was how the CSA 
developers, Frydenberg and Lewis (1997), based their conceptualisation of coping, 
and thus the CSA itself, around Lazarus and his colleague’s cognitive-
phenomenological theory. In particular, coping was conceptualised as an adaptive 
function, where the individual and the environment are engaged in an interactive 
process. Secondly the CSA was chosen over Lazarus’s scales due to its 
development in an Australian context, thereby, providing an opportunity to 
measure coping with people of similar cultural orientation. Given that studies 
investigating personality variables have revealed that there are some culture 
specific coping constructs, the CSA was preferable to other measures 
(Terracciano & McCrae, 2006). The third reason for choosing the CSA over the 
Ways of Coping Checklist was that the scale was well constructed using a 5-level 
Likert scale to assess how each coping strategy was used, whereas the Ways of 
Coping scale used a more constrained 4-point scale. And finally, the CSA has an 
item titled “not cope” and has a section titled “list any other things you do to cope 
with your concern/s,” which from a clinical perspective allows reflection of the 
individualised strategies people use to manage difficult situations.  
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter addressed some of the issues in the measurement of coping 
and the way coping has been measured (breadth, dimensionality, variability and 
generality of coping measures), what constitutes good validity, along with a 
review of the coping scales currently used within psychology and psychiatry. 
Folkman and Lazarus (1980) recognition that more appropriate measures of 
coping were needed, because measures devised to assess coping on a normal 
population were inadequate or inappropriate has seen a plethora of new coping 
inventories. Although some of these suffer the same difficulties that Folkman and 
Lazarus themselves found, that being, that the difficulty lies with transferring 
stress and coping theory into interventions, which is problematic because 
measurement depends on how coping is understood. Indeed, Coyne and Gottlieb 
(1996) stated that, typically, the application and interpretation of checklists are not 
faithful to a transactional model of stress and coping; statistical controls can not 
eliminate the effects of key person and situation variables on coping and no 
consistent interpretation can be assigned to coping scale scores. Coyne and  
Racioppo (2000), in their review on the coping literature, suggest that a 
moratorium on studies incorporating checklists be imposed, because conventional 
checklist methodology has been uncritically accepted as a standard and serves to 
discourage the development of alternative methodologies. Moreover, Lazarus 
(2000) himself also highlighted the need for prospective designs emphasizing 
individual differences that are compatible with a holistic outlook. The overall 
consensus on the way coping has been measured depends on the way coping is 
defined and whether coping is seen as a process or a trait of a person. 
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As seen in this chapter, there are a myriad of coping inventories making 
comparative studies difficult. The most popular coping scale, the WAYS by 
Folkman and Lazarus (1988) that is used substantially throughout the literature, 
also has various versions, making comparisons difficult. In summary, what we 
learn from the measurement of coping is that the way coping is conceptualised 
relies on the way coping is defined, i.e., a trait or a process, and whether or not 
one is measuring a coping strategy in relation to a specific event or coping in 
general. This section helped to generate a guide for choosing the appropriate 
coping scale based on what is known about coping to date. Stability, generality 
and dimensionality are considerations the researcher needs to take into account 
when measuring coping. These considerations enable the researcher to choose an 
appropriate scale, for the appropriate population, to help measure what the 
researcher has in mind.  In essence, a coping scale is valid if it measures what it is 
intended to measure in the specific study. The next chapter will review the CSA 
and how effective it is at measuring coping strategies of a psychiatric population, 
with comparative analyses undertaken with samples of university students and the 
general public. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Coping Scale for Adults (CSA) and Quantitative Studies A, B and C. 
Preamble 
This chapter introduces the Coping Scale for Adults (CSA) by Erica Frydenberg 
and Ramon Lewis (1997), a coping scale originally developed on a community 
sample in Australia. Given the psychometric short comings of some of the more 
prominent scales, such as the WAYS (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988), as described in 
the previous chapter, a review of the CSA indicated that it provided a better 
alternative for assessing the measurement of coping in a psychiatric sample.  
This first part of the chapter comprises an overview of the CSA scale, 
followed by three studies in which the CSA scale was used.  
 Introduction 
According to Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) the conceptualisation of 
coping which underlies the CSA by Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) was derived 
from Lazarus and colleagues cognitive-phenomenological theory of coping as an 
adaptive function, whereby there is an interactive process between the individual 
and their environment. Frydenberg and Lewis (1997), longstanding researchers in 
the area of coping in Australia, developed the CSA to assist in clinical areas and 
research contexts. The CSA is a self-report inventory for adult populations, 18 
years of age and over. The CSA comprises 74 items, including 70 structured items 
that assess the 18 coping strategies, 3 items that comprise an optional “Not Cope” 
scale, and the final item, an open-ended response question,  asking the respondent 
to indicate any coping behaviours they use. The respondent rates the 73 items 
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using a 5 point Likert-scale (1-doesn’t apply or don’t do it, 2- used very little, 3 –
used sometimes, 4-used often and 5-used a great deal).  
The scaled response format on this questionnaire has advantages in that it 
provides a range of response options, in comparison to traditional checklists 
which have yes/no categories (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). The CSA has two 
forms: the general form, which assesses an individual’s choice of coping strategy 
in general; and the specific form, which assesses an individual’s behaviour in 
relation to a specific situation. The specific form of the CSA can be used whereby 
either the individual nominates the concern or the administrator nominates the 
concern. Frydenberg and Lewis (1994) considered that an individual’s choice of 
coping strategies was usually consistent, regardless of the nature of concern, and 
thereby advocated the use of a general scale. The authors also believed that there 
will be times when people’s general style of coping, as it applies to all their 
concerns, will be of greater interest than the way in which their general style is 
modified to cope with a particular concern. Indeed, Steed (1998) has also 
emphasised that there are advantages in using a “general” scale, in that it allows 
comparison of strategy use across various stressors, or even the various stages of a 
single stressor.  The CSA also has short forms of both the specific form and the 
general form, with each short form comprising 20 items.   
Much of the preliminary material of the CSA came from the Adolescent 
Coping Scale (ACS) which was developed to assess the coping strategies of 
young people (Frydenberg & Lewis, 1993).  The CSA builds upon the earlier 
work on the ACS. The close links between the CSA and the ACS, according to 
Frydenberg and Lewis (1997), ensure items in the CSA are lucid, and are not 
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reliant on reading or comprehension skills beyond primary school age. Not all the 
items of the ACS were included in the CSA and items were modified to suit an 
adult population, e.g., ACS: Attend school regularly, CSA: Put effort into my 
work. In the development phase of the CSA, Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) carried 
out a factor analysis on the items to determine suitability of the Adolescent 
Coping Scale (ACS) with an adult population. An oblique factor analysis 
(principal components with Oblimin rotation) was used, because it was assumed 
that the scales would not be entirely orthogonal, since it can be hypothesised that 
while coping contains a number of distinct strategies, such strategies are likely to 
have some overlap. The results revealed suitability of the ACS scales for use with 
an adult population. Along with this, the authors added a few additional scales to 
try to capture the entire adult coping repertoire. The four scales were: Thinking 
about the problem, Humour, Protect sense of self, and Plan and prioritise. 
 The structured nature of the CSA allows for coping behaviours which 
might not have spontaneously come to mind with less structured approaches. 
There is also room for individuals to write down other ways that they may cope, 
which suggests the CSA scale does not preclude other coping strategies that may 
arise for an individual. Given low attention and concentration spans have been 
reported to often be present in those diagnosed with a mental illness (Medalia & 
Revheim, 2002), the CSA was thought to be a good measuring tool to use within 
the psychiatric setting of the current thesis, because of the structured nature of the 
questionnaire and its readable, behaviourally-defined items.  
In essence, the CSA captures all of the coping strategies identified in the 
ACS. As a clinical therapeutic tool the CSA is used to primarily help people to 
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identify and maximise their use of productive strategies and minimise the use of 
dysfunctional strategies. According to Frydenberg and Lewis (1997), the CSA 
helps respondents not only to identify their various coping strategies, but also 
facilitates the development of further coping strategies. In their subsequent 
writings, Frydenberg and Lewis (2002a) stated that removing non-productive 
coping, the focus of much mainstream mental health, does not necessarily 
promote productive coping. They claimed, therefore, that it is the combination of 
both an increase in productive coping strategies and a reduction in non-productive 
coping strategies that enhanced an individual’s overall coping.  
The 19 CSA coping strategies, as described in the CSA Manual 
(Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997, p.10-11), are:   
1. Seek Social Support is represented by items which indicate an inclination to 
share the problem with others and enlist support in its management, e.g. Talk to 
other people to help me sort it out. 
2. Focus on Solving the Problem is a strategy, which comprises reflecting on the 
problem, planning solutions, and tackling the problem systematically, e.g. Work 
at solving the problem to the best of my ability. 
3. Work Hard is a scale describing commitment, ambition and industry, e.g. Keep 
up with work as required. 
4. Worry is characterised by items, which indicate a concern about the future in 
general terms or, more specifically, concern with happiness in the future, e.g. 
Worry about what is happening.  
5. Improve Relationships is about improving ones relationship with others, 
engaging in a particular intimate relationship, e.g. Spend more time with 
husband/wife/boy/girlfriend. 
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6. Wishful Thinking is characterised by items, which are based on hope and 
anticipation of a positive outcome, e.g. Hope that the problem will sort itself out. 
7. Tension Reduction is characterised by items, which reflect an attempt to make 
oneself feel better by releasing tension, e.g. Release pressure by taking alcohol or 
cigarettes. 
8. Social Action is about letting others know what is of concern and enlisting 
support by writing petitions or organising an activity such as a meeting or a rally, 
e.g. Join with people who have the same concern. 
9. Ignore the Problem is characterised by items which reflect a conscious blocking 
out of the problem, e.g. Put the problem out of my mind. 
10. Self-Blame indicates that individuals are critical of themselves for being 
responsible for the concern or worry, e.g. Blame myself. 
11. Keep to Self is characterised by items which reflect the individuals withdrawal 
from others and a desire to keep others from knowing about concerns, e.g. Keep 
my feelings to myself. 
12. Seek Spiritual Support is characterised by items which reflect prayer and belief 
in the assistance of a spiritual leader or God, e.g. Pray for help and guidance so 
that everything will be all right. 
13. Focus on the Positive is represented by items, which indicate a positive and 
cheerful outlook on the current situation.  This includes seeing the bright side of 
circumstances and seeing oneself as fortunate, e.g. Look on the bright side of 
things and think of all that is good. 
14. Seek Professional Help denotes the use of a professional adviser, such as a 
teacher or counsellor, e.g. Discuss the problem with qualified people. 
15. Seek Relaxing Diversions is about general relaxation.  It is characterised by 
items, which describe leisure activities such as reading and listening to music e.g. 
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Find a way to relax, for example, listening to music, read a book, play a musical 
instrument, watch television. 
16. Physical Recreation is characterised by items, which relate to playing sport and 
keeping fit, e.g. Keep fit and healthy. 
17. Protect Self comprises items which indicate attempts to support ones self-
concept by constructive self talk and looking after ones appearance, e.g. Work on 
my self image. 
18. Humour is about being funny as a diversion, e.g. Create a humorous diversion. 
19. In addition to the 18 coping strategies there is an optional scale called  Not Cope, 
which is characterised by, items reflecting an inability to cope and the occurrence 
of psychosomatic illness, e.g. I get sick, for example, headache, stomach ache.  
In the development of the CSA Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) had noted 
limitations in Lazarus and Folkman's theory. When the 19 coping scales were 
explored further with factor analysis, the possibility emerged of combining coping 
strategies into styles. As a result, four distinct coping styles emerged; these styles, 
including their respective coping strategies, were:  
1. Dealing with the problem directly. Focus on solving the problem, work hard, 
improve relationships, seek relaxing diversions, physical recreation, protect 
self, humour.  
2. Optimism. Focus on the positive, seek relaxing diversions, seek spiritual 
support, wishful thinking.  
3. Sharing. Seek social support, social action, seek professional help. 
4. Nonproductive coping strategies. Worry, wishful thinking, tension reduction; 
ignore the problem, self-blame, keep to self, not cope. (Frydenberg & Lewis, 
1997, p.36). 
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Grouping coping strategies into styles follows a trait approach to coping, which 
generally tends to classify people in order to make predictions on how they will 
cope with various stressful encounters (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), instead of a 
process approach to coping.  
The rationale for choosing the CSA as the measuring tool in this study lay 
in its diverse measurement of coping strategies along with the clinical applications 
of the scale. After reviewing other coping scales, the CSA appeared to be the most 
comprehensive instrument of its kind and the first to be developed in an 
Australian context. It also provides an opportunity for the separate measurement 
of a comprehensive range of coping strategies that have been confounded in 
previous research, allowing a more valid measurement of coping strategies than is 
currently available. The CSA has many features which do set it apart as a valuable 
instrument for research and clinical purposes and, given the sample under 
investigation was a psychiatric population, this was of importance.  
Most of the time coping has been categorized by past researchers as either  
adaptive or maladaptive and, now, by Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) as 
“productive” (such as problem solving strategies, seeking social support, focusing 
on work) and as “non-productive” (avoidance, keeping to oneself).  Romi, Lewis 
and Roache, (2013) reported that much of the non-productive coping label has 
originated in research linking the use of coping strategies, such as withdrawal and 
avoidance, to mental health problems in children and adolescents, but this has yet 
to be investigated in adult populations.  
One of the downsides of using the CSA is that there are few published 
studies that have used the scale by researchers other than Erica Frydenberg and 
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Ramon Lewis, its developers. Erica Frydenberg has stated that she is aware that 
people were using the scale clinically in educational and health settings (Personal 
Communication, 22nd July 2013). However, she was not aware of people actively 
using the scale for research purposes and publishing the results. All but one of the 
studies I will be reporting on below are by Frydenberg and Lewis.  
Reliability and Validity of the Coping Scale for Adults (CSA) 
Given that one of the main aims of the current research was to measure the 
coping strategies of a psychiatric population, the question needed to be raised 
“Will the CSA adequately measure the coping strategies of a psychiatric 
population?”.  
Reliability 
Frydenberg and Lewis  (1997) spent a considerable amount of time on the 
item reliability of the CSA scale.  The authors did a test-retest on items to see if 
they met reliability to involve subscale inclusion.  The subscales comprised of an 
adequate number of relatively equal items, around 4 items per subscale. All items 
were responded to by more than 88 per cent of the respondents within one point of 
measurement on the two testing occasions, thereby satisfying the criteria for 
response stability.  
To ascertain the extent to which responses to the 73 (excluding Not Cope) 
items of the CSA remained stable over time, 25 respondents in the original study 
were administered the questionnaire on a second occasion, approximately 14 days 
after the first administration. The test-retest correlations (Pearson product 
moment) were then computed for the individual items. For an item to be 
considered reliable, its correlation co-efficient had to be 0.58 or higher (p<0.001). 
 128 
If the test-retest correlation was less than 0.58, an additional criterion had to be 
satisfied, namely that at least 80% of the responses had to be within one point of 
measurement on the two occasions. The reason for this was that an item’s 
response may be poorly correlated on two occasions due to a restricted range of 
response rather than due to  an instability of responses (see Frydenberg & Lewis, 
1997, p.25). Only 10 of the items failed to register statistically significant 
correlations, however, all were responded to by more than 88 percent of 
respondents within one point of measurement on the two testing occasions, 
thereby satisfying the criterion of response stability, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
From a review of the scale development data, the Cronbach alpha co-efficients  of 
internal consistency (alpha) [range 0.69-0.92] and test-retest stability co-efficients 
[0.33-0.94] showed that all the scales had response distributions covering almost 
the entire full range of possible raw scores. Furthermore, the response to items 
within the scales had sufficient internal consistency in all cases to justify the 
separate use of these scales (Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997). The  developers 
reported that “the 18 coping strategies revealed high test-retest reliability co-
efficients apart from 2 with moderate and one with low. These being co-efficients 
for Focus on Solving the Problem, Social Action and Work Hard scales. 
The authors concluded that the 18 scales of the CSA (excluding the Not 
Cope scale) were very reliable and compared favourably in this regard with 
published coping scales, such as those of  Folkman and Lazarus (1988) and Moos 
(1993) (See discussion on Billings and Moo’s scale in Chapter 3). 
Validity 
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Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) contend that the CSA allowed for a more 
valid measurement of coping strategies than previous scales and they reported that 
“Adults enjoyed completing the questionnaire, as it provided a stimulus for 
thinking about behaviour” (p. 12). Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) stated that the 
questionnaire also has good content validity in that as a measure of coping the 
CSA represents a wide range of coping strategies.  The authors identified 
consistent patterns across studies carried out  using the CSA that linked more 
positive outcomes and less negative ones to the “productive strategies” listed in 
the CSA. The authors also reported on the construct validity of the CSA, noting 
that it was helpful in uncovering significant relationships between a number of 
undesired outcomes, such as low self esteem, feeling overwhelmed, stress and 
coping strategies that have been considered non-productive. These findings were 
consistent with their previous work (Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997) that reported that 
maladaptive coping styles and negative outcomes are stronger than those between 
productive coping styles and productive outcomes.  
Published Studies Using the Coping Scale for Adults  
As indicated previously, the CSA has not been independently assessed for 
its psychometric properties. To date there are no reported studies of the CSA 
measuring coping in a psychiatric population. Indeed, there are few published 
studies using the CSA, but those of note will be reported on below.   
The CSA has been has been used to investigate teachers’ coping with the 
stress of classroom discipline. For example, Lewis, Romi, and Roache (2011) 
investigated 515 teachers from Australia and identified the unproductive coping 
styles which lead to a greater tendency for teachers to become sick. The CSA has 
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also been used to investigate the relationship between workplace contexts and 
how people cope with their concerns (Frydenberg & Lewis, 2002b). The findings 
from this study indicated that managers, irrespective of age and gender, were 
more likely to respond by utilising problem solving or applying themselves and 
were less likely to use non-productive strategies, such as worry, letting off steam 
and wishful thinking.  
More recent uses of the CSA have been by Romi et al. (2013) who 
investigated 772 teachers’ coping strategies and classroom management 
techniques across Australia, China and Israel. The findings across the three 
different cultures were confounded, partly due to the different cultural notions of 
coping and different understandings and meanings of the various cultural coping 
constructs. The authors highlighted this in the Israeli teachers’ notions of 
worrying: “In Israel, the use of Worry relates to what might be characterized as 
under-assertion (hinting, but not punishment) and aggression” (Romi, Lewis & 
Roache, 2013, p.224). This study highlighted the role of  cultural differences 
between the nations of teachers. What is seen as a coping strategy in Australia is 
not universally applicable across other nations, a finding that  has implications for 
the use of  such coping scales with different nationalities.  
Frydenberg and Lewis (2002a) in their article reviewed six unpublished 
studies (Evert, 1996; Goble, 1995; Jones, 1997; Lyneham, 1997; McDonald, 
1996; Spanjer, 1999), that are predominantly masters dissertations, all which have 
used the CSA. In their review the studies were examined for their utility and 
validity. Frydenberg and Lewis concluded that the findings appeared to provide 
support for the view that the link between maladaptive styles and negative 
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outcomes is stronger than the link between productive styles and productive 
outcomes. They suggested that while the therapeutic enhancement of productive 
coping strategies may be seen as the way forward, removing or minimising the 
dysfunctional (non productive) coping mechanisms “does not necessarily promote 
the good” (p. 15).   The authors advocate for “tackling” both sets (productive and 
non productive) strategies to build up peoples’ coping resources and to help them 
develop resilience (Frydenberg & Lewis, 2002a).  They raise a good point here 
and one that could transfer over well to mental health settings. Undoubtedly, the 
combination of increasing productive coping and reducing non-helpful coping 
strategies is a potentially useful approach within clinical settings. However, it is 
implausible that questionnaire results alone would facilitate this, and, more likely, 
the success would come if used alongside a detailed clinical formulation, 
incorporating the many contextual factors impacting on patient coping.  
One study of the CSA that is independent of the Frydenberg and Lewis 
research group was carried out by McGreal, Evans and Burrows (1997). The 
authors utilised the specific form of the CSA in a pilot study to assess gender 
differences in coping strategy use following loss of a child through miscarriage or 
stillbirth. The results suggested differences between men and women in chosen 
coping strategies. Women were more likely than men to use worry, tension 
reduction, wishful thinking, and spiritual support. Men were more likely than 
women to use ignore the problem. However, these results need to be interpreted 
with caution due to the small sample size (N=52, 37 females and 17 males), the 
wide variety of age cohorts, uncontrolled variables, such as knowledge of whether 
the subject’s experience was of the first or second miscarriage or stillbirth, and 
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acknowledgement of the differences in loss at early stages of the pregnancy vs. 
later stages, e.g., giving birth.  
Conclusions 
The CSA, based on Lazarus’s theory of stress and coping, has been used 
extensively in Australia and has clear items combined with a Likert rating scale. 
The scale has been found to have good reliability and validity when used within 
adult groups. As a measurement tool  the CSA provides information that only 
describes what people use or, more precisely, what coping strategies people say 
they use, rather than whether these strategies are functionally useful. The CSA 
was thought to be a good choice to use with a clinical sample to assess whether it 
has any clinical utility for the measurement of coping.   
Comparative Group – College students  
When reviewing the coping literature, the majority of studies have focused 
on the benefits of positive coping amongst college and university students (e.g.,  
Brown, 1994; Epstein, & Katz, 1992; Folkman, & Lazarus, 1985; Lawrence, 
Ashford & Dent, 2006; McCarthy, Lambert & Moller, 2006; Shankland, Genolini, 
Franca, Guelfi, & Ionescu, 2010).  
Epstein and Katz (1992) found that a productive workload in everyday life 
was found to be positively associated with coping ability and unrelated to stress. 
Lawrence, Ashford and Dent (2006) carried out a study to investigate coping 
strategies adopted by men and women who were first-year students in higher 
education. The York Self-Esteem Inventory (YSEI), the Emotional Control 
Questionnaire (ECQ) and the Coping Styles Questionnaire (CSQ) were used to 
measure men’s and women’s’ coping. One hundred and sixty (N=58 female, 
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N=102 male) first-year sport sciences undergraduate students completed the 
questionnaires with one of the authors present at the end of their academic year. 
The results indicated that men reported coping strategies, such as “bottling up,” 
and tended to detach themselves from situations, in contrast to the women, who 
were more likely to use emotion-focused coping.  
Folkman and Lazarus (1985) examined emotion and coping of college 
students (N=108, gender distinctions not specified), measuring the coping process 
at three stages of a mid-term examination, which were: an anticipation stage, the 
waiting period and waiting for their results after their exams. They found that 
different forms of coping were evident during the waiting and anticipatory stages 
of an exam. Problem-focused coping strategies and emphasizing the positive were 
present before an exam and distancing more prominent after the exam. The 
authors reported that despite the normatively shared emotional reactions at each 
stage, individual differences were evident at each stage of the examination period.  
Overall, the studies of coping in university students have also focused on 
particular subgroups of university students. For example, Williams, Arnold, and 
Mills (2005) investigated how veterinary students coped with stress. However, 
most studies have used within-groups procedures and not done comparative 
studies (Felsten, 1998; Porter, Marco, Schwartz, Neale; Shiffman & Stone, 2000). 
In general, some studies into the coping mechanisms of university students have 
found that men tend to use avoidance and detach themselves (e.g., Lawrence, 
Ashford & Dent, 2006), however, others (e.g., Felsten, 1998; Porter, Marco, 
Schwartz; Neale, Shiffman, & Stone, 2000) have found no differences in coping 
strategies in men and women. 
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Study A: The Psychometric Adequacy of the Coping Scale for Adults 
(CSA)—An Examination With a Psychiatric Sample 
Preamble 
The central research aim of this thesis was to investigate the meaning and 
measurement of coping in a psychiatric population. An extensive review of the 
measurement research on coping concluded that an entire coping repertoire of  
“coping” for psychiatric patients has yet to be captured by current psychometric 
scales. However, the literature examined to date also suggests that those 
diagnosed with a mental illness lack adequate coping resources for managing the 
challenges of daily living (Piccinelli & Wilkinson, 2000; Taylor & Stanton, 2007).  
Introduction 
Study A examines the psychometric adequacy of an existing coping scale, The 
Coping Scale for Adults (CSA; Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997), and, in particular, its 
ability to measure the coping strategies of a psychiatric sample (n=110). 
Comparisons are made across the 19 coping strategies, in terms of factor structure, 
gender and age. The objective is to evaluate the CSA’s ability, as measured by its 
19 subscales, to discriminate a psychiatric sample’s coping strategies when 
viewed against information from the normative sample of the CSA. The study is a 
cross-sectional design, comparing the similarities and differences in coping 
strategies of both groups. Given “not coping” is of particular interest in those 
diagnosed with a mental illness, in the analyses special consideration is given to 
the “not cope” scale on the CSA.  
The CSA scale is made up of 18 coping strategies, which are “productive 
and non-productive,” plus one “not coping” strategy. Previous research has 
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suggested that those diagnosed with a psychiatric illness use more maladaptive 
than adaptive coping strategies and the current study set out to test this 
assumption (Aldwin & Revenson, 1987; Fledderus, Bohlmeijer & Pieterse, 2010; 
Frydenberg & Lewis, 2002a). It should be noted that, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
“not coping” may be a functional coping strategy, not maladaptive but adaptive, 
and entirely appropriate, depending on the patient’s circumstance.  
Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis was based on the oft-stated claim in the literature (e.g., 
Aranada, & Lincoln, 2011; Carver, Scheier, Weintraub, & Jagdish, 1989; 
Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997, 2002a; Skinner, Edge, Altman & Sherwood, 2003; 
Snyder, 1999) that psychiatric samples use more maladaptive coping strategies. 
Therefore, it is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1. The psychiatric sample will endorse more non-productive 
coping strategies, as measured by the CSA, than the normative sample.  
There is also abundant research (e.g., Ano & Vasconcelles, 2004; Bergin, 
Masters, & Richards, 1987; Crossley, 1995; Koeing, 2009; Pargament, Koeing, 
Tarakeshwar, & Hahn, 2004; Ruchita, Parmanand, Dandeep, Kumar, Malhotra & 
Tyagi, 2011; Phillips & Stein, 2007; Smolak, Gearing, Alonzo, Baldwin, Harmon, 
& McHugh, 2013; Sullivan 1993), that religion is used as a coping strategy. 
Therefore, it is proposed: 
Hypotheis 2a. That the psychiatric sample will be more likely than the 
normative sample to endorse seek spiritual support as a coping mechanism.  
Some research has focused on those diagnosed with schizophrenia and 
their use of religion as a coping mechanism (Ano & Vasconcelles, 2004; Bergin, 
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Masters, & Richards, 1987; Crossley, 1995; Koeing, 2009; Pargament, Koeing, 
Tarakeshwar, & Hahn, 2004; Ruchita, Parmanand, Dandeep, Kumar, Malhotra & 
Tyagi, 2011; Phillips & Stein, 2007; Smolak, Gearing, Alonzo, Baldwin, Harmon, 
& McHugh, 2013; Sullivan 1993). Therefore, it is proposed: 
Hypotheis 2b. That those diagnosed with schizophrenia will be more 
likely than the normative sample to endorse seek spiritual support as a coping 
mechanism.  
The third and fourth hypotheses culminated in investigating if gender 
differences existed in the types of coping strategy used, because, to date, some 
research has supported this view and suggested evidence for this  (e.g., Felsten, 
1998; Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-Larson & Hobart, 1987; Littlewood, Cramer,  
Hoekstra, & Humphrey, 1991; Matud, 2004; Melendez, Mayordomo, Sancho, & 
Tomas, 2012; McGreal, Evans & Burrows, 1997; Porter, Marco, Schwartz, Neale,  
Shiffman, & Stone 2000; Ptacek et al., 1994; Stroebe, 2001). There are also a few 
studies that suggest evidence for gender differences in coping strategies (e.g., 
Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) also found significant gender differences, as 
reported both in adolescent samples and adult samples, in studies using the 19 
CSA subscales (Frydenberg & Lewis, 1993,1994,1997, 2000, 2002a, 2002b). 
Nevertheless, Lazarus (1999) contends that women and men cope similarly. But, 
there is also a suggestion in the literature that men use more avoidance coping: 
(e.g., e.g., Lawrence, Ashford & Dent, 2006) and women use more emotion 
focused coping e.g., Felsten, 1998; Porter, Marco, Schwartz, Neale,  Shiffman, & 
Stone 2000; Ptacek et al., 1994; Stroebe, 2001).Given these claims in the 
literature, it is proposed: 
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Hypothesis 3.  Men will endorse avoidance coping strategies more than 
women, as measured by the CSA. 
Hypothesis 4. That women will endorse more social support and emotion-
focused coping than men, as measured by the CSA.  
An additional comparison of coping strategies will be made between a sub 
sample of those diagnosed with schizophrenia and the “normative” sample.  
Given the vast amount of research on the “lack” of coping in those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia (e.g., Buchanan, 2007; Kraepelin, 1899; Tyler, 1995), it is predicted 
that: 
Hypothesis 5.  Those diagnosed with schizophrenia will endorse non-
productive coping strategies more than the normative sample, as measured by the 
CSA.  
Method.  
Materials. All samples completed the General Form of the Coping Scale 
for Adults Questionnaire (CSA). 
Participants 
Psychiatric sample. This sample consisted of  110 adults, men (N=55) and 
women (N=55),  between the ages of 18-75 years ( x  age, 33.54, SD =10.01). The 
median age was 31 years. Participants were psychiatric inpatients, from a 
psychiatric hospital in Western Australia who participated voluntarily in the study. 
All patients had a choice to participate in the study or to decline the offer to 
participate, with 100% volunteering to participate. Participants were selected 
against specific inclusion and exclusion criteria. The inclusion criteria were: their 
first language was English, that they had at least 10 years of education, and that 
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they could read and write.  The exclusion criteria were: no known organic deficits 
or memory deficits, e.g., Alzheimer’s disease or dementia. Table 4.1 shows the 
characteristics of the sample according to gender and primary diagnosis, as 
reported in the patients’ medical files and confirmed by their doctor.  
Table 4.1 
Psychiatric Sample Classified by Gender and Diagnosis 
 Schizophrenia Depression Bipolar Personality 
disorder 
Not otherwise 
specified 
Total 
Male 30 12 7 2 4 55 
Female 20 10 16 7 2 55 
Total 50 22 23 9 6 110 
 
A greater number of patients were diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder in this study, which is consistent with previous research sample 
characteristics on individuals diagnosed with a mental illness  (Bourdon, Rae, 
Narrow, Manderscheid, & Regier, 1994). The finding in this study that the 
psychiatric sample consisted of more men than women with the diagnosis of 
depression is not in line with current research (Kessing, 2005; Page, 1999). 
Normative sample. The normative sample was the original sample from 
the CSA study (Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997) that consisted of 369 adults, with an 
age range of 17-75 years. One hundred and sixty four males and 205 females were 
included. A representative sampling of gender was reported by the authors, but 
there was a biased distribution of occupational status favouring the upper end of 
the occupational continuum (Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997). The sample consisted 
of 133 Australian middle managers from a private sector organisation in the retail 
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industry and 236 non-managers from the Australian community.  Frydenberg and 
Lewis (2002b) reported that the managerial respondents were randomly sent out a 
questionnaire, accompanied by a short memo requesting their participation. The 
respondents completed the questionnaire within their work environment, with the 
remaining respondents surveyed in a range of settings, including supermarket 
malls and doctors’ waiting rooms at various times of the day.  Participation in the 
study was voluntary.  
Procedure: Psychiatric sample. The current study took place in a large 
psychiatric hospital in Western Australia with an inpatient facility. The setting for 
the completion of questionnaires was the dining room of the ward. All ethical 
guidelines were adhered to and ethics approval was obtained for the study from 
the ethics committee of both the university and the psychiatric hospital over a 
period of 12 months. I,  as researcher, recruited participants through psychiatrists’ 
and medical officers’ patient lists throughout the four wards of the hospital. These 
medical professionals were not involved in the selection or interview process and 
only provided information on patients and their diagnosis prior to patient selection. 
I individually approached patients with information about the study requesting 
their consent to participate, subject to screening. Once consent was obtained to 
access their medical files, information was screened against the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria and their diagnosis collected. All participants met the inclusion 
criteria and for these patients their medical file was used only to access 
information about their diagnosis. I made an appointment with the patient to 
complete the questionnaire, at a time convenient for the patient, and escorted each 
participant to the dining room on the ward of the psychiatric hospital outside of 
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meal times. Patients were given the Coping Scale for Adults questionnaire (CSA), 
the general form, and a pencil.  Subjects did not provide their names or any other 
identifying information, only their date of birth and gender. The General 
questionnaire has a short description of how to complete the questionnaire which 
is written on the front of the questionnaire. The test instructions were:  
 People have a number of concerns or worries, such as work, studies, 
 family, friends, the world and the like. Below is a list of ways in which 
 people cope with a wide variety of concerns or problems. Please indicate 
 the things you do to deal with your concerns or worries by marking the 
 appropriate number. Work down the page and mark 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 as you 
 come to each statement. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not 
 spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which best 
 describes how you feel. 
 For example if you sometimes cope with your concern by "Talk to others 
 to see what they would do if they had that problem" you would mark 3 as 
 shown below: 
 Doesn’t 
apply or 
don’t do it 
 
Used very 
little 
Used 
some-
times 
Used 
often 
Used a 
great 
deal 
 
1. Talk to others to 
see what they would 
do if they had the 
problem.  
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 Please note that within the scale there are 3 items, designed primarily for 
 clinical purposes, that indicate difficulty with coping. If you don't wish to 
 complete these items you may omit them. The relevant items (highlighted 
 within an asterisk) are 9, 28 and 63.  
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Each patient was asked if they had any questions and each patient fully 
understood what was required.  
Scoring. Each questionnaire was hand-scored and entered into the overall 
data set for the study. The questionnaire has a computerized software program for 
scoring, however, this was not available to the researcher at the time of this study. 
It should be noted that participants answered all of the questions on the 
questionnaire. Lewis, Romi and Roache (2011) also attained a 100% response rate 
from their participants, further evidence that the CSA is a straight-forward, easy 
to administer and answer questionnaire. !
Results. The results of the study follow. 
Diagnostic categories of psychiatric patients.  Preliminary analyses were 
carried out to investigate whether there were gender differences across diagnoses. 
Given the low frequencies in the diagnostic categories when broken down by 
gender, the personality disorder (PD) and not otherwise specified (NOS) 
categories were grouped together as “other.” Chi square test for independence (see 
Appendix A) indicated no significant association between gender and diagnosis 
( ! 2 3( ) = 6.304, p=0.10). The strength of the association Cramer’s v was 0.24, 
which suggests a slight agreement between gender and diagnosis. 
Preliminary analyses of subscale data. A preliminary analysis of the data 
split by gender across all 19 subscales was conducted using box plots and 
histograms. The majority of histograms and boxplots across gender were  
symmetric. However, on the social action subscale, both men (z=2.21, p=0.02) 
and women (z=2.74, p=0.01) exhibited significant skewness (see Appendix A for 
relevant sample statistics). The skewness did not appear to be caused by one or 
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two extreme outliers, but rather by a spread of scores that tapered off towards the 
upper end of score totals. Therefore, no data transformation for this subscale was 
considered necessary. 
Logistic regression: Prediction of gender based on age and diagnosis.  
In order to examine possible gender differences in the psychiatric sample 
logistic regression analysis was used with age and diagnosis as predictors. With 
the gender variable being dichotomous logistic regression was favoured here over 
an alternative MANOVA type design, in order to avoid the parametric assumption 
of multivariate normality that a MANOVA type design requires.  A logistic 
regression was used as it carries no parametric or homogeneity of variance 
assumptions. Table 4.2 displays the results of the logistic regression model, 
predicting gender based on age and diagnosis for the psychiatric sample. The 
overall model was not significant (p = .12) with the final correct classification rate 
being 61.8%. Specifically, 42 of 55 (76.4%) of the male sample were correctly 
classified (true negatives), while 26 of 55 (47.3%) of the female sample were 
correctly classified (true positives). None of the four individual predictors was 
significant (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2 
 
Prediction of Gender Based on Age and Diagnosis: Psychiatric Sample Only 
Variable B SE Wald df p Value Exp(B) 
Age –0.02 0.02 0.81 1 .37 0.98 
Schizophrenic –0.80 0.60 1.76 1 .18 0.45 
Depressive –0.65 0.68 0.89 1 .35 0.52 
Bipolar 0.44 0.70 0.39 1 .53 1.55 
Constant 1.06 0.90 1.39 1 .24 2.88 
Note. n  = 110. Gender classification: 0 = male, 1 = female. Full model: !2 (4, n = 110) = 7.24, 
p = .12. Base classification rate = 50.0%.  Final classification rate = 61.8%. 
Correlations. In order to further examine and distinguish the 18 scales of the CSA, 
the magnitudes of the scale intercorrelations were considered. In summary the 
scales appear sufficiently distinct to warrant their separate use.  For the 
psychiatric sample an examination of correlations between subscales completed 
by the men and by the women showed a large number of significant correlations, 
ranging from low to high magnitude. Overall, female correlations were greater 
than male correlations (see correlational matrix Appendix A for exact values). 
Considering the magnitude of the male subscale correlations, 31 percent had 
correlations greater in magnitude than 0.4, 16 percent were greater than 0.5, and 2 
percent were greater than 0.6, with the maximum correlation being 0.64 between 
the improve relationships subscale and social support subscale. By comparison, 
39 percent of the female subscale correlations were greater in magnitude than 0.4, 
28 percent were greater than 0.5 and 16 were greater than 0.6, with the maximum 
correlation being 0.79 between protect self and focus on the positive subscales. 
Factor analysis. For comparative purposes the data analytic procedures described 
by Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) in the CSA manual were replicated. The first 
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step in establishing the usefulness of the CSA in capturing psychiatric patients’ 
coping strategies was to determine the extent to which the items in the 
questionnaire satisfactorily assessed the related (but distinct) strategies of coping 
they were designed to measure; the second step was to compare those strategies 
used to those measured in a “normal” community sample.  Unfortunately the 
whole normative data set of the original CSA set was not available for use, and 
this was the reason subscale scores were factored instead of individualised items. 
Following the procedure outlined in the CSA manual, a factor analysis using a 
principal axis factoring method of factor extraction, followed by an oblique 
rotation using the oblimin method, was performed on the whole psychiatric 
sample, in order to maximise the sample size for the analysis. The oblique 
procedure was used since it was assumed (see also Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997), 
that the 19 scales would not be entirely orthogonal or independent.  Using the 
criterion of extracting factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 resulted in 4 factors 
being extracted, which accounted for 54.5% of the variance. Factor 1 accounted 
for 31.40% of the variance, factor 2 accounted for 14.87% of the variance, factor 
3 accounted for 4.85% of the variance and factor 4 accounted for 3.35% of the 
variance (see Table 4.3).Visual inspection of the scree plot (see Appendix B) 
indicated that even a 3-factor solution might be appropriate for the psychiatric 
sample, without an unwarranted loss of information, compared to a 4-factor 
solution; however, the 4-factor model was considered the better fit. Using the 4 
extracted factors, an oblique rotation using the oblimin method revealed the 
pattern matrix shown in Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.3 
Psychiatric Sample: Pattern Matrix of 18 Coping Scales Plus Not Cope  
 Factor 
Coping strategy 1 2 3  4 
Social support .60    
Focus on solving the problem   .40 –.40 
Work hard .52    
Worry  .61  –.44 
Improve relationships .69    
Wishful thinking  .43   
Tension reduction .43 .43   
Social action .43   –.42 
Ignore the problem  .68   
Self-blame  .72   
Keep to self  .81   
Seek spiritual support   .63  
Focus on the positive .68  .36  
Seek professional help    –.64 
Seek relaxing diversions .35   –.50 
Physical recreation   .64  
Protect self .40  .39  
Humour .70    
Not cope  .48   
Percentage of variance 31.40 14.87 4.85 3.35 
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Table 4.4 
Normative Sample: Pattern Matrix of the 18 Coping Scales Plus Not Cope  
 Factor 
Coping strategy 1. Dealing 
with the 
Problem 
2. Not Cope 3. Optimism  4. Sharing 
problems 
Social support    .66 
Focus on solving the problem .78    
Work hard .74    
Worry  .83   
Improve relationships .39    
Wishful thinking  .57 .50  
Tension reduction  .73   
Social action    .57 
Ignore the problem  .60   
Self-blame  .78   
Keep to self  .39  –.70 
Seek spiritual support   .68  
Focus on the positive   .76  
Seek professional help    .56 
Seek relaxing diversions .40  .46  
Physical recreation .50    
Protect self .60    
Humour .35    
Not cope  .76   
Percentage of variance 23.3 15.2 9.1 7.2 
Note. From “Coping Scale for Adults: Administrator’s Manual,” by E. Frydenberg and R. Lewis, 
ACER: Melbourne, Australia, 1997, p. 37. Copyright 1997 by Erica Frydenberg and Ramon Lewis. 
Reprinted with permission. 
When interpreting results of a factor analysis, sample size is a component 
to consider but not the sole focus, as Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988) found that if 
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a factor has 4 or more loadings greater than 0.6, then it is reliable regardless of 
sample size. For the psychiatric sample, on the whole the loadings were quite 
reasonable, and certainly this was the case for 2 of the factors (factor 1 and factor 
2). The 110 sample size falls in the lower end of the acceptable size for factor 
analysis (Field, 2013; Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988). However, as detailed above, 
the factor analysis was carried out as a replication of the original CSA analyses of 
Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) and the data was used for comparative purposes.  
When compared with the results presented in Table 4.4 from the CSA 
manual, the current study’s factor analysis highlighted the following differences 
between the psychiatric sample and the normative sample. Examination of the 
psychiatric data found positive loadings on Factor 1 of the following subscales: 
social support, work hard and achieve, improve relationships, tension reduction, 
social action, focus on the positive, seek relaxing diversions, protect self and 
humour. Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) describe Factor 1 on the CSA as “Dealing 
with the Problem,” which encompasses working hard and solving the problem 
while maintaining a social dimension, characterised by relaxing and indulging in 
humorous diversions and physical recreation, as well as attempting to improve the 
significant relationships in one’s life. The original CSA Factor 1 and the 
psychiatric factor analyses differed, as the psychiatric sample’s version of 
“Dealing with the Problem” included extra coping strategies such as: tension 
reduction, seek social support, social action and  focus on the positive.  
Examination of the psychiatric sample data also found positive loadings 
on Factor 2 of the following subscales: worry, wishful thinking, tension reduction, 
ignore the problem, self blame and keep to self and not cope. Factor 2 of 
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Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) was labelled “Not Cope” on the original CSA and 
comprised a list of strategies associated with “not coping.” The psychiatric sample 
had the same subscales, although the loadings were different to the normative 
group of the CSA on this factor.  
Examination of the psychiatric sample’s data found positive loadings on 
Factor 3 “Optimism” of the following subscales: focus on solving the problem, 
seek spiritual support, focus on the positive, physical recreation and protect self.  
Factor 3 on the original CSA consisted of wishful thinking, seek spiritual support, 
focus on the positive and seek relaxing diversions and is different to this extracted 
factor from the psychiatric group, as it was inclusive of coping strategies such as 
physical recreation and protection of self and not relaxing diversions.  
Examination of the psychiatric data found negative loadings on Factor 4 
“Strategies which Focus on Sharing problems” of the following subscales: 
focus on solving the problem, worry, social action, seek professional help and 
seek relaxing diversions. Hence, the factor extracted here from the psychiatric 
sample is dissimilar from that obtained from the normative group and can not be 
classed as a “sharing problems” factor, rather it is a combination of “productive” 
and  so-called “non-productive” coping strategies.  
The four factors from the psychiatric sample were generally weakly 
correlated with one another, with the highest being -0.43, between factor 1 and 
factor 4,  as seen in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 
Factor Correlation Matrix of the Psychiatric Sample 
Factor 1.  2.  3.   4.  
1.  1.000 0.35 .322 –.431 
2.  .035 1.000 –.053 –.110 
3.  .322 –.053 1.000 –.238 
4.  –.431 –.110 –.238 1.000 
 
Univariate two-sample unequal variance t-tests comparing coping 
strategies. Unequal variance two sample t-tests were carried out on the psychiatric 
and normative samples to examine possible mean differences on each of the 19 
subscales. This approach was adopted to avoid possible unwarranted homogeneity 
of variance violations between the two groups. In all cases, samples were large 
enough to be robust to violations of the assumption of sampling from normally 
distributed populations. The overall alpha level was capped at 0.05 across all 19 
tests, and using  a Bonferroni adjustment meant that each t-test and ANOVA was 
evaluated for significance at an alpha level of  0.0026. 
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Table 4.6 
Two-Sample Unequal Variance t-Tests Between Coping Strategies of the Psychiatric Sample and 
the Normative Sample 
 Psychiatric sample  
(N = 110) 
Normative sample 
(N = 369) 
   
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value t df 
Social support 12.40 3.97 12.65 3.12 0.545 –0.61 151.31 
Focus on solving the 
problem 
23.65 6.95 25.59 4.61 0.007 –2.75 138.76 
Work hard 10.14 3.62 12.01 3.19 0.001 * –4.88 162.72 
Worry 13.5 4.01 11.26 3.26 0.001 * 5.53 154.41 
Improve relationships 11.53 4.08 12.07 4.18 0.227 –1.21 182.59 
Wishful thinking 12.79 3.96 10.07 3.84 0.001* 6.37 174.61 
Tension reduction 11.08 3.67 8.69 3.19 0.001* 6.17 162.2 
Social action 9.84 4.06 7.23 2.93 0.001* 6.27 144.44 
Ignore the problem 8.51 2.71 6.51 2.43 0.001* 6.95 164.71 
Self-blame 12.04 3.81 11.36 3.17 0.090 1.70 156.65 
Keep to self 12.34 3.57 11.43 3.61 0.020  2.34 180.61 
Seek spiritual support 9.01 4.11 5.49 2.44 0.001* 8.54 132.67 
Focus on the positive 12.63 4.16 12.75 3.30 0.782 –0.28 152.14 
Seek professional help 12.50 4.43 7.95 3.52 0.001* 9.88 152.29 
Seek relaxing 
diversions 
13.10 3.88 14.45 3.62 0.001* –3.25 169.53 
Physical recreation 8.35 3.20 8.24 3.09 0.750 0.319 174.03 
Protect self 11.80 3.84 12.14 3.52 0.407 –0.83 167.34 
Humour 8.63 3.41 7.87 2.94 0.036 2.11 160.33 
Not cope 8.22 2.99 6.71 2.66 0.001* 4.76 163.8 
Note. Adapted from Frydenberg and Lewis (2002b, p. 647). 
*Significant at p = .0026. 
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As can be seen in Table 4.6, the psychiatric sample was significantly more 
likely to use ‘not coping’ than the normative sample. The psychiatric sample was 
also significantly more likely than the normative sample to engage in : ignore, 
worry, wishful thinking tension reduction, social action, seek spiritual support 
and seek professional help. They were less likely to work hard and achieve, and 
relax. 
Age and Gender Analyses 
The literature, and indeed Frydenberg and Lewis (1997), pay particular attention 
to age and gender differences in coping strategies. While these analyses are not 
particularly necessary in a psychiatric sample, it was thought, nevertheless, 
important to carry them out to be consistent with previous research and to also 
allow for further comparisons between the psychiatric and normative samples. 
There will also be comparative analyses between women in the psychiatric sample 
and women in the normal sample and men in the psychiatric sample and men in 
the normal sample.  
Within gender differences in coping strategies between psychiatric and 
normative samples. For further analysis, both the psychiatric and normative 
samples were split by gender and the above analyses repeated. 
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Univariate analyses: Psychiatric sample. Separate univariate one-way 
ANOVAS were conducted to look at mean differences in subscale scores across 
age quartiles in the psychiatric sample split by gender (see electronic Appendix 
for analyses). The homogeneity of variance assumption, as measured by Levene’s 
test, was satisfied for all subscales for both genders using a 0.01 level of 
significance for each test, with the exception of the social acceptance subscale for 
females (p=0.002). However, as ANOVA is robust to assumption violations, no 
further action was taken in regards to this assumption violation. Only the protect 
self subscale was found to have significant mean difference across age quartiles 
for men (F3,51=7.8, p=0.01). Post hoc t-tests using a Bonferroni adjustment 
revealed a significant mean difference between the 17-33 year age group and the 
44 -75  year age group (p=0.01), with the younger age group having a higher 
mean (
! 
x =16),  than the older year age group (
! 
x = 9.93). For women, no 
significant mean differences across age quartiles were found for any of the 
subscales.  
An investigation of the proportion of people in each age quartile across the 
normative and psychiatric groups, using a chi square analysis, revealed no 
significant differences between proportions in each quartile across the two groups 
( ! 2 3( )=6.25, p=0.1), as can be seen in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7 
Classification of the Numbers and Proportions in Each Age Quartile Across the Two Groups 
 Age quartile 
Sample group 17–26 27–33 34–43 44–75 Total 
Normative      
Count 94 111 80 81 366 
Expected count 85.3 111.5 86.9 82.3 366.0 
% Within sample group 25.7 30.3 21.9 22.1 100.0 
Psychiatric      
Count 17 34 33 26 110 
Expected count 25.7 33.5 26.1 24.7 110.0 
% Within sample group 15.5 30.9 30.0 23.6 100.0 
Total      
Count 111 145 113 107 476 
Expected count 111.0 145.0 113.0 107.0 476.0 
% Within sample group 23.3 30.5 23.7 22.5 100.0 
 
 
Univariate analyses: Gender differences in coping strategies—
psychiatric sample. Unequal variance two sample t-tests were carried out in the 
psychiatric sample to see if there were gender differences in coping strategies. 
Both samples were large enough to fulfil the assumption of sampling from 
normally distributed populations. Due to conducting a large number of t-tests 
using data from low to moderately correlated subscales, each test was evaluated 
for significance at an alpha level of 0.01. Univariate t-tests showed no significant 
differences between males and females on any of the 19 subscales.  
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Logistic regression: Prediction of gender based on age and coping scale 
scores. Table 4.8 displays the results of the logistic regression model predicting 
gender based on age and the 19 coping scale scores for the psychiatric sample. 
The overall model was significant (p = .003) with the final correct classification 
rate being 74.5%. Specifically, 42 of 55 (76.4%) of the male sample were 
correctly classified (true negatives) while 40 of 55 (72.7%) of the female sample 
were correctly classified (true positives). Five of the 20 predictors were significant. 
Specifically, female inpatients were more likely to: (a) be younger (B = -0.07, p 
= .01); (b) have lower social action scores (B = -0.30, p = .006); (c) have lower 
keep to self scores (B = -0.22, p = .05); (d) have higher focus on the positive 
scores (B = 0.44, p = .001); and (e) have lower protect self scores (B = -0.32, p 
= .003), as seen in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8 
 
Prediction of Gender Based on Age and Coping Scale Scores: Psychiatric Sample Only 
Variable B SE Wald df p Value Exp(B) 
Age –0.07 0.03 6.19 1 .01 0.93 
Social support 0.06 0.11 0.29 1 .59 1.06 
Focus on solving the problem 0.02 0.07 0.09 1 .76 1.02 
Work hard –0.07 0.10 0.44 1 .51 0.94 
Worry 0.12 0.09 1.74 1 .19 1.12 
Improve relationships 0.01 0.10 0.00 1 .95 1.01 
Wishful thinking –0.04 0.09 0.27 1 .61 0.96 
Tension reduction –0.10 0.08 1.41 1 .24 0.91 
Social action –0.30 0.11 7.42 1 .006 0.74 
Ignore the problem 0.00 0.12 0.00 1 1.00 1.00 
Self-blame –0.10 0.09 1.28 1 .26 0.90 
Keep to self –0.22 0.11 3.95 1 .05 0.81 
Seek spiritual support –0.04 0.08 0.31 1 .58 0.96 
Focus on the positive 0.44 0.13 11.85 1 .001 1.56 
Seek professional help 0.10 0.08 1.45 1 .23 1.10 
Seek relaxing diversions –0.08 0.10 0.64 1 .42 0.93 
Physical recreation 0.02 0.13 0.04 1 .85 1.02 
Protect self –0.32 0.11 8.63 1 .003 0.72 
Humour –0.12 0.10 1.68 1 .19 0.88 
Not cope 0.12 0.10 1.53 1 .22 1.13 
Constant 7.13 2.39 8.94 1 .003 1,254.62 
Note. n = 110. Gender classification: 0 = male, 1 = female. Full model: !2 (20, n = 110) = 
41.38, p = .003. Base classification rate = 50.0%.  Final classification rate = 74.5%. 
 
 156 
Age quartiles. For comparative purposes, age quartiles were defined, 
according to Frydenberg and Lewis, (2002b) as: 17-26, 27-33, 34-43 and 44-75 
years. The statistical approach used across analyses involved a large number of 
tests involving subscales that required a need for more stringent tests, a possible 
mitigating factor of large samples. The overall alpha level was capped at 0.05 
across all 19 tests, and using  a Bonferroni adjustment meant that each t-test and 
ANOVA was evaluated for significance at an alpha level of  0.0026.  
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Table 4.9 
Differences in Coping Strategies Between Adults From a Normative Sample and a Psychiatric Sample Split by Gender 
 Men’s normative 
(N = 164) 
Men’s psychiatric  
(N = 55) 
 Women’s normative  
(N = 205) 
Women’s psychiatric 
(N = 55) 
 
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value x  SD x  SD p Value 
Social support 12 2.8 12.21 3.59 0.694 13.2 3.2 12.58 4.34 0.326 
Focus on solving the problem 25.8 4.4 23.76 5.91 0.021 25.4 4.8 23.54 7.09 0.030 
Work hard 12 2.4 10.63 3.67 0.007* 12 2.5 9.63 3.82 0.001* 
Worry 10.09 3.8 13.94 3.69 0.001* 11.5 3.9 13.05 4.29 0.012 
Improve relationships 12 3.4 11.87 4.16 0.712 12.1 3.6 11.18 4.02 0.128 
Wishful thinking 9.8 3.3 13.52 3.62 0.001* 10.3 3.8 12.05 4.18 0.006 
Tension reduction 7.8 3.0 11.60 3.85 0.001* 9.4 3.4 10.56 3.44 0.029 
Social action 7.3 3.1 10.49 3.86 0.001* 7.1 2.7 9.2 4.20 0.001* 
Ignore the problem 6.4 2.0 8.76 2.73 0.001* 6.6 2.6 8.27 2.69 0.001* 
Self-blame 11. 3.7 12.63 3.86 0.011 11.6 3.6 11.43 3.70 0.775 
Keep to self 1 3.4 13.03 2.89 0.030 11 3.05 11.63 4.05 0.288 
Seek spiritual support 4.9 3.0 8.98 4.33 0.001* 6 3.4 9.05 3.94 0.001* 
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
 Men’s psychiatric 
(N = 164) 
Men’s normative 
(N = 55) 
 Women’s psychiatric 
(N = 205) 
Women’s normative 
(N = 55) 
 
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value x  SD x  SD p Value 
Focus on the positive 12.6 3 12.49 3.87 0.848 12.8 3.3 12.76 4.46 0.951 
Seek professional help 8.2 4.2 12.61 4.61 0.001* 7.8 4.2 12.38 4.28 0.001* 
Seek relaxing diversions 14.3 3.2 13.49 3.76 0.156 14.6 3.1 12.71 4.01 0.002* 
Physical recreation 8.5 3.1 8.61 3.15 0.810 8 3.3 8.09 3.27 0.857 
Protect self 11.6 3 12.61 3.45 0.054 12.6 3.0 11 4.07 0.008 
Humour 8.4 2.9 9.00 3.43 0.247 7.4 2.9 8.27 3.38 0.085 
Not cope 9.2 3.4 8.25 2.91 0.047 9.6 3.0 8.2 3.09 0.004 
*Significant at p = .0026. 
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As can be seen from Table 4.9, there were significant mean differences 
between men in the normative and psychiatric samples on the following coping 
strategies: worry, wishful thinking, tension reduction, social action, ignore the 
problem, seek spiritual support and seek professional help. For all these coping 
strategies the psychiatric sample had higher scores. For women in the normative 
and psychiatric samples there were significant mean differences on the following 
coping strategies: work hard and achieve, wishful thinking, social action, ignore 
the problem, seek spiritual, support, seek professional help, protect self and not 
coping. Mean scores from the normative sample were significantly higher on 
work hard and achieve, whereas they were higher in the psychiatric sample for: 
social action, ignore the problem, seek spiritual support, and seek professional 
help. 
Comparison of coping strategies of the age quartiles of normative and 
psychiatric samples. Unequal variance two sample t-tests were carried out within 
each of the age quartiles on the psychiatric and normative samples to examine 
possible mean differences on each of the 19 subscales (see Table 4.10). The 
findings presented below take into consideration that the psychiatric sample had 
relatively smaller sample size than the normative sample in each of the 4 age 
quartiles. 
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Table 4.10 
Two-Sample Unequal Variance t-Tests Between The Normative and Psychiatric Samples’ Coping Strategies on Each Subscale Within Each Quartile 
 Normative Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
17–26a      
Seek Social support 13.8 2.9 13.47 4.09 0.754 
Focus on solving the problem 26 4.4 26.7 6.91 0.691 
Work hard 12.1 2.2 11.35 3.77 0.001* 
Worry 12.4 3.9 15.89 4.73 0.030 
Improve relationships 12.5 3.4 13.11 3.74 0.537 
Wishful thinking 10.9 3.7 13.35 3.97 0.028 
Tension reduction 10.4 3.6 11.70 4.61 0.283 
Social action 7.2 2.9 11.64 3.46 0.001* 
Ignore the problem 6.9 2.5 8.52 3.66 0.096 
Self-blame 12.2 3.6 11.17 3.80 0.311 
Keep to self 11.5 3.6 12.11 3.82 0.547 
Seek spiritual support 5.6 3.1 10.82 3.81 0.006 
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Table 4.10 (continued) 
 Normative Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Focus on the positive 12.5 2.9 13.47 5.08 0.454 
Seek professional help 7.3 4.1 12.76 5.17 0.001* 
Seek relaxing diversions 15.6 2.9 13.05 4.02 0.022 
Physical recreation 8.7 3.3 10.23 3.70 0.126 
Protect self 13.0 2.7 13.70 4.92 0.575 
Humour 8.7 2.8 9.29 3.94 0.561 
Not cope 7.6 2.8 8.82 3.19 0.155 
27–33b      
Seek Social support 12.9 2.7 13.17 4.12 0.721 
Focus on solving the problem 25.4 4.1 23.70 6.65 0.166 
Work hard 12.0 2.4 10.17 3.93 0.014 
Worry 11.5 3.9 14.24 3.94 0.02 
Improve relationships 12.2 3.4 12.35 4.38 0.855 
Wishful thinking 9.9 3.6 12.82 3.52 0.001* 
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Table 4.10 (continued) 
 Normative Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Tension reduction 8.8 3.3 11.38 3.64 0.001* 
Social action 7.7 2.7 10.61 4.68 0.001* 
Ignore the problem 6.6 2.5 8.52 2.66 0.001* 
Self-blame 11.4  3.8  12.58 4.32 0.158 
Keep to self 11.1  3.4 12.20  3.74  0.132 
Seek spiritual support 5.1 3.0 9.41 4.18 0.001* 
Focus on the positive 12.5 3.1 12.94 3.94 0.553 
Seek professional help 7.6 3.7 12.26 4.19 0.001* 
Seek relaxing diversions 14.3  3.0 13.58 3.93 0.330 
Physical recreation 8.9 3.4 8.47 3.40 0.521 
Protect self 12.2 2.9 12.35  4.02 0.841 
Humour 8.1 2.9 9.26 3.91 0.116 
Not cope 6.8 2.7 7.73 2.56 0.072 
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Table 4.10 (continued) 
 Normative Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
34–43c      
Seek Social support 12.0 2.5 12.03 3.73 0.966 
Focus on solving the problem 26 4.3 22.51 6.34 0.06 
Work hard 12.3 2.3 9.6 3.32  0.001* 
Worry 10.8 3.5 13.44 4.01  0.003* 
Improve relationships 11.9 3.3 10.84 3.28 0.124 
Wishful thinking 9.4 3.2 13.21 4.11  0.001* 
Tension reduction 7.9 2.6 11.42 3.58  0.001* 
Social action 7.1 2.9 9.12 3.94 0.010 
Ignore the problem 6.2 2.2 8.42 2.38  0.001* 
Self-blame 10.9 3.4 11.93 3.57 0.163 
Keep to self 11.8 3.5 12.09 3.46 0.688 
Seek spiritual support 5.2 2.9 7.84 3.92 0.001 
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Focus on the positive 12.5 2.8 12.30 4.05 0.797 
Table 4.10 (continued) 
 Normative Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Seek professional help 7.9 4.3 13.06 4.68  0.001* 
Seek relaxing diversions 13.5 3.2 12.63 3.68 0.241 
Physical recreation 7.7 2.9 7.75 2.54 0.928 
Protect self 11.8 3.2 11.21 3.30 0.387 
Humour 7.4 2.7 8.27 2.54 0.109 
Not cope 6.4 2.3 8.06 2.90 0.005 
44–75d      
Seek Social support 11.6 3.8 11.15 3.78 0.601 
Focus on solving the problem 25.1 5.7 23.03 5.75 0.117 
Work hard 11.6 2.9 9.96 3.49 0.037 
Worry 10.1 3.8 13.94 3.78  0.001* 
Improve relationships 11.7 3.9 10.26 4.46 0.148 
Wishful thinking 10.1 4.0 11.84 4.36 0.079 
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Tension reduction 7.5 2.7 9.84 3.02 0.001* 
Table 4.10 (continued) 
 Normative Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Social action 6.9 3.2 8.57 3.20 0.026 
Ignore the problem 6.4 2.4 8.61 2.61  0.001* 
Self-blame 10.9 3.5 12.0 3.50 0.170 
Keep to self 11.6 3.6 12.96 3.47 0.092 
Seek spiritual support 6.4 4.0 8.80 4.20 0.014 
Focus on the positive 13.7 3.6 12.07 4.06 0.750 
Seek professional help 9.5 4.8 11.92 4.05 0.015 
Seek relaxing diversions 14.3 3.5 13.07 4.15 0.181 
Physical recreation 7.3 2.8 7.73 3.03 0.525 
Protect self 11.5 3.5 10.61 2.95 0.208 
Humour 7.1 3.1 7.84 3.26 0.314 
Not cope 5.8 2.6 8.69 3.48  0.001* 
aNormative, n = 94; psychiatric, n = 17. bNormative, n = 111; psychiatric, n = 34. cNormative, n = 80; psychiatric, n = 33. dNormative, n = 81; psychiatric, n = 26. 
*Significant at p = .0026. 
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In the 17-26 year age quartile, significant mean differences were found on 
subscales: work hard and achieve, social action, seek spiritual support and seek 
professional help. The psychiatric sample used more social action, seek spiritual 
support and seek professional help than the normative sample, whereas the 
normative sample used more work hard and achieve coping strategies. In the 27-
33 year age quartile, significant mean differences were found on subscales: 
wishful thinking, tension reduction, social action, ignore the problem, seek 
spiritual support and seek professional help. In all cases, the psychiatric sample 
means were larger than those of the normative sample. In the 34-43 year age 
quartile, significant mean differences were found on subscales: work hard and 
achieve, wishful thinking, tension reduction, ignore the problem, seek spiritual 
support, and seek professional help. In all cases the psychiatric sample means 
were higher than the normative sample, with the exception of work hard and 
achieve. In the 44-75 year age quartile significant mean differences were found on 
subscales: worry, tension reduction, ignore the problem, and not coping. The 
psychiatric means were higher than the normative sample on all these coping 
strategies.  
Differences in coping strategies between the normative sample and the 
schizophrenic subsample. An analysis was conducted to compare the normative 
sample to a subsample of those only diagnosed with schizophrenia. Unequal 
variance two sample t- tests were carried out on the subsample and normative 
samples to examine possible mean differences on each of the 19 subscales. This 
approach was adopted to avoid possible unwarranted homogeneity of variance 
violations between the two groups. In all cases, samples were large enough to be 
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robust to violations of the assumption of sampling from normally distributed 
populations.  
Table 4.11 
Unequal Variance Two-Sample t-Tests on Coping Strategies Between a Normative Sample and 
People Diagnosed with Schizophrenia 
 Normative, N  = 
369 
Schizophrenics, N  = 
50 
 
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Social support 12.65 3.12 12.46 3.78 0.735 
Focus on solving the problem 25.59 4.61 23.92 6.91 0.103 
Work hard 12.01 3.19 10.02 3.49 0.001* 
Worry 11.26 3.26 13.42 3.65 0.001* 
Improve relationships 12.07 4.18 11.74 4.11 0.597 
Wishful thinking 10.07 3.84 12.64 3.43 0.001* 
Tension reduction 8.69 3.19 10.68 3.70 0.001* 
Social action 7.23 2.93 9.70 4.15 0.001* 
Ignore the problem 6.51 2.43 8.62 2.26 0.001* 
Self-blame 11.36 3.17 11.08 3.70 0.612 
Keep to self 11.43 3.61 12.62 3.46 0.026 
Seek spiritual support 5.49 2.44 9.44 3.56 0.001* 
Focus on the positive 12.75 3.30 13.40 4.16 0.293 
Seek professional help 7.95 3.52 12.76 4.34 0.001* 
Seek relaxing diversions 14.45 3.62 14 3.77 0.429 
Physical recreation 8.24 3.09 8.66 3.39 0.409 
Protect self 12.14 3.52 12.42 3.94 0.635 
Humour 7.87 2.94 8.82 3.46 0.069 
Not cope 6.71 2.66 7.90 2.88 0.007 
Note. Data for normative sample from Frydenberg and Lewis (2002b, Table 2). 
*p = .0026. 
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As can be seen in Table 4.11, the unequal variance two-sample t-tests 
revealed significant mean differences between subjects diagnosed with 
schizophrenia and the normative sample. Significant mean differences were found 
on the following variables: work hard and achieve, worry, wishful thinking, social 
action, ignore the problem, seek spiritual support and seek professional help. 
Those patients diagnosed with schizophrenia had higher mean scores on all these 
subscales except for the coping strategy work hard and achieve. The normative 
sample was more likely to work hard and achieve than those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. This pattern was different to how the psychiatric group as a whole 
compared to the normative group, the difference being that those patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia sought more relaxing diversions than the 
psychiatric group as a whole. There was no difference between those diagnosed 
with schizophrenia and the normative sample on endorsing the coping strategy 
seek relaxing diversions.  
Discussion. This study evaluated how well the CSA measured coping 
strategies in people diagnosed with a mental illness. Specifically, it compared how 
this group differed from the normative sample used in the original validation of 
the CSA scale.  
Factor analysis results. The results of the factor analysis demonstrated 
that coping in psychiatric patients, while more suited to the four factor model, 
might even be described in terms of a three-factor solution without any 
unwarranted loss of information, compared to the original, four-factor solution. 
The three-factor model being: (a) dealing with the problem, (b) not coping, or (c) 
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optimism. This model omits the fourth factor of the original model, which was 
characterised by sharing coping strategies, i.e., sharing problems, seeking 
professional help, social action and seek social support. The 3-factor structure 
would also be a more parsimonious model for inpatients at a psychiatric hospital, 
as such individuals often do not have the resources, such as social support, to fall 
back on and are either already engaged with professional help or do not wish for 
professional help.  
Not coping and non-productive coping strategies. All comparative 
analyses highlighted a number of significant differences in the way the psychiatric 
sample coped with general concerns, when compared to the normative sample. On 
this basis, the CSA appeared to discriminate between the psychiatric and 
normative populations.   
Hypothesis 1: The first hypothesis was supported in that the psychiatric 
sample endorsed the not coping subscale and non-productive coping strategies 
more on the CSA questionnaire, than the normative sample. The finding that the 
psychiatric sample was more likely to endorse not coping and less likely to 
endorse productive strategies than the normative sample was not unexpected, 
given that the psychiatric sample were inpatients in a psychiatric hospital and this 
finding is consistent with other research (Frydenberg, & Lewis, 2002b; 
Wisniewski & Frydenberg, 1995). For example, the work hard and achieve 
coping strategy was not likely to be endorsed by the psychiatric patients, because 
as inpatients most were unemployed and hospitalised. The different coping 
strategies endorsed by the two groups suggest each group may adapt a particular 
coping strategy depending on the demands placed upon them by virtue of 
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differing environments, a finding which is certainly in keeping with research on 
coping in those diagnosed with a mental illness (Steed, 1998). This finding also 
concurs with Holahan and Moos (1987) who found that active coping strategies 
were associated with more personal and contextual resources, whereas avoidance 
coping was associated with fewer such resources. The results are also consistent 
with prior work in the psychological literature on the link between coping and 
personal and environmental resources (Billings & Moos, 1981; Pearlin & 
Schooler, 1978; Tepper, Rogers, Coleman & Maloney, 2001).  
The coping strategy work hard and achieve is considered an effective 
coping strategy amongst the vast majority of those in the coping field and also 
falls into categories such as problem solving and problem focused, that are seen as 
adaptive coping strategies (Endler & Parker, 1990; Lazarus & Folkman, 1980). 
The normative sample in this study were more likely than the psychiatric sample 
to use the work hard and achieve coping strategy. The literature suggests that the 
majority of people use work as a coping strategy and are more likely to put more 
of their efforts into work when faced with difficult situations (Stanley, 1983). For 
the psychiatric sample in this study who were hospitalised, this was not an option. 
For many of these people in such dire circumstances, when faced with adversity, 
they also have few options other than to “not cope,” as they have few social 
supports, and often abhorrent family and living conditions. Newnes (2014) argues 
that social factors are still minimised by health professionals. Instead, there is the 
continued implementation of boundaries of what meets “normal” and, in effect, 
this boundary setting also highlights what is “abnormal,” which is anything that 
does not fit into the parameters defined as “normal.”  
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The psychiatric sample was more likely than the normative sample to 
engage in, what Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) term, “non-productive” coping 
strategies. Contrary to previous research (Aldwin & Revenson, 1987; Fledderus, 
Bohlmeijer & Pieterse, 2010), the psychiatric patients in this study were more 
inclined to use a mixture of non-productive strategies with more productive, 
adaptive coping strategies, such as optimistic and shared coping strategies.  The 
psychiatric sample also used social resources, a finding consistent with Holahan 
and Moos (1987). There was a difference between the psychiatric and normative 
sample on not coping, with the psychiatric sample endorsing more items on this 
subscale compared to the normative sample. This subscale contained coping 
strategies such as: worry, keep to self and wishful thinking, seen by Frydenberg & 
Lewis (1997) as “non-productive” coping strategies. However, such coping 
strategies may be useful to individuals in times of stress. As reported above, while 
the psychiatric sample may have endorsed more so-called “non-productive” 
coping strategies, they used a mixture of productive coping alongside not coping. 
Such an approach may be useful for these patients, given the multiple vicissitudes 
they are “dealing with”.  Categorising such attempts as “non-productive” when 
the context is unknown may be passing a judgment on the way a person manages 
difficulties in their life. This is where the CSA does little to represent individual 
variation in coping strategies.   
An interesting finding in this comparative study was that the hospital 
admission did not seem to have prevented some types of problem-solving, or 
active coping attempts. This finding is especially noteworthy, considering some 
inpatients were involuntarily admitted to the facility.   
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Religious and spiritual coping mechanisms.  
Hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2a that the psychiatric sample will be more 
likely than the normative sample to endorse seek spiritual support, was also 
supported by the current study and these results are consistent with many other 
research studies (Ano & Vasconcelles, 2004; Bergin, Masters, & Richards, 1987; 
Crossley, 1995; Koeing, 2009; Pargament, Koeing, Tarakeshwar, & Hahn, 2004; 
Ruchita, Parmanand, Dandeep, Kumar, Malhotra & Tyagi, 2011; Phillips & Stein, 
2007; Smolak, et al., 2013; Tepper, Rogers, Coleman & Maloney, 2001). 
Hypothesis 2b. Hypothesis 2b that those diagnosed with schizophrenia will be 
more likely than the normative sample to use the coping strategy seek spiritual 
support was supported by the research findings.  Those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia did use an optimistic coping strategy seek spiritual support, which 
has been reported in the literature (Ruchita et al., 2011; Smolak, et al., 2013; 
Tepper et al., 2001). Again, as found with the overall psychiatric sample, those 
diagnosed with schizophrenia used a mixture of  “productive” and “unproductive” 
coping strategies.  
Gender differences.  
Hypothesis 3. The third hypothesis that men will endorse avoidance 
coping strategies more than women, as measured by the CSA, was not supported 
by univariate analyses.   
Hypothesis 4. The fourth hypothesis that women will endorse more social 
support and emotion-focused coping than men as measured by the CSA was also 
not supported. Investigations into gender differences revealed no significant 
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differences between men and women in the types of coping strategies they used, a 
finding consistent with Folkman and Lazarus (1980).  
While there were no gender differences as reflected in the univariate 
analyses,  multivariate analyses revealed that gender could be accurately predicted 
by the following subscales, social action, keep to self, focus on the positive and 
protect self, as a set. Multivariate analyses revealed that women in the psychiatric 
sample were more likely to have lower protect self and social action subscale 
scores, be younger and have higher focus on the positive scores. Overall, the 
literature has revealed that women are more likely than men to use strategies that 
involved verbal expressions to others, to seek emotional support, ruminate about 
problems, and use positive self talk, (Felsten, 1998; Pearlin & Schooler, 1978; 
Tamres, Janicki & Helgeson, 2002).  
Another interesting finding in the study was that men in the psychiatric 
sample used some of what are considered to be more stereotypical coping 
mechanisms of women, such as: worry, wishful thinking, tension reduction, social 
action, ignore the problem, seek spiritual support and seek professional help, 
more than men from the normative sample. This finding is in contrast to general 
research in how men cope.  
There were no significant differences in problem-focused strategies, 
indicating that men from the psychiatric group fared similarly to the normative 
group. The age cohort of 17-33 year old men revealed coping mechanisms, such 
as protecting themselves,  more than any other cohort, and more than females. 
This finding is consistent with previous research (Porter & Stone, 1995; Ptacek et 
al., 1994). Contrary to findings from Frydenberg and Lewis, (2002b), this study 
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found that gender and age did impact, to a certain extent, on responses given by 
the psychiatric population.  
Gender differences in coping strategies were investigated using two 
different approaches (univariate and multivariate statistical analyses).  It was no 
surprise that some variables were significant on their own, but not significant in 
the presence of others, and some insignificant on their own, but significant in the 
presence of others. Interestingly, what this means for this study is that women in 
the psychiatric sample were more likely to be younger than men; have lower 
social action scores; have lower keep to self scores; have higher focus on the 
positive scores; and have lower protect self scores. 
Analyses conducted to investigate whether there was a relationship 
between diagnosis and gender, revealed that there were no significant differences, 
a finding consistent with Narrow et al. (2007) and Kinderman et al., (2013) who 
acknowledge the general unreliability of psychiatric diagnoses per se. The 
unreliability of psychiatric diagnoses is a point other researchers have raised (e.g., 
Aboraya, 2007; Jacobs, 2009). Review of  diagnoses and discussions with ward 
psychiatrists revealed patients had received an array of diagnoses and, therefore, 
for the purposes of this study, the most recent diagnosis was used. The 
multiplicity of diagnoses and the limited conclusions which could be drawn raise 
an important consideration for future researchers who wish to use diagnosis in 
analyses.  
Coping strategies of those diagnosed with schizophrenia. When the 
psychiatric sample was refined to those diagnosed with schizophrenia and 
compared to the normative sample, the results revealed significant differences on 
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the following subscales: work hard and achieve, worry, wishful thinking, social 
action, ignore the problem, seek spiritual support and seek professional help. 
Those people diagnosed with schizophrenia had higher mean scores than the 
normative sample on all subscales except for the subscale work hard and achieve. 
Hypothesis 5, that the normative sample would be more likely to use the work 
hard and achieve coping strategy than those diagnosed with schizophrenia from 
the psychiatric sample, was supported by the results of this study.  The 
schizophrenic subsample, in keeping with previous research findings, utilised 
worry, ignoring the problem, seek spiritual support and seek professional help 
significantly more so than the normative sample. These results are in keeping with 
research on people diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
Strengths and limitations of Study A. The strengths of this study lie with 
the instrument, as the CSA was easy to administer, had good psychometric 
reliability, and patients reported that they enjoyed completing the questionnaire, 
as it prompted them to think about their many coping strategies. Some remarked 
that it reminded them of certain coping strategies they had not used in a while and 
could possibly use again. Given some of the patients who completed the 
questionnaire may have had low attention and concentration spans at the time, 
from a clinical perspective this feedback is helpful in understanding that patients 
did not find completing the questionnaire too challenging. Therefore, the CSA 
demonstrated good clinical utility within a psychiatric hospital. The CSA also 
provided a range of coping strategies which were easily identifiable and the Likert 
style of response options made for a reliable and valid way to measure patients’ 
coping strategies.  
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Where limitations arise with the CSA are in its use as a measurement tool 
of coping per se for psychiatric inpatients. This scale alone only reflected the 
coping strategies which patients endorsed they might use or were more likely to 
use than other coping strategies, in general. The very nature of the scale’s 
categorisation of   coping attempts as “productive” and “non productive” again 
enforced a categorization on an individual’s attempts to manage situations.  
Conclusion and recommendations. In this study the CSA successfully 
discriminated between the psychiatric and normative samples’ coping strategies. 
In particular, the findings suggest that the CSA might be a useful tool for 
measuring the coping strategies of individuals diagnosed with a mental illness, 
with caution applied. But, it must also be remembered that there are many 
problems associated with transferring such information from coping 
questionnaires over into a summary of patient overall coping and the meaning of 
coping for this population, as also suggested by Aldwin and Revenson (1987) in 
their longitudinal study. Aldwin and Revenson found that coping inventories 
negatively correlated with perceptions of efficacy, which suggested, in their study, 
that they may have overlooked the positive coping strategies of people. What 
people report on a questionnaire is only a particular coping strategy, not their 
overall coping per se. A score for the use of a particular coping strategy might be 
useful in an individual capacity, but clustering groups of scores for people and 
comparing them does nothing to add to the meaning of the coping experience.  
A possible way around the limitations of the CSA as a questionnaire 
listing items patients only endorse, would be to use the CSA as an adjunct clinical 
tool as part of case formulation, but only in an individual clinical capacity. Such 
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inventories could be used as a way of enhancing a coping repertoire, but not as a 
coping diagnostic tool per se. As a teaching resource or a way to help identify 
patients’ strengths and coping styles, with caution applied, it has its merits. 
However, more appropriately, carefully formulated approaches that bring together 
a variety of sources of information, plus personalized contact, interviews and 
discussions of how patients manage their difficulties, in general, would yield a 
richer and a more personalised account of patients coping. I would certainly 
caution against the sole use of the CSA questionnaire as a research instrument for 
those diagnosed with a mental illness, because it might promote “assessment of” 
and “judgment of” coping by mental health professions, resulting in the 
categorization of patient coping attempts.   
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Study B: Matched Study: A Comparative Analysis Between a 
Community and a Psychiatric Sample Matched on Age and Gender.  
The purpose of the Study  
A matched study was carried out between the psychiatric group and a 
separate adult community group in Western Australia to investigate differences in 
coping strategies between the two groups after matching for age and sex. This 
study was a comparative study of coping strategies between a psychiatric inpatient 
sample and a “normal” community sample that were matched on age and gender. 
The study was a matched pairs design, to investigate differences in coping 
strategies between the two groups after matching for age and sex. Participants 
were matched on these two variables as previous studies had found evidence for 
age and gender differences in coping strategies. For example, Frydenberg and 
Lewis (1997) had found significant gender and age differences in coping 
strategies in both adolescent and adult samples using the CSA as a measurement 
tool (Frydenberg & Lewis, 1993,1994,1997, 2000, 2002a, 2002b). These findings 
are also consistent with previous research on gender and age differences 
(Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-Larson & Hobart, 1987; Littlewood, Cramer,  Hoekstra, 
& Humphrey, 1991; Matud, 2004; Melendez, Mayordomo, Sancho, & Tomas, 
2012; McGreal, Evans & Burrows, 1997). The psychiatric sample matched with a 
community sample for age and sex, will use more unproductive coping strategies 
as measured by the CSA.  
Therefore, it is hypothesised: 
Hypothesis 1.  When matched for age and sex, those diagnosed with a mental 
illness would use more unproductive strategies than the community sample. 
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Design 
The study was a matched pairs design, to investigate differences in coping 
strategies between the two groups after matching for age and sex. 
Method 
 Participants 
Psychiatric sample. The original psychiatric sample, as described in Study 
A of this chapter, was also used for this study.!They!were matched by year of birth 
and gender against the set of ten male and ten female community participants. In 
brief, this group of psychiatric patients consisted of inpatients, 18-75 years old (
! 
x  
=33.54, SD=10.01), with a variety of diagnoses (see Study A, Table 4.1).  
  Matched Community Participants. Twenty male (N=10) ( x  age, 
35.9, SD =11.46) and female (N=10) ( x  age, 35.2, SD =9.23) adults, between the 
ages of 18-60, from the Western Australian community, were matched by year of 
birth and gender against the set of psychiatric inpatients described in Study A (see 
Study A for participant information). Recruiting of the matched sample took place 
over a six-month period.  A list of the year of birth required was posted on my 
supervisor’s office door at the university and employees (not students) at the 
university completed a questionnaire if they matched the required age and gender. 
People were also recruited from doctor’s surgeries in local neighbourhoods using 
the same process. Questionnaires were completed by the participant in their own 
environment as per questionnaire instructions on the front of the CSA and 
returned via the reply-paid envelope to my supervisor’s university address.  
Measures 
The matched sample completed the General Form of the Coping Scale for Adults 
Questionnaire (CSA). The questionnaire takes on average 10 minutes. The 
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community participants completed the questionnaires in their home environment 
as per the CSA test instructions on the CSA questionnaire (see Study A test 
instructions)  
Procedure  
The procedure for the psychiatric sample was as described in Study A.  
Results  
In order to see whether the 20 pairs matched by age and gender were 
suitable for analysis by a paired t-test, difference scores were computed for each 
subscale and examined by the use of QQ plots to check for any evidence of the 
difference scores possibly being sampled from non-normal distributions (as the 
paired t-test assumes that the difference scores were sampled from a normally 
distributed population). For all 19 subscales, the QQ plots did not indicate that the 
difference scores might have come from non-normally distributions.  As a result 
of this, the data were analysed by the use of paired t-tests.  Due to conducting a 
large number of tests using data from correlated subscales, each test was 
evaluated for significance at a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.0026 (see 
Appendix B).  
No significant mean differences between the two samples were found on 
the 19 subscales. As a check of the robustness of the above analysis, Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranked tests, which avoid the assumption of the difference score 
populations being normally distributed, were conducted on each subscale. The 
results of these analyses were in total agreement with the above paired t-tests, and 
showed no significant differences (see Appendix B).  
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Discussion: There was no support for the first hypothesis that aimed to 
explore whether a matched-pairs analyses, matched for age and sex, would reveal 
differences in coping strategies between the psychiatric group and a community 
sample.  These findings are also not consistent with findings from Study A. A 
possible reason for the lack of significant differences between the groups could 
have been due to the matching variables of gender and year of birth being 
ineffective in terms of controlling the variability in the participants. Another 
possible reason could have been the small sample size that may have resulted in 
the analyses having a lack of power to find significant differences between the 
two groups (Siegel & Castellan, 1988).   
A finding that needs to be acknowledged from Study A that may have 
influenced the matched study was that there was a biased distribution of 
occupational status favouring the upper end of the occupational continuum 
(Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997). In Study A the normative sample comprised 133 
Australian middle managers from a private sector organisation in the retail 
industry and 236 non-managers from the Australian community.  Therefore, it 
could be considered that the comparative group in Study A was not a “true” 
representation of a normative community sample, as it favoured higher 
occupational status. Consequently, this smaller matched study with the findings of 
no difference just might reflect more of the true meaning of the little difference in 
the choice of coping strategies between so-called normative and psychiatric 
samples. 
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Study C: How Do Those Diagnosed With a Mental Illness Cope When 
Compared to University Students? A Comparative Analysis of Coping Using 
the Coping Scale for Adults (CSA) 
The current study extended the investigation of the CSA (Frydenberg & 
Lewis, 1997) with the incorporation of a sample of undergraduate university 
students (N=110). The objective of this study was to compare coping strategies of 
those diagnosed with a mental illness to university students.  The study was a 
cross-sectional design of the similarities and differences in coping strategies of 
psychiatric inpatients and university students, as measured by the CSA. Factor 
structure, gender and age differences across the 19 coping strategies were 
compared.  
Method.  
Participants 
 Undergraduate university students. The participants were 110 
students (
! 
x  =30.34, SD=9.0), male (N=55) and female (N= 55), aged between 18-
60 years, who were enrolled in undergraduate psychology units. Students 
volunteered and were randomly selected from a number of tutorial groups in first 
and second year psychology.   
 Psychiatric sample. The original psychiatric sample, as described 
in Study A of this chapter, was also used for this study. In brief, this group 
consisted of inpatients, 18-75 years old (
! 
x  =33.54, SD=10.01), with a variety of 
diagnoses (see Study A, Table 4.1).  
 Descriptions of Coping strategy endorsed across the university  
  and psychiatric groups within each age quartile. For comparative 
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purposes age quartiles were defined as previously in Study A, namely 17-26, 27-
33, 34-43 and 44-75 years. Unequal variance two-sample t-tests were carried out 
within each of the age quartiles on the university and psychiatric samples to 
examine possible differences in coping strategy use across each of the 19 
subscales (see Table 4.13). With the exception of the psychiatric sample 17-26 
age quartile and the university samples 27-33, 34-43 and  44-75 age quartiles, all 
other samples were large enough to be suitable for general parametric techniques. 
It should be noted, however, that the last age quartile, 44-75 years, does not 
consist of any university males, and is, therefore, a comparison with only 
university females of that age. 
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Table 4.12 
Age Quartile Cross-Tabulation for the Psychiatric and University Samples 
 Age quartile 
Sample group 17–26 27–33 34–43 44–75 Total 
Psychiatric      
Count 17 34 33 26 110 
Expected count 35.5 28.0 27.5 19.0 110.0 
% Within sample group 15.5 30.9 30.0 23.6 100.0 
University      
Count 54 22 22 12 110 
Expected count 35.5 28.0 27.5 19.0 110.0 
% Within sample group 49.1 20.0 20.0 10.9 100.0 
Total      
Count 71 56 55 38 220 
Expected count 71.0 56.0 55.0 38.0 220.0 
% Within sample group 32.3 25.5 25.0 17.3 100.0 
 
Procedure. Students were administered the General form of the CSA in 
their tutorial group.  The standardised test instructions were used and the 
examiner was present in the room while students completed the questionnaire. 
Recruiting took place over a 6 month period. Data collected for the psychiatric 
sample was as described in Study A.  
Results.  
Comparative analyses of  university and psychiatric samples. Several 
analyses were carried out to examine possible differences between the university 
and psychiatric samples. To investigate possible age differences between the 
university and psychiatric samples, a two-way ANOVA (age by group and 
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gender) revealed a significant interaction between gender and group (F3,216 =10.99, 
p=0.000). To examine this interaction effect more closely, separate unequal 
variance t-tests were carried out. Within the male subgroup there was a significant 
difference in age between the university and psychiatric groups (t75, =5.9, 
p=0.000), with the psychiatric males being older ( x =37.05, SD=11.52 ) than the 
university males ( x =26.98, SD=5.25).  
Within the female subgroup there was no significant difference in age 
between the two samples (t104, =0.93, p=0.35). Within the psychiatric group there 
was no significant age difference between genders (t100,=0.83, p=0.409). Within 
the university group there was a significant age difference between genders (t79, =-
4.23, p=0.000), with males ( x =26.98, SD=5.25) on average being younger than 
females ( x =33.70, SD=10.57).  
Data from the university sample were analysed similarly to Study A. A 
preliminary analysis of the data split by gender across all 19 subscales was 
conducted using box plots and histograms. The majority of histograms and 
boxplots were reasonably symmetrical (see Appendix B). For males social action 
(z=2.42, p=0.01), seek spiritual support (z=3.55, p=0.00); seek professional help 
(z=2.85, p=0.00) exhibited significant skewness. For females work (z=-2.51, 
p=0.01), tension reduction (z=3.16, p=0.00), social acceptance (z=4.46, p=0.00), 
seek spiritual support (z=2.73,p=0.01), and seek professional help (z=2.25, 
p=0.02) exhibited significant skewness (see Appendix B for relevant sample 
statistics). The skewness did not appear to be caused by one or two extreme 
outliers, but instead appeared to be the result of  a spread of scores that tapered off 
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towards the upper end of score totals. No data transformation was considered 
necessary. 
Preliminary analysis. Unequal variance two sample t-tests were carried 
out on the university sample to examine age differences across gender. Both 
samples were large enough to avoid the assumption of sampling from normally 
distributed populations. There was evidence of a significant mean difference on 
the age variable across gender (t79=4.23, p=0.00), with females being older (
! 
x  
=33.7; SD=10.57) than males (
! 
x  =27.0; SD=5.24). As a result of this finding, age 
was included as a co-variate in any multivariate analyses that follow.  
Age quartiles, university and psychiatric samples. An investigation of the 
proportion of people in each age quartile across the university and psychiatric 
groups, using a chi-square analysis, revealed significant  differences between 
proportions in each quartile across the two groups ( ! 2 3( ) = 29.21, p = 0.00 ), as can 
be seen in Table 4.12. In the 27-33 age quartile and the 34-43 age quartile there 
were more psychiatric subjects than university subjects. The university sample 
had more than expected numbers in the 17-26 age quartile and less than expected 
in the 45-75 age quartile. 
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Table 4.13 
Two-Sample Unequal Variance t-Tests Between the University and Psychiatric Samples’ Coping Strategies on Each Subscale Within Each Quartile 
 University Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
17–26a      
Seek Social support 14.22 3.5 13.47 4.09 0.502 
Focus on solving the problem 25.22 4.59 26.7 6.91 0.416 
Work hard and achieve 10.99 2.50 11.35 3.77 0.716 
Worry 10.96 3.56 15.89 4.73 0.038 
Improve relationships 10.85 3.09 13.11 3.74 0.033 
Wishful thinking 11.42 2.94 13.35 3.97 0.078 
Tension reduction 9.90 3.30 11.70 4.61 0.15 
Social action 7.05 2.46 11.64 3.46 0.001* 
Ignore the problem 7.25 2.22 8.52 3.66 0.191 
Self-blame 11.01 3.86 11.17 3.80 0.883 
Keep to self 10.00 3.71 12.11 3.82 0.055 
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Table 4.13 (continued) 
 University Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Seek spiritual support 6.03 3.72 10.82 3.81 0.001* 
Focus on the positive 12.89 3.34 13.47 5.08 0.662 
Seek professional help 6.81 3.44 12.76 5.17 0.001* 
Seek relaxing diversions 15.09 2.57 13.05 4.02 0.064 
Physical recreation 8.51 3.04 10.23 3.70 0.096 
Protect self 11.51 3.35 13.70 4.92 0.102 
Humour 8.78 3.11 9.29 3.94 0.627 
Not cope 7.12 2.94 8.82 3.19 0.063 
27–33b      
Seek Social support 12.09 3.89 13.17 4.12 0.324 
Focus on solving the problem 25.59 3.47 23.70 6.65 0.172 
Work hard and achieve 10.95 2.08 10.17 3.93 0.339 
Worry 10.36 3.44 14.24 3.94 0.005 
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Table 4.13 (continued) 
 University Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Improve relationships 10.86 3.28 12.35 4.38 0.153 
Wishful thinking 10.73 2.69 12.82 3.52 0.015 
Tension reduction 9.63 3.30 11.38 3.64 0.07 
Social action 6.90 2.34 10.61 4.68 0.001* 
Ignore the problem 7.04 1.40 8.52 2.66 0.009 
Self-blame 10.59 4.17 12.58 4.32 0.091 
Keep to self 10.90 2.69 12.20 3.74 0.138 
Seek spiritual support 5.45 3.63 9.41 4.18 0.001* 
Focus on the positive 12.04 1.73 12.94 3.94 0.250 
Seek professional help 8.72 3.45 12.26 4.19 0.001* 
Seek relaxing diversions 15.09 2.54 13.58 3.93 0.088 
Physical recreation 7.63 2.79 8.47 3.40 0.321 
Protect self 12.31 2.64 12.35 4.02 0.969 
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Table 4.13 (continued) 
 University Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Humour 8.77 2.50 9.26 3.91 0.568 
Not cope 6.71 2.16 7.73 2.56 0.115 
34–43c      
Seek Social support 11.63 3.87 12.03 3.73 0.709 
Focus on solving the problem 27.18 3.06 22.51 6.34 0.001* 
Work hard and achieve 11.44 1.67 9.6 3.32 0.009 
Worry 11.13 3.76 13.44 4.01 0.047 
Improve relationships 10.31 3.69 10.84 3.28 0.589 
Wishful thinking 11.41 3.08 13.21 4.11 0.069 
Tension reduction 9.45 2.55 11.42 3.58 0.021 
Social action 8.72 3.28 9.12 3.94 0.689 
Ignore the problem 7.59 2.21 8.42 2.38 0.192 
Self-blame 11.18 4.59 11.93 3.57 0.518 
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Table 4.13 (continued) 
 University Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Keep to self 10.04 3.97 12.09 3.46 0.056 
Seek spiritual support 6.09 3.10 7.84 3.92 0.070 
Focus on the positive 12.68 3.24 12.30 4.05 0.703 
Seek professional help 8.95 3.48 13.06 4.68 0.001* 
Seek relaxing diversions 14.45 2.82 12.63 3.68 0.044 
Physical recreation 8.54 2.85 7.75 2.54 0.301 
Protect self 12.31 2.86 11.21 3.30 0.194 
Humour 9.00 3.43 8.27 2.54 0.401 
Not cope 6.63 2.42 8.06 2.90 0.054 
44–75d      
Seek Social Support 15.58 3.11 11.15 3.78 0.001* 
Focus on solving the problem 29.08 3.02 23.03 5.75 0.001* 
Work hard and achieve 12.1 0.94 9.96 3.49 0.005 
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Table 4.13 (continued) 
 University Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Worry 10.75 2.99 13.94 3.78 0.010 
Improve relationships 11.25 2.49 10.26 4.46 0.392 
Wishful thinking 10.17 3.54 11.84 4.36 0.218 
Tension reduction 9.25 2.99 9.84 3.02 0.575 
Social action 8.58 4.54 8.57 3.20 0.997 
Ignore the problem 6.25 2.56 8.61 2.61 0.015 
Self-blame 12.58 3.17 12.0 3.50 0.615 
Keep to self 8.67 2.87 12.96 3.47 0.001* 
Seek spiritual support 7.50 3.63 8.80 4.20 0.336 
Focus on the positive 12.25 2.73 12.07 4.06 0.878 
Seek professional help 12.66 4.73 11.92 4.05 0.644 
Seek relaxing diversions 14.5 2.93 13.07 4.15 0.236 
Physical recreation 6.75 2.73 7.73 3.03 0.331 
 
! 193 
Table 4.13 (continued) 
 University Psychiatric  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Protect self 12.58 2.84 10.61 2.95 0.063 
Humour 9.00 3.19 7.84 3.26 0.315 
Not cope 6.67 3.60 8.69 3.48 0.119 
aUniversity, n = 54; psychiatric, n = 17. bUniversity, n = 22; psychiatric, n = 34. cUniversity, n = 22; psychiatric, n = 33. dUniversity, n = 12; psychiatric, n = 26.  
*Significant at p = .0026.  
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Due to conducting a large number of t-tests using data from correlated 
subscales, the overall alpha level was capped at 0.05 across all 19 tests. Thus, 
using a Bonferroni adjustment meant that each test was evaluated for 
significance at an alpha level of 0.0026. 
In the 17-26 age quartile, significant differences were found for social 
action, seek spiritual support and seek professional help, with the psychiatric 
sample using these coping strategies more than the university sample. 
In the 27-33 age quartile, significant differences appeared on the sub-
scales: social action, seek spiritual support and seek professional help. In all 
cases, the psychiatric sample means were larger, indicating that they used these 
coping strategies more often than the university sample.  
In the 34-43 age quartile, significant differences were found with seek 
professional help, and focus on solving the problem. The university sample 
reported that they used more focus on solving the problem than the psychiatric 
sample and the psychiatric sample reported that they used seek professional help 
coping strategy more than the university students.  
In the 44-75 age quartile, significant differences were found on coping 
strategies seek social support, focus on solving the problem, and keep to self. The 
university reported that they focus on solving the problem and used seek social 
support coping strategies more than the psychiatric sample. The psychiatric 
sample used coping strategy keep to self more than the university students in this 
age quartile. 
ANOVA. Separate univariate one-way ANOVAS were conducted to look 
at mean differences across age quartiles in the university sample split by gender 
(see electronic Appendix for analyses). It should be noted that for males there 
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was no 44-75 age quartile, as there were no males older than 43 in the university 
sample. The homogeneity of variance assumption was assessed with  the 
Levene’s test prior to conducting each separate ANOVA and was satisfied for all 
subscales. Only the seek social support subscale was found to be significantly 
different across age quartiles for males (F2,52=9.44, p=0.00).  Post hoc t-tests 
revealed no significant mean differences between the 17-26 age quartile and both 
the 27-33 (p=0.006) and 34-43 (p=0.003) age quartiles. The mean score (13.91) 
for the17-26 age quartile was significantly different to the mean score (9.7) for 
27-33 age quartile and the mean score (9.4) for the 34-43 age quartile. There was 
no significant mean difference between the 27-33 and the 34-43 age quartiles.  
For females, significant mean differences across age quartiles were found 
for focus on solving the problem (F3,51=8.49, p=0.000) and seek professional help 
(F3,51=5.76, p=0.002). For focus on solving the problem post hoc t-tests using a 
Bonferroni adjustment error rate of 0.0026 revealed significant differences 
between the 17-26 age quartile (mean= 23.68) and both the 34-43 (mean=28.25) 
and 44-74 (mean=29.08) age quartiles. There were no other significant mean 
differences between any other age quartile groups on this subscale. For seek 
professional help the 17-26 (mean=7.42) age quartile was significantly different 
to the 44-75 (mean=12.67) age quartile. There were no other significant mean 
differences between any other age quartile groups on this subscale. 
Correlations. The correlations between the 18 scales of the CSA were 
examined and their magnitudes were considered for the total student sample. Of 
the 153 correlations between pairs of scales, 9 percent had correlations greater in 
magnitude than 0.4, 4 percent were greater than 0.5, and no correlations were 
greater than 0.6. These correlations were similar to those reported for the 
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normative sample (Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997), with the exception of a 
maximum correlation of 0.73 between self blame and worry in the normative 
sample. 
The magnitudes of the scale correlations were considered separately for 
male and female students.  For males, of the correlations between pairs of scales, 
13 percent had correlations greater than 0.4, 5 percent were greater than 0.5, and 
2 percent were greater than 0.6, with the maximum correlation being 0.78 
between self blame and worry coping strategies. For females, 11 percent had 
correlations greater in magnitude than 0.4, 4 percent were greater than 0.5 and 1 
percent were greater than 0.6, with the maximum correlation being 0.66 between 
work hard and achieve and problem focused coping strategies. In essence, the 
correlation patterns were similar for males and females (see Appendix B for 
exact values). As noted previously in Study A, the CSA manual did not provide 
separate between-scales correlations for males and females.  
Factor analysis. In order to compare the underlying factor structure of  
the CSA in relation to the university sample, a principal axis factor analysis was 
performed. Following the procedure outlined in the CSA manual, this method of 
factor extraction, followed by an oblique rotation using the oblimin method, was 
performed on the whole university sample, in order to maximise the sample size 
for the analysis. Using the criteria of extracting factors that have eigenvalues 
greater than 1 resulted in 6 factors being extracted which accounted for 50.95% 
of the total percentage of variance available for extraction. Factor 1 accounted 
for 18.81% of the variance, factor 2 accounted for 11.50% of the variance, factor 
3 accounted for 7.17% of the variance, factor 4 accounted for 5.41% of the 
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variance, factor 5 accounted for 4.86% of the variance and factor 6 accounted for 
3.20% of the variance.  
The scree plot (see Appendix B) indicated that even a 6-factor solution 
might  be applicable, without an unwarranted loss of information, compared to a 
4-factor solution of the original CSA. Using the 6 extracted factors, an oblique 
rotation using the oblimin method revealed the factor pattern matrix, shown in 
Table 4.14. 
The pattern matrix in Table 4.14 is different from that of the normative 
sample (see Table 4.4) both in terms of the number of extracted factors and 
variable loadings. These differences could be due to a number of reasons. Firstly, 
the samples came from different populations and the sample sizes were 
significantly different across the two samples. The university was also a 
significantly younger sample than the psychiatric group.   
The correlations between the 6 extracted factors were low and mainly 
negative, as seen in Table 4.14. 
Examination of the data suggested that factor 1 significant loadings, 
consisting of worrying, wishful thinking, tension reduction, self blame and not 
cope, could represent a “non-productive  coping” dimension, similar to factor 2 
in the normative sample (non-productive coping).  
Factor 2 loadings, consisting of focus on solving the problem, seek 
relaxing diversions, protect the self and humour, could be seen as “dealing with 
the problem,” similar to factor 1 with the normative sample (dealing with the 
problem).  
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Table 4.14 
Pattern Matrix of the 18 Coping Scales Plus Not Cope Scale for the University Sample 
 Factor 
Strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Social support   –.545    
Focus on solving the problem  .662     
Work hard     .503  
Worry .863      
Improve relationships       
Wishful thinking .507      
Tension reduction .621      
Social action    .459  –.423 
Ignore the problem       
Self-blame .769      
Keep to self   .835    
Seek spiritual support     –.733  
Focus on the positive      –.718 
Seek professional help    .550   
Seek relaxing diversions  .480     
Physical recreation      –.573 
Protect self  .641     
Humour  .603     
Not cope .750      
Percentage of variance 18.81 11.50 7.17 5.41 4.86 3.20 
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Table 4.15 
Factor Correlation Matrix of the University Sample 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.000 –.066 .084 –.075 –.268 .007 
2 –.066 1.000 –.237 .004 .025 –.326 
3 .084 –.237 1.000 –.076 –.010 –.051 
4 –.075 .004 –.076 1.000 .018 –.030 
5 –.268 .025 –.010 .018 1.000 .101 
6 .007 –.326 –.051 –.030 .101 1.000 
 
Factor 3 loadings, consisting of social support and keep to self, was the 
reverse of the normative samples factor 4 (sharing the problems),  as the 
university sample had a negative loading for social support and a positive 
loading on the keep to the self subscale. Hence, the third factor extracted for the 
university sample was more likely to represent “keep to self.”  
Factor 4 loadings, consisting of social action and seek professional help 
reflected a pro-active degree of coping, similar to the normative sample’s factor 
4, (sharing the problem).  
Factor 5 had a positive loading on work hard and achieve and a negative 
loading on seek spiritual support, which was not in keeping with their loadings 
in the normative sample, “dealing with the problem” (factor 1) and 
“optimism” (factor 3), respectively. The factor extracted here was more a 
practical strategy for dealing with problems in general. 
Factor 6 consisted of  negative loadings on focus on the positive, social 
action and physical recreation. In the normative sample these items loaded on 
separate factors as seen in the normative sample “optimism,” “sharing the 
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problem,” and “dealing with the problem,” respectively.  The factor extracted 
here was more consistent with a withdrawal coping strategy. 
Gender 
Univariate analyses: The coping strategies used by university students. 
Unequal variance two sample t-tests were carried out on the university sample to 
see if the coping strategies used by males differed from those used by females. 
Both samples were large enough to avoid the assumption of sampling from 
normally distributed populations. Examination of univariate t-tests showed only 
one significant difference between males and females on the seek social support 
subscale, with females utilising this coping strategy more than males (refer to 
Table 4.16). 
Logistic regression: Gender by subscales and age as the predictor. Table 4.17 
displays the results of the logistic regression model predicting gender based on 
age and the 19 coping scale scores for the university sample. The overall model 
was significant (p = .001) with the final correct classification rate being 83.6%. 
Specifically, 49 of 55 (89.1%) of the male sample were correctly classified (true 
negatives) while 43 of 55 (78.2%) of the female sample were correctly classified 
(true positives). Nine of the 20 predictors were significant. Specifically, female 
students were more likely to: (a) be older (B = 0.29, p = .001); (b) have higher 
seek social support scores (B = 0.38, p = .003); (c) have higher improve 
relationships scores (B = 0.33, p = .02); (d) have higher tension reduction scores 
(B = 0.42, p = .01); (e) have lower social action scores (B = -0.36, p = .03); (f) 
have lower ignore the problem scores (B = -0.55, p = .03); (g) have lower self-
blame scores (B = -0.51, p = .01); (h) have higher keep to self scores (B = 0.40, p 
= .008); and (i) have lower humour scores (B = -0.40, p = .008 (Table 4.17). 
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Table 4.16 
Gender Differences in Coping Strategies Used by an Adult University Sample 
 Male (N = 55) Female (N = 55)  
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value 
Social support 12.32 4.11 14.52 3.17 0.002* 
Focus on solving the 
problem 
26.03 4.30 26.18 3.96 0.854 
Work hard 11.01 2.50 11.30 1.76 0.612 
Worry 10.25 3.85 11.45 2.99 0.071 
Improve relationships 10.16 3.45 11.41 2.75 0.038 
Wishful thinking 11.12 3.00 11.16 2.97 0.949 
Tension reduction 9.09 3.12 10.29 2.99 0.042 
Social action 7.67 2.79 7.38 3.14 0.609 
Ignore the problem 7.58 2.06 6.76 2.13 0.043 
Self-blame 10.52 4.44 11.74 3.42 0.111 
Keep to self 10.36 3.86 9.72 3.11 0.344 
Seek spiritual support 5.90 3.59 6.27 3.58 0.596 
Focus on the positive 13.14 3.05 12.07 2.84 0.059 
Seek professional help 7.54 3.81 8.98 4.08 0.059 
Seek relaxing diversions 15.05 2.79 14.74 2.49 0.542 
Physical recreation 8.74 3.07 7.56 2.72 0.035 
Protect self 12.05 3.47 11.85 2.63 0.073 
Humour 9.52 3.02 8.16 2.92 0.018 
Not cope 6.38 2.46 7.41 2.95 0.05 
*Significant at .0026. 
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Table 4.17 
Prediction of Gender Based on Age and Coping Scale Scores: University Sample Only 
Variable B SE Wald df p Value Exp (B) 
Age 0.29 0.07 15.11 1 .001 1.33 
Social support 0.38 0.13 8.53 1 .003 1.47 
Focus on solving the problem –0.18 0.13 1.94 1 .16 0.84 
Work hard 0.27 0.21 1.63 1 .20 1.31 
Worry 0.32 0.19 2.79 1 .10 1.38 
Improve relationships 0.33 0.14 5.87 1 .02 1.39 
Wishful thinking –0.05 0.15 0.13 1 .72 0.95 
Tension reduction 0.42 0.16 6.64 1 .01 1.52 
Social action –0.36 0.16 4.72 1 .03 0.70 
Ignore the problem –0.55 0.25 4.98 1 .03 0.57 
Self-blame –0.51 0.20 6.36 1 .01 0.60 
Keep to self 0.40 0.15 7.01 1 .008 1.49 
Seek spiritual support 0.07 0.10 0.46 1 .50 1.07 
Focus on the positive 0.01 0.16 0.01 1 .93 1.01 
Seek professional help 0.11 0.11 1.02 1 .31 1.12 
Seek relaxing diversions –0.17 0.16 1.15 1 .28 0.84 
Physical recreation –0.22 0.13 2.78 1 .10 0.80 
Protect self –0.06 0.13 0.23 1 .63 0.94 
Humour –0.40 0.15 7.08 1 .008 0.67 
Not cope 0.28 0.20 1.94 1 .16 1.33 
Constant –8.83 4.47 3.91 1 .05 0.00 
Note. n = 110. Gender classification: 0 = male, 1 = female. Full model: !2 (20, n = 110) = 76.15, 
p = .001. Base classification rate = 50.0%.  Final classification rate = 83.6%. 
Comparison of Psychiatric and University Samples.  
Subscale univariate analyses. Unequal variance two-sample t-tests were 
carried out on the university and psychiatric samples to examine possible coping 
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strategy use for each of the 19 subscales. As can be seen in Table 4.18, the 
psychiatric sample was more likely to use not coping than the university sample. 
The psychiatric sample was also more likely than the university sample to 
engage in ignore, worry, wishful thinking, social action, keep to self, seek 
spiritual support, seek professional help and not cope. They were less likely than 
the university sample to focus on solving the problem, and relax.  
Table 4.18 
Two-Sample Unequal Variance t-Tests Between the Psychiatric Sample and the University Sample 
 Psychiatric 
(N = 110) 
University 
(N = 110) 
   
Strategy x  SD x  SD p Value t df 
Social support 12.40 3.97 13.43 3.81 0.051 -1.96 217.632 
Focus on solving the problem 23.65 6.95 26.10 4.11 0.002* -3.18 176.930 
Work hard 10.14 3.62 11.20 2.16 0.009 -2.64 177.884 
Worry 13.5 4.01 10.85 3.49 0.001* 5.23 213.926 
Improve relationships 11.53 4.08 10.79 3.17 0.134 1.50 205.451 
Wishful thinking 12.79 3.96 11.14 2.97 0.001* 3.50 202.151 
Tension reduction 11.08 3.67 9.69 3.10 0.003 3.03 212.071 
Social action 9.84 4.06 7.52 2.96 0.001* 4.84 199.384 
Ignore the problem 8.51 2.71 7.17 2.12 0.001* 4.08 206.060 
Self-blame 12.04 3.81 11.13 3.99 0.085 1.73 217.537 
Keep to self 12.34 3.57 10.04 3.50 0.001* 4.82 217.914 
Seek spiritual support 9.01 4.11 6.09 3.57 0.001* 5.63 213.813 
Focus on the positive 12.63 4.16 12.60 2.98 0.951 0.06 197.550 
Seek professional help 12.50 4.43 8.26 3.99 0.001* 7.46 215.657 
Seek relaxing diversions 13.10 3.88 14.90 2.64 0.001* -4.02 192.112 
Physical recreation 8.35 3.20 8.15 2.94 0.630 0.48 216.453 
Protect self 11.80 3.84 11.95 3.06 0.749 -0.32 207.652 
Humour 8.63 3.41 8.84 3.04 0.630 -0.48 215.186 
Not cope 8.22 2.99 6.89 2.75 0.001* 3.43 216.491 
*Significant at p = .0026.  
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Multivariate analysis: Logistic regression.  In order to replicate the t-test 
analyses conducted incorporating any potential correlations between subscales, a 
multivariate logistic regression was undertaken.  Table 4.19 displays the results 
of the logistic regression model predicting group based on age and the 19 coping 
subscale scores. The overall model was significant (p = .001) with the final 
correct classification rate being 89.5%. Specifically, 98 of 110 (89.1%) of the 
psychiatric sample were correctly classified (true negatives) while 99 of 110 
(90.0%) of the university sample were correctly classified (true positives). Ten of 
the 20 predictors were significant. Specifically, as seen in Table 4.19, university 
students were more likely to: (a) be younger (B = -0.07, p = .004); (b) have 
higher focus on solving the problem scores (B = 0.23, p = .001); (c) have lower 
worry scores (B = -0.32, p = .001); (d) have lower tension reduction scores (B = -
0.23, p = .01); (e) have lower social action scores (B = -0.17, p = .05); (f) have 
higher self-blame scores (B = 0.43, p = .001); (g) have lower keep to self scores 
(B = -0.17, p = .04); (h) have lower seek spiritual support scores (B = -0.25, p 
= .001); (i) have lower seek professional help scores (B = -0.27, p = .001); and (j) 
have higher seek relaxing diversions scores (B = 0.22, p = .02). 
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Table 4.19 
Prediction of Group Based on Age and Coping Scale Scores 
Variable B SE Wald df p Value Exp(B) 
Age –0.07 0.02 8.08 1 .004 0.93 
Social support 0.10 0.09 1.34 1 .25 1.10 
Focus on solving the problem 0.23 0.07 10.16 1 .001 1.25 
Work hard –0.03 0.09 0.09 1 .77 0.97 
Worry –0.32 0.10 11.13 1 .001 0.73 
Improve relationships –0.11 0.09 1.59 1 .21 0.89 
Wishful thinking –0.15 0.09 2.70 1 .10 0.86 
Tension reduction –0.23 0.09 6.44 1 .01 0.79 
Social action –0.17 0.08 3.86 1 .05 0.85 
Ignore the problem 0.01 0.10 0.01 1 .91 1.01 
Self-blame 0.43 0.11 16.35 1 .001 1.54 
Keep to self –0.17 0.08 4.22 1 .04 0.85 
Seek spiritual support –0.25 0.07 13.25 1 .001 0.78 
Focus on the positive –0.04 0.10 0.20 1 .66 0.96 
Seek professional help –0.27 0.08 12.79 1 .001 0.76 
Seek relaxing diversions 0.22 0.10 5.25 1 .02 1.25 
Physical recreation 0.13 0.09 2.09 1 .15 1.14 
Protect self 0.07 0.10 0.51 1 .47 1.07 
Humour 0.08 0.08 0.96 1 .33 1.08 
Not cope 0.08 0.11 0.48 1 .49 1.08 
Constant 2.22 1.83 1.48 1 .22 9.25 
Note. N = 220. Group classification: 0 = psychiatric, 1 = university. Full model: !2 (20, N = 220) 
= 164.82, p = .001. Base classification rate = 50.0%.  Final classification rate = 89.5%. 
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Discussion. The purpose of this study was an exploratory comparative 
analysis, to investigate the coping strategies adopted by university students and, 
specifically, it addressed how this group endorsed coping strategies compared 
with the psychiatric sample. In line with previous research, the university sample 
exhibited several differences. Firstly, as a comparative sample they were much 
younger than the referent group a common demographic characteristic in 
research with college or university samples (e.g., Geisner, Neighbors & Larimer, 
2006; Main et al., 2011).  
Within the university the one significant gender difference, that being for 
seek social support, with women engaging in this coping strategy significantly 
more often than men, was not unexpected. With the exception of this subscale, 
these results suggest that both men and women cope similarly, a finding 
consistent with current research. For example, Lawrence, Ashford, and Dent 
(2006) investigated differences in the coping strategies adopted by male and 
female first year students in a higher education environment and the extent to 
which such strategies had an impact on self-esteem and attainment. They found 
gender differences in terms of engagement in coping strategies and academic 
attainment. Specifically, women “attained” at a significantly higher level than 
men, while they found men detached themselves from the emotions of a situation 
and used strategies such as emotional inhibition, or as they stated, ‘bottling up’ 
of emotions more than women. 
In considering coping strategies in combination, multivariate analyses 
interestingly revealed that women in the university sample were more likely to 
be older than men and have higher seek social support; improve relationship; 
tension reduction, keep to self  scores; and lower social action, ignore the 
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problem, self blame and humour scores than their male counterparts on the CSA. 
This finding is consistent with Folkman and Lazarus’ (1985) examination of 
emotion and coping of college students at various intervals of the university 
semester. University students are known to utilise a variety of coping 
mechanisms relating to the time period within the semester.  
A number of significant differences were noted in the way the university 
sample coped with general concerns when compared to the psychiatric sample. 
When compared with the normative sample, the university sample utilised less 
productive coping mechanisms than the normative sample, a finding consistent 
with poor coping of university students (Brown, 1994; Epstein, & Katz, 1992; 
Folkman, & Lazarus, 1985; McCarthy, Lambert & Moller, 2006; Lawrence, 
Ashford & Dent, 2006; Shankland,  Genolini, Franca,  Guelfi, & Ionescu, 2010).  
Although the psychiatric sample was more likely to use not coping than 
the university sample and engage in the following coping strategies more so than 
the university sample: ignore, worry, wishful thinking, tension reduction, social 
action,  keep to self, seek spiritual support, seek professional help and not cope, 
they were less likely than the university sample to use  focus on solving the 
problem, work hard and achieve, and seek relaxing diversions. 
Finally, factor analyses revealed a 6-factor structure in the university 
sample suggesting that university students use a slightly different combination of 
coping methods compared to the psychiatric sample and normative sample. The 
six categories being: non-productive coping, dealing with the problem, sharing 
the problem, pro-active independent degree of coping; practical strategy for 
dealing with problems in general and a withdrawal coping strategy. The results 
may reflect the different demands placed upon university students within the 
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university environment, as Folkman and Lazarus’ (1985) study noted students 
use different coping mechanisms at the different stages of a university semester, 
depending on the stresses of the time.  
This study carries with it some limitations and the results are limited in 
their generalizability because of the relatively small sample sizes in some sub-
analyses. Confirmatory factor analyses were not carried out for two reasons. 
Firstly, the sample sizes were not large enough to sub-divide into a sample for 
confirmatory analysis and, secondly, this study replicated all of the analyses 
carried out by Frydenberg and Lewis (1997). Frydenberg and Lewis used a 
principal components with Oblimin rotation factor analysis to establish the 
usefulness of the CSA, in determining the extent to which the items on the 
questionnaire satisfactorily assessed the related (but distinct) strategies of coping 
they were designed to measure. Because of the overall nature of the present study 
in assessing the usefulness of the CSA, Frydenberg and Lewis’s (1997) approach 
was adopted for the current analyses.  
While there are some differences between the university sample and 
psychiatric sample in the pattern of their results, the majority of the findings are 
consistent with research on coping within university populations. In general, 
university students have been found to use more withdrawn, avoidant coping 
strategies. 
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General Discussion  
Overall, the application of quantitative methodology to measure coping in those 
diagnosed with a mental illness was useful in identifying the coping strategies 
described on the CSA that psychiatric patients endorsed as being of importance 
to them.  While researchers have found that the use of social support increases 
well-being in psychiatric populations, this study did not support this (Cohen, 
McGowan, Fooskas & Rose, 1984; Cohen, Towbes & Flocco, 1988; Cummins, 
1988; Hobfoll, 1986; Ford & Procidano, 1990; Granovetter,1982; 
Greenglass,1993; Potasznik & Nelson, 1984). When patients were asked to 
comment on the use of social support as a coping strategy, they reported using 
social support as a coping strategy, but not significantly more than the normative 
or university samples. Overall, it was found that psychiatric patients do report 
using what Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) report as “non-productive” coping 
mechanisms. When compared to the broader literature, these results suggest that 
the psychiatric sample was more likely than so-called “normative” samples, to 
use passive coping strategies rather than active coping strategies (Carver, Scheier, 
Weintraub & Jagdish, 1989; Fledderus, Bohlmeijer & Pieterse, 2010).  
Dividing coping into productive and non-productive is not helpful in 
understanding the meaning of coping for patients and may misrepresent patients’ 
attempts to cope with their difficulties. Questions such as: At what point does 
worry become unproductive? What defines not coping? And at what point does 
wishful thinking, and keeping to oneself  become unproductive? Different coping 
strategies can serve many things for different individuals. Pearlin and Schooler 
(1978) also mention the notion of an individual’s coping resources referring to 
not what people do, but to what is available to them in developing their coping 
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repertoires, which may not be easily measured by a scale. Therefore, coping 
strategies, such as seeking social support, may not be available to individuals 
who have had little or no social supports, which is sometimes the case with many 
people diagnosed with a “psychiatric illness”. Granovetter (1982) further 
elaborates on the role of social support and claims that people of no relation to 
the person, for example, the person at the news agency, the person at the corner 
shop or the service station attendant or any person who is seen frequently, can 
provide the role of social support as effectively and, in some cases, even more so 
than a family member, close relative or friend. 
However, the psychiatric group’s choice of coping strategies should not 
be underestimated, as they used a broader array of strategies than the normative 
and university groups, as measured by the number of strategies they endorsed 
more frequently.  This finding is at odds with the bulk of past research that 
suggests that psychiatric patients “don’t cope.”  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
coping is usually understood in psychiatry to be what a person is “not” doing, 
rather than what they “do” to manage their difficulties, and the concept of the 
person within the mental health system is one of vulnerability and not coping 
(Pupavac, 2001). The assertion commonly referenced in the psychological 
literature that people diagnosed with a mental illness, such as depression, 
schizophrenia and anxiety, lack adequate coping resources for managing the 
challenges of daily living, which at times causes psychological distress 
(Piccinelli & Wilkinson, 2000; Taylor & Stanton, 2007), was not supported by 
this quantitative study. What this quantitative study reflected was that patients do 
use an array of coping strategies (both productive and non-productive) and were 
quite willing to report on exactly the types of coping strategies they used.  
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The CSA was found to be a useful tool for measuring the coping 
strategies of individuals diagnosed with a mental illness, in that it assesses a 
variety of coping strategies via the 19 separate scales, which is in keeping with 
the complex and multidimensional nature of coping. When evaluating the CSA 
as a measuring tool, the results from comparative analyses indicated that the 
CSA offers a measure of external validation and of clinical utility. The 
psychiatric sample endorsed various types of coping strategies, thereby 
suggesting that the CSA provided a set of coping strategies they in some way 
may have related to. The CSA also discriminated between the types of coping 
strategies endorsed by all three samples. However, as a measurement scale, in 
itself it does not advance our understanding of the reasons why it discriminates. 
The instrument itself uses a Likert rating scale which provides a good range for 
responses and, therefore, good potential for variability. The CSA items are 
unambiguous and, as stated in the administrators’ manual, were behaviourally 
and cognitively defined, so respondents could easily understand the questions 
(Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997).  A clinical qualitative note was that psychiatric 
patients reported that they “enjoyed” completing the questionnaire and some 
patients provided written statements at the end of the questionnaire which were 
not formally analysed. However, some comments reflect that patients considered 
the questionnaire was helpful, as it acted as a reminder of what coping strategies 
they already used and also reminded them of others that they had used in the past 
(remembering through prompting of the coping strategy on the questionnaire).  
The quantitative measurement of coping revealed the many coping 
strategies that those diagnosed with a mental illness use to cope in general. 
However, what this measurement did not reflect was the very individualized 
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nature of coping and, in particular, individual factors. Lazarus (2000) advocated 
for mixed methodological approaches to coping research, as current approaches 
focus too narrowly on the presumed goal of reduction of psychological distress 
and ignore the likelihood that people approach difficult situations with multiple 
goals. Many quantitative measures run the risk of over simplifying constructs 
such as “coping” and may mask the underlying meaning and contributions to 
one’s coping. Boyle (2011) argues that standardised assessments in the area of 
mental health which categorise coping (i.e., non-productive and productive 
coping), run the risk of converting experience to “symptoms” or disorders, 
without ever mentioning the role of context and life experience. This 
categorisation overlooks important factors in the causation of patient “distress” 
or, as researched in this study, “coping.” Boyle argues that the approaches of 
quantitative measurement, such as correlating scales comparing groups, relies too 
heavily on the persons’ “inner world.”  
While the many coping strategies psychiatric patients use was revealed, 
and was compared to other samples, what was missed was the essentially rational, 
local and individual nature of coping in psychiatric patients’ lives. Summerfield 
(2011) argues that: 
. . . valid research methods must reflect the ‘nature of reality’ for 
participants and a standard questionnaire used across heterogeneous 
societies cannot do this (p. 239).    
In the area of mental health, coping questionnaires do not reflect what 
Summerfield refers to as ‘the nature of reality’ for patients. The difficult and 
problematic nature of  taking standardised questionnaire results to be indicative 
of a person’s “reality,” was also highlighted in a study by Shedler, Mayman and 
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Manis (1993). Shedler et al (1993) found that people who denied psychological 
distress on self-report measures and who also appeared to look healthy on the 
basis of these standard mental health scales, in actual fact, were not 
psychologically healthy. They named this concept, “illusory mental health,” and 
they report that it has physical costs and may be a risk factor for medical illness. 
They found that clinical judges were far better in distinguishing genuine from 
illusory mental health, whereas so-called “objective” mental health scales were 
not. The authors call into question the standardised methods that researchers are 
using and advocate for more meaningful mental health research. As Lazarus 
(2000) explains, the questionnaire format is advantageous in that it permits the 
study of large samples and the quantification of the coping process. However, as 
Folkman and Moskowitz (2004) make clear, the main source of data is included 
in in-depth interviews and observations.  
 From another perspective, Coyne and Racioppo (2000) have criticized 
the failure of stress and coping research to be useful in clinical practice, and 
Lazarus (2000) reports that many researchers “hope” that research findings will 
have practical value, however, few rarely do. Tennnen, Affleck, Armeli and 
Carney (2000) report that a daily process approach to coping, tracking mood and 
coping as close to their real time occurrence as possible, offers unique insights. 
However, such an approach is demanding, both on researchers and the 
participants. Tennen et al. provide an example of an alternative choice of data 
collection in the form of a pain diary and how a pain diary may yield a different 
picture of the pain experience than would a summary from a clinical office visit.  
While there are those who believe more scientific approaches are needed 
in the classification of what constitutes a mental illness (e.g., Titmarsh & 
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Goodyer, 2011), there are others who believe that collaboratively working with 
patients identifying individualized contributing factors, and how these may 
influence the person’s presentation, in addition to recognising their personal 
strengths, may allow a deeper understanding of the patient and, hence, a more 
personalized treatment approach (e.g., Macneil, Hasty, Conus & Berk, 2012). In 
addition, Folkman and Moskowitz (2004) also advocate for more longitudinal 
studies to reflect more detail of the true nature of coping for individuals across 
the lifespan.  
To bridge the gap between research and its transfer to clinical practice, 
the use of qualitative procedures might be advantageous for future investigations 
of coping in the area of mental health. From the findings of this quantitative 
study, it is recommended that quantitative methods are used in researching the 
coping strategies of those diagnosed with a mental illness, although this author 
would caution against a sole reliance on a quantitative approach. Relying on only 
one measurement approach to coping may not do justice to the overall 
experience of what coping strategies are useful for people diagnosed with a 
mental illness, and what coping might mean for these people.  
Summary and Conclusions 
What this study has demonstrated is that the exclusive use of quantitative 
approaches will only generate information to a set of pre-determined coping 
strategies, as outlined on a questionnaire. Therefore, a single quantitative 
measure of coping is not useful in identifying coping from a multidimensional 
perspective. A side matter to the sole use of quantitative measures is that from a 
clinical standpoint, as Hallam (2013) points out, there may be a failure to engage 
in individual case formulation due to the reliance on quantitative research 
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methods, and this reliance also dictates future outcomes and the language 
employed, e.g., “disorder.” This is the point at which qualitative measures have 
an added advantage, as Summerfield (2008) advocates the use of more 
qualitative measurement within mental health to “promote more grass roots 
ownership of the terms of reference of mental health and enable a robust and 
relevant knowledge base to emerge” (p. 993). 
Overall, the quantitative measurement of coping via the CSA was helpful 
in identifying the particular coping strategies these patients used. However, 
categorising their attempts as “productive” or “non-productive” implied some 
strategies were superior to others and ignored the fact that these patients were 
dealing with a set of difficult life circumstances unlike those faced by most 
people. Applying labels of “productive coping” and “unproductive coping” is 
reliant on a reductive and circular logic and understanding; categorising coping 
this way misses the essentially rational, local and individual nature of what might 
count as coping, in the context of psychiatric patients’ lives. Social factors and 
contextual factors have a major influence on both the degree of long-term stress 
that individuals have to cope with and also the abilities that people have to 
manage or cope with these stressors, and are more suitable to qualitative 
measurement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 216 
PREFACE TO PART 2 
Part 1 of this thesis has shown that, with the exercise of caution, quantitative 
approaches to coping might have their place in applied research within 
psychology.  However, there are acknowledged major conceptual and 
methodological issues with the sole use of such measures in the measurement of 
coping (De Ridder, 1997; Oakland & Ostell,1996; Schwarzer, & Schwarzer, 
1996).  
In particular, as seen in the previous chapter, the CSA, a standardized 
rating scale, was unable to account for personal characteristics, history, context 
and circumstances, which determine which incidents people report as being 
stressful. In essence, such quantitative measures result in ignoring both past 
coping efforts, which have influenced the perception of the stressful episode 
encountered, and the range of coping responses employed. A more detailed 
analysis revealed that these summary statistics masked very real difficulties.  
Part 1 to set out to explore what role there was for the quantification of 
coping or a coping process, given coping can mean very different things for 
different people. As discussed in Chapter 2, coping is referred to in three 
versions throughout this thesis: coping as the overall concept of the action, 
coping strategies or mechanisms as the things people do to cope, and coping 
styles, as combinations of coping strategies that people use as a way of coping.  
The quantification of “coping” per se is problematic as coping and 
categorization of a “non-productive coping” give rise to the interpretation by 
some that the individual is not coping at all. This approach invites notions such 
as “poor coping” and “pathology” and explores the weaknesses of people. 
Snyder (1999) believes that  “…the movement toward a positive adaptive view 
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about people is still evolving, and that there still are many negative, pathological 
assumptive networks being applied to the understanding of the coping process” 
(p. 331). This is not to say that coping strategies as listed via a questionnaire are 
not useful, although the current research suggest caution against the sole use of 
such measures in a psychiatric population to measure coping. As the reader will 
come to understand from the findings in this thesis, coping and coping processes 
are best understood in an individual formulated context. 
In order to fully understand the coping process, an individual’s 
fundamental assumptions which guide them through their world, the world in 
which they live and the people and events that shape their experience (whether 
these are benevolent or malevolent) need to be considered. The quantification of 
coping strategies is unlikely to capture all of these assumptions, along with the 
meaningfulness of their world and how they ‘make sense” of  it, as well as their 
notions of  “self.”  
Given the problematic nature of the measurement of coping solely by 
questionnaire, there are many reasons why one would caution against their sole 
use of quantitative measures as highlighted by Boyle, (2011) and Summerfield,  
(2008). In the quantitative measurement of psychiatric patients’ coping, 
described in the previous chapter, the problem of “causation” arose. No causation 
could be inferred from participants responses, because the results could 
demonstrate only how certain variables correlated with each other or what pre-
defined coping strategies were preferred over others. CSA scores indicated the 
types of coping mechanisms respondents used. While these responses could be 
compared across the other groups (university sample, normative sample and a 
matched community sample) measured with the same instrument, again this 
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revealed little about the meaning of coping for psychiatric inpatients. These 
quantitative results also posed a phenomenological question for this study. Even 
though the psychiatric patients engaged in a variety of coping strategies, as 
measured by the CSA; did their responses reflect the true meaning of coping for 
them? In an attempt to move closer to the meaning of coping for the individual, 
additional information is needed. One might ask clinically pertinent questions of 
the individual about the significance and importance of their various coping 
strategies. In this way the clinician tries to determine definitions of what coping 
might be for the individual, given the ever changing, individual nature of coping. 
Therefore, there are two possible components to the measurement of coping. The 
first, the measurement of coping strategies through quantitative means, and then, 
narrative approaches which allow a more authentic account of what coping is for 
an individual. Therefore, coping can be established in two very different ways.  
In Part 2 of this thesis, I clearly follow a post-modern, constructivist 
theoretical orientation to understanding the meaning and measurement of coping 
and this is reflected in the type of methodology chosen. The design of this study 
was exploratory in nature and centered around a phenomenological investigation. 
The nature and the purpose of the design was to unearth as much as possible 
about psychiatric patients coping without having any preconceived notions about 
what one might expect a patient’s coping ability to be and the difficulties they 
experience.  Through a semi structured interview and detailed case formulations 
much more was discovered about how patients’ cope and this information, to a 
certain extent, challenged mainstream definitions of coping.  
To follow is the article that is currently in print in the journal: Qualitative 
Health Research.  Following on from this is Chapter 6 called Meet the People, 
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which is a series of cases studies of 10 selected inpatients.  
What follows in the next chapter is a qualitative investigation of the 
reports of the meaning of coping by the 38 psychiatric inpatients themselves. 
This study is currently in print in the journal, qualitative health research, and is 
formatted with respect to their publication conventions.  This study contains 2 
other authors who were my supervisors of this PhD project, I am first author in 
recognition of my roles as primary researcher, analyst and author. With regard to 
the data analysis, transcription and reading and re-reading the texts, and coding 
the data, I transcribed the data and read and re read the data under supervision 
from both Dr Suzanne Dziurawiec and Professor Mark Rapley who was highly 
qualified in qualitative research and methodology. 
Chapter 6, called Meet the People, presents a series of case studies of 10 
selected inpatients part of the larger sample of inpatients who were interviewed 
for the qualitative study. The thesis concludes with an overall discussion in 
Chapter 7.  
 !
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Abstract 
Contemporary psychiatric theory holds that a precipitant of major mental illness 
is the inability of some vulnerable individuals to cope with the difficulties of 
everyday life. Such mentally ill people are characterized as having deficient, 
dysfunctional, or absent coping skills. Recently, researchers have exerted 
considerable effort to distinguish between productive and non-productive coping. 
In this article, we argue that not only are such conceptualizations reliant on 
reductive, circular logic but they also miss the essentially rational, local, and 
individual nature of coping in psychiatric patients’ lives. We used semistructured 
interviews and thematic analyses of psychiatric patients’ descriptions of their 
coping. Patients reported that professional intervention reduced their ability to 
cope, that they distrusted the mental health system and its professionals, that 
coping mechanisms were misinterpreted, that situational crises modulated coping, 
and that sometimes coping was just “not coping.” We argue for a more respectful, 
nuanced understanding among mental health professionals of coping. 
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It appears that a consensus in the literature has coalesced around the proposition 
that long-term stress leads both to adverse mental health states, such as anxiety 
and depression, and to physical illness, such as cardiovascular disease and type 2 
diabetes (Kiecolt-Glaser, McGuire, Robles, & Glaser, 2002). Although debate 
has raged about the relative contributions of intraindividual and socioeconomic 
factors in the development of individuals’ capacities to manage stress, the weight 
of the evidence suggests that social factors play a major role. This influence is 
seen in both the degree of long-term stress with which individuals have to cope 
and in the abilities people have to manage, or cope with, these stressors, with 
concomitant inequalities in both physical and mental health outcomes (Adler & 
Matthews, 1994; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). 
In psychology and psychiatry, the roots of coping research can be traced, 
arguably, back to Freud’s work on defense mechanisms (see Freud, 1968) and 
Adler’s reformulation of defenses as safeguards that serve to protect the self 
from external environmental threats (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1967). Although 
researchers have proposed many different theoretical models of coping in the last 
30 years (e.g., Hobfoll’s, 1989, multiaxial model; Lazarus’s, 1966, transactional 
model), the field is plagued by the fact that coping has been understood, 
researched, and studied in different ways (Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 
2003). To date, this diversity in approaches has not resulted in a coherent 
conceptualization regarding the nature of coping for those diagnosed with a 
mental illness. 
Broadly speaking, two major approaches characterize the psychological 
literature on coping. The first, trait-based approach, has examined the effect 
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personality variables have on individual coping capacity (e.g., Coan, 1973; 
McCrae, 1984; McCrae & Costa, 1986). Treatment of coping as a trait assumes 
that, once coping is in place, it presumably operates as a stable behavior. 
Therefore, the individual will cope in particular ways over his or her life course. 
The second approach has concentrated on identifying and measuring the 
strategies people use to manage problematic situations (e.g., Carver, Scheier, & 
Weintraub, 1989; Endler & Parker, 1990; Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997; Moos, 
1992). Consistent with this approach, coping is viewed as an essential aspect of 
the emotional process and emotional life. It is the relationship between an 
individual and the environment that determines the level of stress the individual 
experiences and what coping mechanisms he or she utilizes (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). Through a process of primary appraisal, the individual assesses a situation 
as threatening, and then, through a secondary appraisal, the individual determines 
whether he or she has the resource strategies to cope. In this view (e.g., Lazarus, 
1999), emotions are always a response to relational meaning: the person’s sense 
of the harms and benefits in a particular person–environment relationship. This 
relational meaning determines the coping process. 
The major approaches to coping vary in terms of the degree to which they 
take into consideration contextual variables. Some approaches are strongly 
contextualist (e.g., Holahan & Moos, 1987; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), whereas 
others (e.g., Bodenmann, Charvoz, Widmer, & Bradbury, 2004) focus on 
individual-level variables. In particular, trait approaches give weight to 
personality characteristics (Coan, 1973; McCrae, 1984; McCrae & Costa, 1986) 
or individual and social resources (Holahan & Moos, 1987) such as optimism 
and social support (McColl, Hau, & Skinner, 1995; Taylor & Stanton, 2007). 
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Under both approaches, however, coping is typically construed as the 
deployment of rational responses to objective problems. This view permits, ipso 
facto, the demarcation of adaptive and maladaptive coping and the presence or 
absence of coping skills or deficits. In contrast to the deficit focus of much of the 
psychological literature (cf. Rose, 1989), more recently, some researchers (e.g., 
Iwanaga, Yokoyama, & Seiwa, 2004; Keyes, 2007) have proposed that coping is 
better understood as a positive concept and have focused on the use of adaptive 
strategies, building on an individual’s strengths. It should also be noted that, 
historically, a minority position in the literature has recognized that maladaptive 
strategies can also be useful, if they help to manage stressors successfully 
(Menninger, 1963; Snyder, 1999). 
Although the literature acknowledges major conceptual and 
methodological issues within the research and measurement of coping (e.g., 
Coyne & Gottlieb, 1996; De Ridder, 1997), currently the most popular method 
for measuring coping is quantitative, and the most common approaches are those 
derived from the work of Lazarus and colleagues (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). In keeping with established critiques of mainstream social science 
methods (cf. Garfinkel, 1967; Schütz, 1962), Coyne and Gottlieb (1996) argued 
that coping theory and the associated checklist methodology obscure, where they 
do not minimize, important individual differences in how people manage 
stressful events. Thus, coping appears to be a more uniformly reflective, planned, 
and goal-oriented activity than it may actually be. In particular, standardized 
rating scales, such as the Ways of Coping Questionnaire (WAYS; Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1988) or the Coping Response Inventory (Moos, 1992), are unable to 
accommodate the fact that personal characteristics, history, and circumstances 
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determine which incidents people report as being stressful. In addition, previous 
coping efforts influence the perception of novel stressful episodes an individual 
encounters, and the range of coping responses the individual employs may reflect 
how these episodes fit into the rest of the individual’s current circumstances and 
history. 
Consistent with these criticisms, Oakland and Ostell (1996) also noted 
that the efficacy of coping actions and the adequacy of external resources are two 
pivotal variables in the coping process, both of which are commonly overlooked 
in quantitative checklists. Moreover, an associated difficulty with the 
psychometric measurement of coping is that rating scales tend to treat coping 
strategies as definable capacities (similar to, perhaps, short-term memory), of 
which persons may have greater or lesser amounts. As a consequence, by their 
cross-sectional nature, scales such as the Coping Scales for Adults (CSA; 
Frydenberg & Lewis, 1997) and the WAYS (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988), even 
when they claim to attempt to characterize coping as a process, fall back on 
intraindividual thoughts and actions and components of coping rather than 
conceiving of coping as an ongoing interactional process. For example, the 
WAYS identifies a set of eight distinct coping factors that, although eschewing 
the explicitly pejorative characterization of some strategies as nonproductive, 
and recognizing the importance of personal meaning, the seeking of support, and 
spiritual or religious dimensions to coping, still arguably conveys that some 
factors (or ways of coping) are superior to others. 
With respect to coping in psychiatric populations, currently, dominant 
understandings of mental disorder, often referred to as biopsychosocial or 
diathesis/vulnerability-stress models (Read, Mosher, & Bentall, 2004), suggest 
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that such disorders arise from the difficulty some (biologically vulnerable) 
individuals have in dealing with adversity. For these individuals, adverse life 
circumstances precipitate the onset of a putative biological (most commonly, it is 
suggested, neurochemical and/or genetic) disease process (Moncrieff, 2008; 
Taylor & Stanton, 2007). That is to say, those who are diagnosed as mentally ill 
are, it is claimed (and for a bewildering range of possible theoretical reasons), 
unable to cope with the “vicissitudes of life” (Summerfield, 2004, p. 233). That 
there is an inherently circular form of, essentially, folk reasoning at work here 
has not, it seems, obstructed the rise to near-total theoretical hegemony of this 
so-called model in contemporary psychiatry and (clinical) psychology (Boyle, 
2011; Bracken & Thomas, 2005; Hansen, McHoul, & Rapley, 2003; Smith, 
1978; Summerfield, 2006, 2008). 
Smith (1978) clearly described an example of this circular reasoning, 
illustrating how patient “K” was diagnosed as mentally ill. The article reported 
on the gathering of information from various sources, the interpretations of 
others, and elements of K’s behavior, with the final judgment that K is mentally 
ill. In essence, how do we know that K is mentally ill? We know this because she 
cannot cope effectively with the challenges of everyday living. Why can she not 
cope effectively with the challenges of everyday living? We know this because 
she is mentally ill. This presents serious concerns, because, as Moncrieff (2010) 
suggested, once a psychiatric diagnosis is applied, it signals a need for various 
care actions and behavioral controls, which are presented as treatments. In the 
process, the patient is often overlooked, and, as Rapley, Moncrieff, and Dillon 
(2011) pointed out, “the social circumstances that cause or contribute to [the 
patient’s] suffering often go unexamined and unchallenged” (pp. 4–5). 
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When patients’ coping was measured psychometrically by the CSA, their 
coping strategies differed from those of other samples such as community and 
university samples (Ryan & Dziurawiec, 2013). The patients were more likely to 
respond by using what Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) described as nonproductive 
coping strategies such as ignoring problems, worrying, keeping to oneself, 
seeking spiritual support, and seeking professional help. They were less likely to 
engage in productive strategies such as focusing on solving the problem, working 
hard and achieving, or relaxing to deal with problems—what are, in effect, 
characteristics of the highly Westernized, gendered, and culture-bound version of 
the self-contained, rugged individualist. In essence, then, scales such as the CSA 
valorize a stereotypically masculine set of ways of dealing with problems in 
living (what, according to Barry, 1997, might be termed the “Marlboro man” 
approach—created via an extensive, 45-year-long advertising campaign, the 
image involved a rugged cowboy character with only a cigarette, to conjure up a 
masculine image for filtered cigarettes). Such scales explicitly denigrate as 
nonproductive, a priori, ways of handling stressful life events that are more 
passive or that draw on interpersonal resources. 
Quite aside from the concerns raised in the literature that the field of 
coping research is disappointing and has stagnated (Somerfield & McCrae, 2000), 
and the many, as yet unresolved, methodological issues in quantitative coping 
research (De Ridder, 1997), serious questions remain in the conceptual domain. 
How sensible is it to categorize peoples’ attempts at coping? Can coping be 
sensibly described, a priori, as productive or unproductive? At what point does 
an attempt to cope become unproductive? Are broad categorizations of coping as 
productive or unproductive based on an empirical knowledge base, or are they, 
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as they may appear, more like moral judgments than scientific evaluations? 
Indeed, can any particular coping strategy sensibly be labeled as effective or 
ineffective, productive or nonproductive, or even adaptive or maladaptive 
without reference to the context in which it is used? By what criteria are we to 
judge that some forms of coping are pathological or are symptoms of mental 
illness? A closer look at psychiatric inpatients’ attempts to cope was needed. 
Furthermore, assumptions about symptomatology, pathology, and disorder 
needed to be suspended. 
Method 
We conducted a phenomenological investigation of the experience of coping as 
told by psychiatric inpatients. The study was part of a larger doctoral-study 
investigation, into coping in a psychiatric population. Via semistructured 
interviews and thematic analyses, we aimed to understand better what psychiatric 
patients find particularly challenging, how they cope with these challenges, and 
how these understandings of their coping call into question mainstream 
definitions of coping. The justification for this type of design was that it 
permitted us to capture more of the patients’ experience of coping, without any 
preconceived notions of what their coping abilities might be. In conducting this 
study, we gathered information about the various strategies patients use and do 
not use. We followed strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative 
research, such as credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, as 
Shenton (2004) outlined. One great advantage of the methodology we used was 
that patients reported enjoying the experience of the interview, and therefore, as 
much as possible, we are confident that this article presents a true picture of the 
phenomenon of what coping means to patients. 
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Procedure 
We conducted this study in a large, inpatient-only psychiatric hospital in Western 
Australia. The hospital offered no addiction, rehabilitation, or other specialty 
services. The setting for the interviews was a separate room in the research 
department of the hospital. The study adhered to all ethical guidelines, and we 
obtained approval for the study from the ethics committees of both the university 
and the psychiatric hospital. The first author approached psychiatrists and 
medical officers from throughout the hospital to request their patient lists. These 
medical professionals were not involved in the selection or interview process. 
Data collection took place over a period of 12 months. 
We recruited participants throughout all wards of the hospital, with the 
exception of the long-stay ward, which contained many patients with severe 
neurocognitive deficits. The first author individually approached patients with 
information about the study and requested their consent to participate, subject to 
screening. Once a patient gave both verbal and signed consent to access his or 
her medical files, we screened relevant information against the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. All patients met the inclusion criteria, which were that the 
patient spoke English as his or her first language and that he or she had 
completed at least 10 years of education. Exclusion criteria included 
deteriorating organic conditions and significant memory impairment (e.g., 
Alzheimer’s disease or dementia). The first author made an appointment for an 
interview at a time convenient for each patient and, on the day of the interview, 
met the patient on the ward and escorted him or her to the interview room. At the 
conclusion of the interview, the first author escorted each participant back to the 
ward. 
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Participants 
Thirty-eight patients, 25 men and 13 women, aged between 18 and 60 years, 
participated in the study. This sample size is around the mean number of subjects 
generally found in interview studies reported in the qualitative literature (Mason, 
2010). Of the men, 16 had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, three of depression, five 
of bipolar disorder, and one of personality disorder. Among the women, six had a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, two of depression, three of bipolar disorder, and two 
of personality disorder. We found in the review of the patients’ medical files that 
they had been given many diagnoses—sometimes up to three or four different 
diagnoses over a period of 2 years—and multiple medications. The most recent 
long-standing diagnosis was the one used for this study. Patients had varying 
amounts of contact with inpatient mental health services, with the number of 
inpatient admissions ranging from between 1 and 5 (18 patients) to more than 25 
(1 patient). In terms of their psychiatric histories, fewer than half of patients had 
received counseling or psychological intervention for their problems (10/38), all 
were currently in receipt of psychotropic medication, and the majority reported a 
history of illicit drug use (26/38) and, in some cases, multiple suicide attempts 
(28/38). In 16 cases, a family history of mental illness was reported. 
Interview 
The first author, who is an experienced psychologist, carried out the 
semistructured interviews,which provided an opportunity for patients to talk in 
more detail about their difficult life experiences and their methods for coping 
with these experiences. Each patient completed an interview that took 
approximately 35 minutes. Interviews were brief to allow for low attention and 
concentration spans, which have been reported in the research to often be 
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concomitant with various mental illnesses (Medalia & Revheim, 2002). The 
interviewer developed good rapport with all patients and informed them that 
there were no right or wrong answers to the questions, asked them to be honest in 
their responses, and made them aware that, at any stage, they could leave the 
interview or exit the research study. The interviewer provided patients with her 
contact details (e-mail address and telephone numbers) in case they wanted to 
discuss their own interviews or read and/or comment on their transcripts. Only 
two patients wanted to listen to their responses immediately after the interview, 
primarily to make sure that the researcher had recorded everything, but partly out 
of curiosity. Neither patient requested any edits to their recordings. Moreover, no 
patient left the study or later requested that his or her information be retracted. 
Interview questions were as follows: What things do you find the most 
difficult to deal with in your life? Are there any particular situations that you find 
difficult to manage? (all of the patients identified at least one situation, and the 
interviewer noted all situations). What sorts of things do you do to manage 
difficult situations? (interviewer listed the patient’s particular situations). When 
do you use the (various) approaches you have described? Which works best? 
When do the other approaches work best? 
The first author audio-recorded and transcribed interviews verbatim. A 
professional secretary working in a mental health hospital, and with experience 
in transcription of doctors’ audio recordings, also transcribed the interviews. A 
100 percent agreement rate regarding content was achieved, with only minor 
variations in pauses and punctuation. 
Analytic Procedure: Thematic Analysis 
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We adopted a phenomenological approach for the analysis of the interviews and 
used an inductive thematic analytical procedure, described by Hayes (1997) and 
elaborated by Braun and Clarke (2006). This approach allowed for a richer 
interpretation of the data and the capacity to assess underlying themes. We 
adopted strategies for ensuring the trustworthiness of the data, in accordance 
with Guba’s constructs (see Shenton, 2004). The first author read and reread, 
noting initial ideas, and the second author, who had extensive experience in 
qualitative research, provided supervision of the process. The first author 
carefully scrutinized the interviews to identify meaningful units of text relevant 
to the questions posed about coping and then generated the initial codes, 
grouping units of text on the same issue together into analytical categories and 
giving provisional definitions. The same unit of text could be included in more 
than one category. Finally, after the first author completed the process of 
reviewing, defining, and naming the themes, the second author carried out a 
validity check. Both authors systematically reviewed the data to ensure that an 
exhaustive set of data supported each theme. 
Results 
We identified 12 categories organized into five superordinate themes. There was 
equal distribution of responses across all but one of the five themes. The five key 
themes were as follows: (a) a coping strategy was not a symptom of mental 
disorder; (b) coping was hindered by distrust in the mental health system and its 
professionals; (c) coping is related to meaningfulness, that is, being able to 
comprehend, manage, and attribute meaning to oneself and the world; (d) 
situational crises modulated coping strategies; and (e) “not coping” is a way of 
managing difficult situations. In the analysis that follows, we expand on the 
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themes arising from this analysis. As such, what we offer is a necessarily 
selective discussion of pertinent instances of the 
themes we identified. 
Theme 1: A Coping Strategy Was Not a Symptom of Mental Disorder 
Patients recounted a number of ways of managing difficulties in their lives. On 
the face of it, these coping strategies are describable as unproductive forms of 
coping or, more strongly, could be construed as symptomatic of the mental 
disorders with which patients have been diagnosed. Hence, the provision of 
fanciful narratives about managing difficulties might be readily redescribed as 
representing a departure from conventional reality testing and avoidance of, or 
retreating from, problems. For example, the use of drugs and alcohol might be 
construed as the type of socially avoidant and/or maladaptive behavior 
conceptualized as a secondary symptom of those diagnosed with schizophrenia 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). We note that such interpretations are 
predicated on an a priori assumption of patienthood, a perspective that conditions 
explanation. Here we suggest that, if we suspend judgment and examine patients’ 
accounts in their own terms, some rather different understandings of their 
accounts become possible. That is to say, there is a choice to be made about the 
meaning that is attributed to the reports patients make about their experiences. 
In the following extract, a patient describes the techniques he used to 
handle the experience of hearing voices: 
Interviewer (I): Does this happen before, before you have a relapse? 
Patient (P): No, I just feel a bit sick and it gets worse and worse. I just lay 
up in my bedroom and wait for it to pass. 
I: So you just feel a bit sick. 
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P: Not physically sick. 
I: Can you explain that situation to me? 
P: Well, I hear voices and I get disoriented. Disoriented or orientated, 
what is it? 
I: Disoriented. Oriented means you are aware of your time and place. 
P: That’s what I thought. 
I: When you say you get disoriented, do you mean you don’t know where 
you are? 
P: Yes. I don’t know what day it is, I don’t know what week it is. I know 
where I am, but I just lock myself away in my bedroom until it’s passed. 
I: Does that work? Have you used this in the past to help manage that? 
P: Yeah. 
I: How long do you lock yourself away? 
P: Until it’s over, four hours, five hours. 
I: Can you tell me about that? 
P: If I get very bad, I take PRN, which is a very strong dose of droperidol, 
which helps a bit but gives me a lot of side effects. That’s another reason 
for locking myself away. 
I: So you don’t just lock yourself away, you take PRN before you do 
that? 
P: Yes. 
 
The patient’s way of managing his distressing experience by locking 
himself away for 4 or 5 hours is presented as a tried-and-tested coping 
mechanism. This type of behavior could be describable as avoidant or 
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unproductive coping and is potentially categorizable as a variety of the social 
withdrawal (or asociality) considered to be a symptom of serious mental illness 
under prevailing nosologies (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Alternatively, it is understandable as a perfectly sensible and efficacious way of 
dealing with feeling sick and disoriented. We note that his description of his way 
of dealing with voices is, semantically and prosodically, matter of fact and 
businesslike: there is no sense of floridity or reality distortion in his description. 
A similar interpretation is applicable to the following exchange, in which 
another patient fluently describes the strategies she uses to manage both her 
mental health difficulties and associated illicit drug use: 
I: So what sorts of things do you do to manage these situations? 
P: Just taking every day as it comes. Just prove to myself that I can stay 
off the drugs and keep clean. Remember my time in [the psychiatric 
hospital] without them. My sadness, my rehabilitation, my detox. 
Medication that I’ve found to substitute those drugs. The stages like I said 
for the butterfly. From the caterpillar to the egg, from the egg to the 
caterpillar and now the egg to the butterfly and now I’m reaching out and 
I’m going to fly off and spread my wings. That’s my strategy for how I’m 
going to handle this. 
I: Can you just tell me a little bit about that? 
P: I’m the egg. I felt like I was in a stocking trying to get out, like in 
theater arts where you see people reaching out and struggling and trying 
to get out of that stocking. That’s how I felt before I went through detox. 
Now I feel I’ve broken out of that and I’m going to change into a 
butterfly. I don’t live on anxieties anymore. I used to at one stage of my 
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life but that’s when I was depressed and lonely but now I have to just go 
with the flow. 
I: Which strategy do you use now and works the best? 
P: The butterfly strategy. 
I: Do the others work? 
P: That’s the only one that I can see clearly that means something to me. 
 
The patient clearly articulates three ways of dealing with her difficulties. 
These are her own, self-developed coping mechanisms. It is of note that three of 
the approaches identified are analogous to established psychotherapeutic 
interventions: first, what might be otherwise described as cognitive coping 
strategies, that is, “taking every day as it comes,” “proving to myself that I can 
stay off the drugs and keep clean,” “remembering” successful withdrawal; 
second, using medication appropriately; and third, employing an approach akin 
to narrative therapy, providing a metaphorical restorying of her recovery. In an 
account reminiscent of Laing’s (1960) description of a study of a chronic 
schizophrenic called “Ghost of the Weed Garden” in his book The Divided Self: 
An Existential Study in Insanity and Madness, the patient uses the extended 
metaphor of metamorphosis to help the interviewer understand her experience. 
McCabe, Heath, Burns, and Priebe (2002) suggested that the standard 
psychiatric injunction not to engage with the detailed concerns and content of 
psychotic patients’ talk is, indeed, routine practice. Assertions such as “I’m 
going to change into a butterfly” are, in everyday psychiatric practice, less likely 
to be taken metaphorically and more likely to be viewed as delusional. As with 
the avoidance strategies described by the first extract, however, the account this 
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patient offers is clear and insightful. To characterize either of these patients’ 
ways of coping as other than effective, for them, is to misconstrue their 
experiences. 
Theme 2: Coping Was Hindered by Distrust in the Approach of the Mental Health 
System and Its Professionals 
Across all patients’ accounts, the ability to cope with their difficulties was 
strongly related to levels of distrust in the mental health system and the 
professionals working in it. This theme revealed barriers to patient coping and 
cast doubt on what is considered by mainstream psychiatry and psychology to 
facilitate coping. In all interviews, patients described hospital stays, particularly 
after involuntary admission, and psychiatrists, with their systemic reliance on 
physical treatments, with medication as a first line of treatment and the routine 
use of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT; commonly used as a treatment option for  
so-called drug-resistant depression and often for older people with depression; 
see Newnes, 2011), as unhelpful and not supportive of their own coping. 
Indeed, a number of informants suggested that their interaction with 
mental health services decreased their sense that they were able to cope with 
their difficulties, instead promoting a sense of learned helplessness. As described 
previously in a patient’s extract under Theme 1, the medication prescribed to 
assist him to cope with his mental health problems had effects that produced 
additional difficulties with which he then had to cope. Although, for this patient, 
the strong dose of droperidol “helps a bit,” the side effects it induces, 
paradoxically, augment his perception that he needs to use avoidance as a 
strategy to manage his problems. Here, then, we can see the unintended 
iatrogenic consequences of psychiatric intervention: nonproductive coping 
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strategies being fostered by interventions intended to ameliorate the difficulties 
warranting the intervention in the first place. 
Similarly, another patient’s experience illustrates the way in which, 
although he describes his psychiatric medication regime as helpful, he is reduced 
to the nonproductive strategy of wishful thinking, simply “hoping I’ll get better,” 
in the face of professional ignorance about ways to help him cope with his 
impotence: 
I: What things do you find the most difficult to deal with in your life? 
P: Impotence. 
I: What situations do you find difficult to manage? 
P: Mundane day-to-day activities. 
I: What are you doing to manage your impotence? 
P: I can’t manage it. It’s beyond the pale. 
I: Do you take much medication at the moment? 
P: Heaps of things. I’m on olanzapine, that’s an antipsychotic. I’m on 
sertraline, that’s an antidepressant. I’m on clonazepam and diazepam, 
they’re both tranquilizers, for antianxiety. I’m on anti–gastric reflux. 
Occasionally I’m on Epidrin, which is antimigraine. I’m on procylclidine, 
which is antiakathisia. I think that’s the lot but there may be something 
else. 
I: Have you tried to do anything else? 
P: I’ve tried to masturbate myself . . . It makes me feel low self-esteem. 
I: Have you talked about it in your men’s groups? 
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P: I’ve told my psychiatrists here. They didn’t know how to deal with it 
but said they are going to ring around to see if there are any specialists 
who could help me. I’ve got no further than that. 
 
The finding here that patients need to cope with side effects of their 
medication, in addition to the difficulties for which the medication is prescribed, 
is consistent with Jablensky et al.’s (1999) finding that 63.2% of respondents to 
their Australian national mental health survey described specific side effects of 
medication and believed that these side effects impaired their daily lives. 
Researchers in a subsequent study in 2010 established that three-quarters of 
participants (77.4%) complained of medication side effects and that three-fifths 
(61%) suffered impairment in their daily lives as a result of these medication side 
effects (Morgan et al., 2012). 
For some of the patients, if professional help in the form of medication 
was seen as limited, more assertive interventions were seen as being positively 
countertherapeutic. In the following extract, another patient describes situations 
he finds difficult to manage: 
I: Are there any difficult situations you find difficult to manage? 
P: In particular, being locked in Admissions East and people are being 
dragged in kicking and screaming, throwing themselves against walls, or 
shitting themselves at nighttime. Having to explain myself over and over 
again. Being accountable for every minute of every day. I don’t pry into 
other people’s lives. I’m just constantly repeating myself. 
In addition to unpleasant physical surroundings, deprivation of liberty, 
and the distressing experience of witnessing “people . . . being dragged in 
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kicking and screaming,” the patient’s account draws attention to another feature 
found repeatedly in the interviews, namely, the difficulties patients had in their 
interactions with mental health professionals. Whereas for this patient, the issue 
was having to explain himself over and over again, being accountable for every 
minute of every day, and constantly repeating himself, many other respondents 
reported not trusting health professionals, not trusting professional advice, and 
not being heard by their treating psychiatrists. Another patient reported that she 
felt her psychiatrist thought she was lying and, since her hospital admission, she 
had found out that things she had spoken about confidentially with her 
psychiatrist had not remained confidential. She reported, “I’m having second 
thoughts about psychiatrists now, only because I always thought a psychiatrist 
was like a doctor, confidential, but I was told it’s not, it’s not like a [general 
practitioner] being a psychiatrist.” 
The lack of congruence between individuals’ understandings of 
themselves and mental health professionals’ diagnostic perceptions of the 
individuals was a topic that the patients frequently raised. When asked what the 
most difficult things to deal with were, another patient reported that she could 
cope with most problems but not with being called crazy. As she said, “I’m not 
crazy, they put me down crazy, but I’m not crazy.” As such, when discussing 
what strategies helped them with coping, patients reported that, because many 
mental health professionals saw them unidimensionally, medication did not 
always help, and ECT did not make them “better.” Paradoxically, some patients 
were rendered helpless by the mental health system. Patients repeatedly reported 
how disheartening they found the experience of putting their faith and trust in the 
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mental health system and in professionals, only to be given a label and left with a 
so-called cure (medication or ECT) that did not work. 
In addition, a number of patients suggested that they had let important 
people down, or “failed” them, by being admitted to the hospital. Indeed, for 
several of the women interviewed, being involuntarily separated from family and 
children was not perceived as an aid to recovery. Rather, as one patient 
mentioned, it was looking forward to leaving the hospital that gave him hope and 
enabled him to cope with the additional trauma of compulsory hospitalization. 
As he said, “I know I’m not a danger to myself and others. I just want to get on 
with my life. A normal life. Everyone’s wondering where the hell I am, lecturers, 
cricket planning, being locked in here is compounding the problem.” Another 
patient’s estimation of her situation seemed to sum up this dilemma clearly: “I 
know I have to help myself, the tablets aren’t going to do it, the ECT isn’t going 
to do it. I don’t know if I’m strong enough to do it either.” 
The interview responses as a whole suggest, for these patients at least, 
that their repeated exposure to the mental health system has decreased their 
confidence in their coping skills and increased a sense of helplessness. Patients 
repeatedly offered accounts of “putting up with hospital,” “going along with 
[treatment],” and “doing nothing” while hospitalized. They also described using 
(what the coping literature characterizes as nonproductive) coping strategies, 
such as wishful thinking, hope, and passivity, to help them endure their situations. 
Theme 3: Coping Is Being Able to Comprehend, Manage, and Find Meaning in Self 
and the World 
Across all interviews, patients described coping as enhanced or, conversely, as 
compromised by a small number of common factors. Patients indicated that 
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when they experienced the world as predictable, understandable, and structured, 
they felt that they had adequate personal resources to meet the demands placed 
on them by circumstances, that they and their lives made a contribution to others 
(that they were worthwhile), that they had their difficulties heard and construed 
as “normal,” that they experienced self-esteem, and that their coping abilities 
were enhanced. Conversely, when their experience of the world ran contrary to 
this (and, as we have seen, many patients’ experiences of mental health services 
consisted of precisely this), they reported that their capacity to cope was severely 
attenuated. 
Patients’ experiences of mental health services were largely experiences 
of being passive and, not infrequently, unwilling recipients of treatment. In 
response to the question, “What do you find most difficult to deal with in life?” 
one patient reported, 
Probably having a psychiatric illness. At times I find that hard to deal 
with. Just I don’t know if you’d call it embarrassing just having that label, 
saying the words schizophrenia and psychosis is a bit heavy for people to 
fathom or understand. Some people understand it better than others and I 
find that quite difficult . . . Sometimes you have your good days and your 
bad days, and when you have your bad days sometimes you want to be in 
total isolation away from people and they sometimes don’t understand 
that you just want to be alone and you don’t want to offend them or be 
offensive toward them. 
 
Patients described wanting to be able to comprehend, manage, and find 
meaningfulness in their experiences and the world around them, just as everyone 
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always tries to make sense of his or her predicaments. As Rowe (2003) described 
this quest for meaning, “we give our world meaning and we act in accordance 
with that meaning” (p. 174). O"e of the difficulties facing patients was the 
understanding of their illness by spouses and/or family members. In keeping with 
these concerns, many patients claimed that they would be careful about with 
whom they discussed their illnesses and that, most of the time, they omitted 
details, making it easier to understand, in an effort not to burden their spouses, 
families, and friends. As one patient explained, “trying to cope with the label and 
illness . . . it is about sort of easing into it with people, not telling them the full 
scope and complexity of the illness.” But when queried about what most helped 
them cope with their difficulties, patients also reported that talking to people 
whom they trusted or whom they felt could shed some objective light on their 
situation was helpful. This process added meaningfulness to their situation and 
sense of themselves. As this patient observed, “for me, relaxing or speaking to a 
close friend. Having a chat to someone who can shed some light onto a few 
problems you’re having at the time. That works best.” 
In addition to seeking support from friends and family, a number of 
patients described a range of strategies they used to add meaning and 
achievement to their lives as a way of coping with mental health difficulties. In 
the following extract, a patient describes his own, active strategies for dealing 
with his suicidal thoughts: 
I: If I were to ask you what strategy you use that works the best, what 
would you say? 
P: Now that we’re sitting here talking, I realize how strong the poetry is, 
because it also enables me to think wow I’ve written five pages, I feel 
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good. I’ve done something. So on top of everything else it’s an 
accomplishment. So I’d probably say that stands quite high up on the list. 
In my bedroom it would be different. It depends what I’m coping with. 
Suicidal thoughts or something like that is very difficult to come out of. 
Then I have to have layer upon layer, I have to have a bath, have the 
essential oils, I have to do some meditation, I have to pray. 
 
We are struck by both the very mundane nature of the strategies 
identified by the patients in these interviews—seeking support from 
understanding friends, attempting to secure objective advice, adopting self-care 
strategies such as meditation and relaxation techniques—and also the very real 
difficulties that being identified as mentally ill caused for patients in adopting 
these coping strategies. Also of note, we suggest, is the very articulate and 
insightful way in which patients were able to describe both the coping 
mechanisms they found helpful and the barriers to their use that diagnosis posed. 
Theme 4: Situational Crises Modulated Coping Strategies 
Across all interviews, patients reported that their usual coping styles were 
affected by situational crises, leading to an increase in the need for coping 
strategies and adaptation of strategies and, for some, admission to hospital. The 
deployment of certain coping strategies and the need for coping depended on the 
seriousness of the circumstances. Patients adapted their coping strategies 
depending on the severity of their life events. Of note here is that most of the 
patients interviewed described abhorrent life circumstances with which few 
people would have coped. As Newnes (2014) emphasized, the material context 
of peoples’ lives needs to be recognized: 
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Talking treatments are bound to kill a little of the spirit, despite the best 
intentions of patient and psychologist; talk is neither going to change the 
context of the patient’s life nor—necessarily lead to the patient gaining 
the power essential to change, a fairly dispiriting outcome (p.18). 
One patient described having to “adapt” her coping style for many years 
after her partner went to prison, and, at the same time, she was embroiled in legal 
proceedings against her parents. Her partner was her major source of support 
over the years, to help her cope with the anxiety with which she had been left 
from being repeatedly sexually and physically abused by both her parents for 28 
years of her life. When asked what she found difficult to deal with in her life, she 
described the following: 
P: Loss of my children. My partner being in prison I guess, it’s hard when 
he’s not around. Legal proceedings. The list goes on. 
I: What sorts of things do you do to manage these difficult situations? 
P: I have very little coping mechanisms, I don’t cope well. I don’t have 
any stress triggers, like I don’t have any signs that I’m under stress and 
when I do erupt it’s usually a self-mutilation of some sort or it’s suicidal 
attempts but there’s no sort of sign in between. It’s either I feel really fine 
or I feel suicidal and there’s nothing in between. 
I: Which strategy works best for you? 
P: Accepting it. When I accept it, I basically let go of the situation, I 
believe it’s out of my hands and I just let it go. I’m not in a secure, stable 
position to fight for any rights and until I’m home based and settled I’ve 
got nothing to stand on to fight with so I have to accept it and let it lie for 
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now but I don’t think I’ll leave it at that forever. That’s just a temporary 
measure to cope so that I can cope with life. 
This patient’s voluntary hospital admission occurred after she began self-
mutilation. She then reports accepting her situation, and this helped her cope. 
Bridgett and Polak (2003) reported that a crisis leading to a hospital admission is 
defined as when a patient has exhausted his or her coping resources and support 
from others. For the majority of patients interviewed, a suicide attempt had 
preceded an admission to the hospital. Many patients reported serious life events 
(both past and present) that had led to an increase in the utilization of coping 
strategies, thoughts of suicidality, and a subsequent hospital admission.  
Patient emergency admissions were usually preceded by a situational 
crisis, such as relationship breakdown and loss of contact with family, significant 
other, children, and loved ones. Other patients spoke of situations in which 
insidious trauma that dominated their lives had become intolerable. They 
described engaging in a variety of behaviors, ranging from dangerous to 
sabotaging, to cope with situational crises. Patients described “serious” situations, 
outside of, by their definition, normal experiences, that they saw as requiring 
drastic measures. One patient reported that he jumped in front of a train as an 
attempt to cope with a relationship breakdown: “I just got sick of relationships 
breaking down. You build things up and they just keep falling down. It’s like 
why should I try? If you try you get hurt, so why bother?” Bridgett and Polak 
(2003) have highlighted that a hospital admission, once seen as a necessary 
resource for dealing with a situation in which alternative resources have been 
exhausted, now carries, at least for some, the side effect of being taken from the 
social context and medicalized. 
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Theme 5: “Not Coping” as a Way of Coping 
Dillon (2011) outlined ways in which dissociation, consequent on severely 
traumatizing life experiences, may function as a self-protection (or coping) 
strategy. In the interviews discussed in this article, many patients similarly 
reported dealing with their distressing experiences simply by accepting the fact 
that not coping with them was, in and of itself, an effective strategy for dealing 
with overwhelming circumstances. That is to say, some patients actively and 
consciously rejected the societal expectations of rugged individualism, which is 
the essence of normal in the academic coping literature. In essence, we see the 
embrace of not coping as a coping mechanism. 
Patients reported various strategies that would be categorized as 
unproductive coping mechanisms by instruments such as the CSA. As the 
interviews show, some patients would engage, for example, in binge drinking to 
manage a crisis, and then return to their regular routines. Some patients reported 
a powerful sense of guilt, having been told by mental health workers that this 
type of strategy was inappropriate, which then necessitated additional emotional 
and psychological resourcefulness to cope with the guilt induced by such 
professional advice. The variety of supports reported most frequently to help get 
through difficult situations were religion, alcohol, and prescription and illicit 
drugs, which Malow, West, Williams, and Sutker (1989) argued to all be means 
of self-medicating. Indeed, patients displayed acute insight into the fact that their 
inappropriate use of alcohol or drugs was a strategy to cope with particular 
situations at particular points in time. As one patient put it, 
I’ve been doing a lot of drugs. Chases the demons away. Puts you into a 
different state of mind so that you’re not thinking about why you’re 
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taking the drugs, you’re just enjoying the drugs you’re taking. You’re just 
escaping the reason not the cause . . . that’s my way of coping, shut the 
world out. 
 
Another patient described how “not coping” actually helps her “cope.” 
Her response to the question, “What helps you to cope?” illustrates this clearly: 
My husband. . . . Now I can say, “I feel like shit” and go back to bed or 
say, “I want to go home” and we’ll go. I know that if I’m in bed the kids 
will have a cooked meal for them. He’s allowing me to have a breakdown 
and learn to cope and to not cope when I can’t cope. 
 
Conclusion 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to reveal the personal accounts of the 
many ways in which psychiatric patients cope with the difficulties with which 
they are faced. Among some patients, a style of coping was evident that is 
reflective of stable coping strategies (McCrae & Costa, 1986). The majority of 
patients used a combination of coping mechanisms, which is more in keeping 
with Lazarus’s (1966) theory of coping. Patients’ accounts of coping reflected 
the relational meaning between themselves and their environments, which 
affected the levels of stress they experienced and their subsequent coping 
processes (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). In some instances, their accounts 
illuminated the barriers to their coping, which calls into question what 
mainstream psychiatry and psychology consider as facilitative of coping. We 
identified five themes that cohere around the problems inherent in the definitions 
of coping imposed by others in their environment. These definitional impositions 
! 249 
negatively affect patients’ experiences of self and their views of their own coping 
strategies. 
Underlying many patients’ reports of difficulty in coping with their 
problems was a sense of confusion over the issue of their personal agency 
consequent on diagnosis, multiple problems induced by a systemic reliance on 
physical treatments in mental health services, and the diminution by professional 
helpers of their personal resources for coping with distress. Feelings of 
worthlessness and decreased self-esteem engendered by contact, often 
involuntary, with mental health services were associated with poorer coping 
responses. Patients consistently reported being frustrated by not being heard by 
service providers and that their experiences  
with services did not add meaning to their lives. 
Summerfield (2004) argued that underpinning the construct of mental 
health is the concept of the person, which contains questions such as, What can 
someone be faced with and still be normal? What is acceptable behavior in a 
time of crisis? The idea of the person in current Western society now focuses not 
on resilience but on vulnerability, which leads to a “blurring between unpleasant 
but everyday mental states and those suggesting a clinical syndrome” 
(Summerfield & Veale, 2008, p. 327). This notion of pathologizing normal, 
everyday behavior, for example, marital problems or bereavement, requiring 
mental health professional intervention has severe consequences on how the 
individual views his or her own coping, “even when the person concerned has 
lived a competent life to date and has never demonstrated vulnerability to mental 
disturbance” (Summerfield, 2004, p. 233). There are also cultural implications 
with too narrow a view of what constitutes coping for those with mental health 
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issues. What is seen as culturally appropriate in one group may be viewed as 
vastly different in another. This echoes Summerfield’s (2008) argument that the 
globalization of mental health is fraught with issues and sets out “to instruct, 
regulate, and modernize, presenting as definitive the contemporary Western way 
of being a person” (p. 992). 
As we explored the meaning of coping with psychiatric inpatients, the 
difficulties they face, and how they “do” coping, one feature emerged repeatedly: 
professional intervention in the form of diagnosis, as opposed to understanding 
patients as people experiencing “problems in living,” reduced informants’ ability 
to cope. Relatedly, patients repeatedly provided accounts of experiences in which 
professionals misinterpreted coping strategies as symptoms of illness, rather than 
as the best attempts the patients could muster to manage their difficulties. What 
was important for patients was to find someone who could be trusted, who could 
help them to make sense of what they were experiencing without judgment. This, 
however, was a service that was not provided, or facilitated, by the mental health 
system in which the patients were enmeshed. This outcome resulted in the 
patients’ lack of trust in mental health services and in the professionals working 
in them, which in turn led to additional difficulties in coping. Most of the 
patients interviewed saw themselves as members of the community dealing with 
everyday life events such as love, loss, and relationship breakdown. This 
sometimes led to successful coping, meaning, on occasion, not coping—a 
strategy that patients were able to clearly articulate. 
Bentall (1992) elegantly demonstrated that the criteria psychiatry 
employs to define some forms of conduct as pathological are, and can only be, 
moral ones. Similarly, what does or does not count as helpful, healthy, or 
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appropriate means of dealing with problems, that is, coping strategies, cannot but 
be a matter of local and individual, rather than universal, definition. As such, we 
suggest, not only is the global notion of inadequate coping in and of itself a 
totalizing moral judgment but also the notion that ways of coping, which attract 
the opprobrium of psychiatry, are in some meaningful sense “symptomatic” of a 
“mental disorder” is inherently tautologous and, hence, meaningless. Even were 
this not the case, it is our contention that the ways of managing often traumatic 
life circumstances, described by the patients in this study, are not only essentially 
comprehensible but also often creative and courageous. To describe such ways of 
coping as “nonproductive,” or as “symptoms” of “mental disorder,” is, we 
suggest (with due respect to Sarbin & Mancuso, 1984), not to arrive at a medical 
diagnosis but rather to pass pejorative moral judgment.  
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CHAPTER 6   
 Meet the People: A Selection of Case Studies 
 “I know I have to help myself, the tablets aren’t going to do it, the ECT 
isn’t going to do it. I don’t know if I’m strong enough to do it either” 
—Louise  
Preamble 
This chapter examined, through a narrative synthesis of a set of case studies, the 
commonalities amongst patients that impact on their coping. The same 38 
inpatients used in Chapter 5 were used in this chapter of case studies, although 
only 10 cases were selected for in-depth analysis.  This chapter expands on the 
thematic analysis carried out in Chapter 5 and takes more of an individualistic 
case formulation approach to the understanding of the nature of coping, 
including the patients’ psychiatric, social, environmental and family contexts. 
The circumstances and meanings of coping are reflected through patients’ 
interviews and information accessed from their medical files. Information from 
patient medical files is not the focus of these case studies and is used only 
throughout to provide contextual, qualitative information of the patients 
interviewed for this study. The qualitative information gathered, combined with 
patient interviews of their coping, proved helpful in identifying more about the 
meaning of coping for these patients.  
Introduction  
There is evidence now accruing for the use of more individualistic 
approaches to the measurement of coping (Davies, Thomas, Leudar, 1999; 
Hallam, 2013; Lazarus, 2000). Indeed, individualistic approaches to the 
investigation of coping are significant in the area of mental health, as they allow 
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a more detailed analysis of the contextual variables impacting on patients’ coping. 
While compilations of case studies alone present limited contributions to the 
development of scientific knowledge, as part of a larger study they can provide 
interesting and noteworthy insights (Peterson, 2004). 
As detailed in the previous literature reviews, (see Chapters 4 & 5), the 
ways in which coping has been researched and understood in the past have been 
problematic for the area of mental health and have not enabled researchers to 
move forward in understanding psychiatric patients’ accounts of coping. These 
approaches have meant that patients’ attempts at coping have either gone 
unnoticed, or been viewed by others as “unhelpful,” and overall coping 
behaviours and strengths minimized. As noted previously, there are many 
criticisms of the sole use of quantitative psychometric measurements of coping.  
When solely quantitative measurement is used, what is reflected is a problem of 
causation. For example, statistical relationships may be revealed in the data, but 
quantitative measurement of coping through standardised questionnaires does not 
measure “process.” This is a methodological problem and the point at which the 
coping literature falters.  
Coping by its very nature is an interactional entity and depends very 
much on how an individual interacts with their circumstances, which makes 
measuring the concept of coping in itself difficult. Psychologists need to 
acknowledge the difficulties in measurement and in defining coping and report 
accordingly. As seen in Chapter 4, coping can be measured in terms of what an 
individual uses in times of need (e.g., coping strategies) but, when unpicked 
further (e.g., through narrative and qualitative lines of investigations), much 
more is revealed about the coping experience for the individual. As Rowe (2007) 
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stated,  “all individuals try to make sense of their predicament. They are driven 
by a quest for meaning” (p. 174).  So too, people diagnosed with a “mental 
illness” are trying to make sense of their experience, and dismissing their coping 
attempts as unproductive coping or “madness,” is characteristic of only a few 
cultures, including Australia, America and Britain. Because individuals and their 
coping mechanisms can not be classified easily, the inclusion of personal 
narratives alongside quantitative measures can reveal a much deeper description 
and understanding of patients’ coping. One of the advantages of narrative 
approaches to coping is the restorying of the many attempts those diagnosed with 
a mental illness make at managing difficulties in their lives, much of which is 
unseen in quantitative approaches (Combs & Freedman, 2012; Freedman & 
Combs, 1996; Hallam, 2013; Morgan, 2001, 2002; Morgan, Brosi & Brosi, 2011).   
Personal narratives as a therapeutic technique have been used 
successfully in the treatment of persons diagnosed with various “mental illness” 
(Combs & Freedman, 2012; Davies et al., 1999; Ensink, 1993; Morgan, Brosi & 
Brosi, 2011). In this chapter the patients’ own accounts of their experience of 
managing difficulties (coping) were the main focus and these are reflected 
through semi-structured interviews. With these, along with medical file notes, I 
attempt to explicate the relationship between coping attempts and mental illness, 
as we know it. 
 This chapter is unique in that it brings together not only the content of 
the semi-structured interviews that detail description of patients’ narratives, but 
also information reviewed from patients’ medical files, such as psychiatrists’ 
letters, psychiatrists’ intake and discharge summaries, ward round meeting 
discussions of patients and allied health (e.g., social workers, psychologist and 
! 263 
occupational therapists) input into patient care. The combined accounts provide 
vital information about patient coping. This approach was seen as necessary 
because contemporary psychology and psychiatry offer scientific “truths” about 
coping which themselves offer hypothetical realities, which are amenable to 
analysis. Hallam (2013) states: 
 . . . scientific constructs differ from any of the socially constructed 
 realities of “mental illness.” The concept of mental illness is not a 
 scientific concept; the idea of being mentally ill constitutes reality, and, if 
 taken to be something “real,” a person may look to science to explain it” 
 (p. 106).  
In constructing the individual case formulations my position in parts is 
shared with critical discourse analysis and qualitative analytical approaches in 
that I suspend, where I can, a prevailing mainstream knowledge (e.g., clinical 
psychological, psychiatric) and following Foucault scholarship, illuminate 
psychiatric inpatient truths as contingent upon social cultural contexts, presented 
by the inpatients themselves, and contextual information, as indicated in their 
files. My formulation highlights that patients do not bring an interiorised 
irrationality with them into the therapeutic space, but rather examines how the 
contemporary truth of the irrationality of patients is brought off in, by, and 
through their “therapeutic” interactions with professionals. That is to say here 
that, while at one level primarily investigating one’s coping the co-construction 
of what is ‘madness’ by therapists and patients takes precedence, rather than 
starting from the a priori position that, for example, certain forms of talk index a 
pre-existing form of insanity referred to as ‘schizophrenia.’ Within this 
presentation of case studies, there will be, at times, a critical analysis of the psy-
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professions in terms of their impact on patients’ coping per se. This perspective 
begins from a position of “critical psychology” and “survivor” literatures 
(Sweeney et al., 2009), which suggest that mainstream psychiatric assumptions 
about those diagnosed with a mental health issue entail pathologizing 
generalisations about complex issues which are, in practice, shaped by and 
produced in the interaction of psychiatrists, allied health professionals and 
patients. By employing qualitative methods, an understanding of the experiences 
of patients’ coping in terms of personal and interpersonal meaning was explored, 
and provided a platform to view patients’ coping attempts as individualised ways 
of managing situations. These approaches also circumvented categorising patient 
coping attempts as non-productive or productive, or as in the extreme cases 
within psychiatry, as inherently meaningless symptoms of an individualized 
“mental illness.”  
The end result is a set of case formulations which reflect a real set of 
experiences which revealed commonalities in the context of coping.  
The Present Study 
Patient demographics were collected for the 38 patients (see Appendix C 
for the complete list). For each of the patients interviewed, the following 
information was gathered: gender, date of birth, diagnosis, number of admissions, 
number of suicide attempts, family history of mental illness, psychiatric 
medication, counselling offered, engagement in counselling, and illicit drug use. 
A late inclusion of descriptive information was whether the patient was still alive 
after the interviews, as it was disturbing yet poignant to find that 4 of the patients 
from this study had died. This study used interview content of 10 patients who 
were selected on the basis of their most current diagnosis to represent a mixture 
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of the diagnoses from the same 38 inpatients in the qualitative study, who 
completed the semi-structured interview (see Chapter 5 for methodology). 
Patient demographics for the patients included in the present study are listed 
below in Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.1 
Descriptive Information Regarding Patients 
Patient Year of birth Diagnosis Admissions Suicide 
attempt 
Family history 
of illness 
Psychiatric 
medication 
Counseling 
offered 
Engage 
counseling 
Drug  
use 
Tanya 1974 Depression 3 0 No Yes Yes No Yes 
Ben 1970 Bipolar 26 26 Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Anna 1971 Borderline Personality Disorder 11 11 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Jim 1972 Bipolar 3 0 No Yes Yes No Yes 
Rose 1972 Schizophrenia 3 0 Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Mark 1977 Depression 2 2 Yes Yes No No No 
Tara 1968 Schizophrenia 9 1 No Yes No No No 
Mel 1962 Bipolar disorder 5 5 No Yes No No No 
Phil 1968 Schizophrenia 15 11 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
James 1957 Schizophrenia 53 12 No Yes No No Yes 
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The word “coping” was not used in the semi-structured interview 
questions due to the preconceived notions people often have about coping.  
Instead, patients were asked, “What things do you find the most difficult to deal 
with in your life?” and “What sorts of things do you do to manage difficult 
situations?,” followed by “When do various approaches get used?” And “Which 
works best?” and “When do various approaches work best?” The word coping 
did appear from time to time through patients’ descriptions and during the 
process of the interview. A less sophisticated vocabulary was utilised in the 
semi-structured interviews, in order to relate to the patients. For example, no 
difficult words or complicated sentences were used and I would try, where 
possible, to use patient examples of their coping attempts to move deeper into 
their story. The open ended, reflective lines of interviewing allowed the 
interview to unearth as much as possible about the patient’s coping efforts. These 
were not therapy sessions, of course, but when combined with background 
information collection from the patient’s medical file, bits and pieces of the 
patient’s life and contexts emerged.  
Information was taken from patients’ interviews and will be used as 
excerpts in this study to illustrate each individual’s experience of coping as a 
psychiatric patient. Medical file records contain relevant background information. 
The information reviewed for case studies included: diagnosis (if multiple 
admissions, all admissions were reviewed), medication prescribed, contact with 
health professionals, community services, and other qualitative information. 
Only non-identifying qualitative information was used throughout the case 
studies.  
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Files were reviewed after the patient interviews. Files were perused on 
more than one occasion to gather a more detailed description of patients’ lives 
and their social and cultural contexts. Patients agreed to the use of the release of 
all confidential information and agreed for it to be used as part of the PhD or any 
publication arising out of the PhD. The hospital requested a special formatted 
consent form to be completed by patients’ to authorize access to their medical 
files for research purposes. 
It should be noted that the research interview and transparency of this 
study was of a high standard: patients could leave the study whenever they 
wished. Even after completing their interview, patients could request for their 
interview to be deleted, and, if anything was recorded they felt did not reflect 
their position, they could also request to delete that part. The interview content 
revealed honest, real and frank disclosure, some of an extremely private nature; 
yet these patients wanted to convey their story. As previously mentioned, only 
two patients did want to listen to their responses immediately after the interview, 
which they did, primarily it seemed to make sure that the researcher had 
“recorded everything.” 
Qualitative information relevant to this study from patient medical files, 
such as admissions and medication, is referred to from time to time in this study 
to reflect information relevant to patient coping. Pseudonyms have been used to 
protect the identity of the patient and information gathered during this study. 
Where there has been a break in the transcript to omit a lengthy transcript, this 
will be indicated by ellipses (i.e.  . . . ). Excerpts from the transcripts appear 
throughout this chapter. 
Meet the People: 10 Case Studies 
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Mel. Mel was a 40-year-old mother who reported a long history of being 
treated for bipolar affective disorder. Mel reported a very unhappy childhood and 
that her parents had an extremely volatile relationship. She reported that she 
suffered a neglectful, abusive childhood, both of which has been found to relate 
to later onset of psychiatric problems (Keyes, et al., 2012; Read, 1997, 2005a; 
Read & Bentall, 2012; Weich, Patterson, Shaw, & Stewart-Brown, 2009). Mel 
reported that she trained to be a school teacher. While she taught for some years, 
she stopped teaching after becoming “unwell.” Mel married at the age of 23, had 
3 children, and reported that she was “happily married,” for a period of time. Mel 
reported that she found her marriage deteriorated, and her husband on 
unemployment benefits difficult to deal with. Mel’s 9-year history of bipolar 
affective disorder and was treated with antidepressants, antipsychotics, 
benzodiazepines, and eventually ECT.  
Of her five admissions to this particular inpatient hospital, she was 
usually admitted for suicidal attempts or extreme suicidal ideation. Mel was also 
treated with ECT over a 25-year span for recurrent episodes of depression. She 
reported that she self-harmed on several occasions. Her admissions to hospital 
centred around feeling as though she was not able to cope with everyday life, and 
perseveration, with respect to her memory loss. She reported at times she stopped 
taking her sodium valproate as she put on too much weight while on this 
medication and also admitted that she became quite drowsy while on this 
medication.  
In most of Mel’s admission’s notes, psychological follow-up was highly 
recommended, although there was no documentation on file to suggest this was 
carried out in hospital or in the community, apart from a single cognitive 
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assessment, which indicated memory impairment. Mel reported poor memory for 
20 or so years and reported that she felt depressed because she could not 
“remember any happy times in her life.”  Mel reported “there is nothing that 
anyone can do to help me get my memory back,” and that she had no energy or 
motivation to do anything. She reported that she experienced problems in her 
daily living activities e.g., washing and dressing herself. A behavioural 
observation noted in her medical file was that she experienced these difficulties 
because she had forgotten how to do simple tasks. In her interview Mel describes 
her memory problems as a significant barrier to her “feeling better” and reported 
regularly having to “cope” with her memory difficulties.  
During the interview for this study Mel described her memory problems 
as being the most difficult thing to manage. She reported that she found it hard to 
retain information. She also found it hard being away from her children when she 
was admitted to hospital for her suicidal ideation. Mel was from the country so 
she only had telephone contact and no visits from family members. Mel 
described the following: 
Interviewer (I): What things do you find the most difficult to deal with in 
your life 
Patient (P): What I find most difficult to deal with is my memory 
problem. That’s the most difficult one. The fact that I don’t retain 
information, that’s the main problem in my life and the fact that I’m not 
with my children that’s the second most difficult thing to deal with.  
I: Are there any particular situations that you find difficult to manage? 
P: I can’t think of any. I’ve been in hospital now for a long time so I’m 
not put into situations to have to handle situations. I don’t really have to 
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handle anything. Everything’s done for you. So you’re not really faced 
with anything.  
I: What sorts of things do you do to manage those difficult situations? 
P: To manage not being with my children. I’ve taken to ringing them up 
once a week. I ring them up weekly and I have written letters.  
It was well documented that Mel found it difficult being away from her children 
and that this had a profound negative impact on her overall coping. It is not clear 
whether or not efforts were made to reunite Mel with her children, although she 
spent long periods in hospital away from her family.  
During her last admission, which was approximately six months after her 
interview for this research study, she was commenced on anti-depressant 
medication, and had another course of ECT treatment, after a second opinion 
from another psychiatrist, despite her memory concerns. Her mood and affect 
had reportedly improved significantly, however she again expressed concern that 
her memory was very poor during the admission which was making her feel 
more “depressed.” At this point Mel was assessed by a psychologist for memory 
difficulties and it was found that her “cognitive performance was weaker than 
her educational history implied.” Given these findings her treating psychiatrist 
ordered a battery of scans to investigate a possible organic cause for her 
presentation. She was treated with further ECT, which was thought to improve 
her affect. Sadly, Mel succeeded in one of her suicide attempts and took an 
overdose of prescribed medications as discovered in the write up of her case 
study. Certainly Mel’s poor memory, depression and missing her children 
impacted on her overall coping. Mel’s’ case presents a dilemma many treating 
professionals are faced with within mental health systems and that is the concern 
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of the patient’s safety. In the most serious concerns for “safety” confinement is 
sometimes the only possible solution, as determined by the Western Australia 
Mental Health Act of 1996, however it was also the confinement with which Mel 
found impacted on her “coping” as reported in her interview for this study.  
Rose. Rose was an Aboriginal woman with three children, who was in a 
defacto relationship. Rose was from a family of four and reported a “happy 
childhood,” although her sister was given a diagnosis of schizophrenia when she 
was 18 years of age.   Rose lived in the Northern Territory region of Australia 
and she was first referred to a country psychiatric clinic. Her first admission 
indicated that Rose was delusional, paranoid and was unable to look after herself 
and her children and they were placed in the care of family services. Rose was 
reportedly paranoid that her neighbours were against her and her partner and 
claimed that her neighbours rape her when her defacto is not around. Rose had 
reportedly used marijuana, alcohol, heroin and amphetamines in the past.  Rose 
reported that she had infrequent contact with her children.  
Rose’s mood reportedly improved while she was abstinent in hospital. 
Her illicit substance use was thought to have contributed to her admission.  In 
Rose’s second admission two years later, her presentation to hospital was similar, 
an admission for increasing paranoia and delusions although this time Rose 
reported that her husband was involved in her mistreatment. Precipitants to this 
admission were: polysubstance abuse, recent bone infection, daily marijuana use 
2-4 cones per day and speed - intravenous 4 or more times per week. At the end 
of this admission, file notes suggested that she was “coping” and that her 
delusions were “unfounded.” Rose also requested drug counselling for drug 
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misuse. Her discharge summary indicated that the diagnosis of schizophrenia 
appeared less likely and was more likely to be drug induced psychosis. 
Rose’s third admission two years later indicated that she had relapsed 
into drug misuse, this time with both amphetamines and cannabis. On this 
admission she requested change of treating professional. It was thought that she 
developed a “delusional system” regarding the medical profession. Her discharge 
diagnosis as documented was: cannabis abuse, psychotic relapse, paranoid 
schizophrenia (schizoaffective). Rose was commenced on a compulsory 
antipsychotic medication regime. The basis for the diagnosis change from drug-
induced psychoses, as indicated in her previous two admissions, to psychotic 
relapse, paranoid schizophrenia (schizoaffective) is not clear. In both of Rose’s 
previous admissions it was reported that her alcohol and drug use had caused her 
paranoia and delusions, which resolved after abstaining from alcohol and drugs 
while in hospital. It was clear in her interview and she reported that she was 
annoyed and extremely upset that her children had been taken away from her and 
this was the most difficult thing to deal with as seen in the below excerpt:  
I: What things do you find the most difficult to deal with in your life? 
P: Getting my children back. Because it’s going to take time. 
To “cope” with the loss of  her children, Rose used many creative coping 
strategies, one which was described previously in Chapter 5, involved a 
metaphor of a caterpillar breaking out from an egg to a butterfly, to deal with this 
anguish. She elaborated as follows: 
I: When did these various approaches get used? 
P: They used to get used because I fell out of society and I just stopped. 
I: Which strategy do you use now that works the best? 
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P: The butterfly strategy 
I: Do the others work. 
P: That’s the only one that I can see clearly that means something to me. 
I: Is there anything else that you do or think about that helps? 
P: Just that 
That one line where Rose indicates that’s the only effective strategy that 
means something to her is in effect a coping strategy which is both helpful and 
provides meaning to Rose. What Rose clearly demonstrates here is the ability to 
see beyond her situation and describe where she is at from a psychological 
perspective using a metaphor. She uses this strategy in order to describe her 
meaning and this is a particularly useful cultural story telling, a metaphorical 
strategy Aboriginal women have used for many years, especially in their 
“dreamtime.” Dreamtime is also used to refer to an Aboriginal person’s set of 
beliefs or spirituality. Therefore, this technique could be understood in the 
Western framework as a religious coping mechanism.  
When investigating coping within Aboriginal cultures, it is also important 
to note that the role of the woman in child rearing is seen as vital. In Aboriginal 
culture the woman’s role is the major influence in the socialization of the young, 
more so than the man’s. Therefore, if children are left with the men, they suffer 
further neglect and miss the teachings the women provide for them. A limited 
number of studies have highlighted the additional problem that incarceration 
causes for Aboriginal women and their children.  
In Baldry’s (2009) focus group that explored the experiences and needs 
of 17 Aboriginal women post-prison, the number one finding was: “The 
overwhelming theme in the women’s interviews was the importance of their 
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children in their lives” (Baldry, 2009, p.14). These women expressed their 
concern for needing their children in their lives, which is central to their cultural 
values as primary caregivers. They reported having had little to no contact with 
their children while in prison, and that it was not uncommon for their children to 
be made wards of the state once they were imprisoned, without any consultation 
with them as mothers. Alcohol and drug use were significant barriers to gaining 
and maintaining the custody of their children.  
This case study supports Baldry’s claims and also shows the issues 
around Rose’s “poor coping.” Indeed, Aboriginal women and children within 
Aboriginal communities throughout Australia are subjected to some horrific 
forms of abuse which are well recognized and could have been at the root of 
Rose’s problems. (Bhandari, 2006; Holland, Dudgeon & Milroy, 2013). Holland 
et al. (2013) draw support for their position from a conclusion drawn by a 
prominent Aboriginal professor of psychiatry Helen Milroy:  
The impact of trauma on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children 
and their families is a major undetected, underestimated and 
misunderstood determinant of mental health conditions in the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander adult population (p. 15).  
What is very clear from Rose’s admissions is that her delusions and 
paranoia eventually resulted in the diagnosis of schizophrenia after her third 
admission. Before this time her diagnoses were linked to her repeated drug and 
alcohol misuse. As reported in her interview, she found it difficult to be without 
her children, was aware of her drug and alcohol misuse, and had informed people 
of the mistreatment she had experienced in the form of rape in her hometown. 
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Yet these issues were not explored further with her in the admissions to hospital 
and she was commenced on compulsory medication regimes.   
Jim. Jim was a 30-year-old man born in Australia who reported an 
unpleasant family history including sexual abuse by a family member. All of 
Jim’s hospital admissions identify the history of sexual abuse as the main 
presenting problem of the patient. Jim reported throughout his interview that he 
experienced flashbacks of the past sexual abuse and feelings of guilt on a daily 
basis. His first admission to the hospital was documented as a “self 
presentation.” He was diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder and was 
managed on the acute care unit and commenced on flupenthixol depot. On his 
second admission, Jim was admitted as a voluntary patient and was managed on 
anti-depressants, and a course of ECT.  He was reported to initially respond and 
then his mood would deteriorate and further ECT treatments were given. At the 
end of the course of the ECT treatment, he was discharged into the community 
where he was referred to a psychiatrist for psychotherapy. 
Jim’s third admission was seven years later. On this occasion he was 
described as “paranoid” and “not making sense” when the police had arrested 
him. He had been using marijuana heavily on the day and was caught lighting a 
fire.  He was admitted as a voluntary patient, although was managed on a locked 
ward, due to his “delusions and lack of insight.” His management was on-going 
at the time this case history was written. Jim’s belief that he was a healer, was “a 
problem,” in his interviews. He reported in his interview that he had sessions 
with the psychologists in the hospital for past issues of sexual abuse. Regarding 
Jims’ interview, the relevant excerpts are as follows: 
I: What things do you find the most difficult to deal with in your life.  
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P: My own sexual abuse. Relationships and what’s going on in the 
environment. 
I: What sorts of things do you do to manage difficult situations? 
P: I normally go out the bush and meditate and put my feet in the running 
brook or something but for six weeks I haven’t been able to do that 
because I was required in Perth for various appointments with politicians 
and stuff so I wasn’t able to fall back on what I normally do to alleviate 
the pressure of difficult situations.  
I: Is there anything else that you do to manage difficult situations? 
P: Meditate. Just go back to nature to your roots. I’m very much a 
Christian but I’m also very much a pagan an earth person. 
I: Any other things you do that help? 
P: Make up beautiful, relaxing  herbal brews. I’m a bit of a cook. I 
practice Kadachism which is the black fella method of helping ones 
people. Things like that I find helps me improve the situation. 
I: In relation to the issues that you identified what do you do to cope with 
your past history of sexual abuse. 
P: When I’m with a group of friends I can be reasonably open and frank 
about it which makes it an awful lot easier. They’re my new friends 
though. Not my old friends. I’ve been to many counseling sessions and I 
find that anyone who charges $110 just to walk in the door, although I 
know they have to make a living I don’t think you build up a relationship 
for that rate when you’re not very well to achieve an end. It takes five or 
six weeks to get to know each other.  
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While Jim has engaged in psychological intervention, he brings up the 
economics of it all. To find $110 when he is on unemployment benefits is 
extremely difficult. Moreover, he is correct in that a therapeutic relationship does 
take some time to build up. In his interview he also detailed finding it difficult to 
manage “worrying.” He reported that he was also worried about being on 
medication, and that he suffered many side effects from the medication. Jim’s 
interview reflected that he believed the trauma of being sexually abused and 
relationship issues were the most difficult things he has had to deal with in his 
life. He described using helpful coping strategies, such as meditation and his 
Christian faith, to deal with the trauma he had experienced in his past. In his 
interview Jim described that he had had difficulties with relationships and, in 
particular, impulse control with sex and that he had had sexual intercourse with 
many women. He described the problem, as he saw it, and had used abstinence.  
James. James was a 57-year-old man who reported family difficulties 
and that his family had caused him great sadness for many years. His affairs were 
managed by the public trust. During this current admission when he was 
interviewed, he was being treated with an increased dose of his antipsychotic 
medication. James had over 53 admissions to the one-inpatient psychiatric 
hospital. The first was in 1988 when the diagnosis given was “schizophrenic 
episode.” His admissions ranged from involuntary to voluntary, with a series of 
unconventional admissions, which ranged from “special admissions” to “social 
admissions.” It is unclear whether he was reviewed during these unconventional 
admissions, as such admissions seemed to occur when James self presented to 
hospital due to situational crises or self neglect. He was typically commenced on 
his usual medication regimes of antipsychotic medication.  
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For James, the following reasons for admission to hospital included: 
not coping, increasing paranoia, lack of insight, delusional beliefs and thought 
disorder. These terms were never expanded upon or behaviourally described, just 
the words are used. Therefore, it is unclear why James was paranoid or thought-
disordered or how he lacked insight which led to his admission to hospital. James 
reported that he used marijuana to cope. In his interview James reported that he 
visited a psychiatrist in his late teens to “get help,” because as he described, he 
thought psychiatrists “helped people.” At the time, he described himself as 
having an alcohol problem and that he “felt depressed”. When asked if there 
were any particular situations that he finds difficult to manage, James said: 
P: Not really. I don’t like being on psychiatric medication. I’ve been on it 
for 23 years and I get fed up with it you know. I mean why can’t I have 
tablets. They stick a needle in my bum every two weeks because the 
doctors don’t trust me to take the medication. All these chemicals going 
up to my brain might shorten my life expectancy. I’m concerned about it 
and the doctors don’t tell me anything about the medication. They don’t 
care. They just see me and throw me out of the office (laughs) Not quite 
but some of the doctors don’t like me. They’re too strict.  
I: Can you tell me how you manage the psychiatric medication, having it 
every two weeks, how do you deal with that? 
P: Not very good. I’m in here because I was avoiding the nurses coming 
to inject me. Like I said with these injections I could get tardive 
dyskinesia. The doctors don’t give a shit about me, they couldn’t care less. 
What do they care they get their fucking fifteen hundred dollars a week, 
what do they care about me, nothing. They don’t care about me, it’s just a 
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job. They get their money and the nurses get their five or six hundred 
dollars, no one cares. I can’t do anything about it Jacqui, they make me 
have the needle. They make it compulsory that I have the needle. I don’t 
think it’s fair because when I was (patients age) I took myself off to a 
psychiatrist, I wasn’t brought in by police, I didn’t commit a crime, I 
went to a bloody doctor because I was depressed. I was drinking too 
much because I was depressed and I thought a psychiatrist was someone 
you could talk to. Next thing I know I had shock treatment and I was 
stabbed in the arse with a modecate injection. It was bloody horrible, I 
felt worse. It stuffed me up. I’d like to know what my life would be if I’d 
never ever gone to a psychiatrist. I could have stopped drinking and 
figured the whole thing out for myself. I wasn’t having auditory 
hallucinations, I wasn’t hearing voices, I wasn’t crazy. No one’s crazy in 
my family. No one’s got a history of being in an institution or psychiatric 
disability or illness. I think some of the patients come here because 
someone died in the family and they’re stuck on medications for the rest 
of their lives. Doctors don’t care, they’re just drumming up business to 
keep people in the hospital so they can get their way. I don’t think the 
doctors really care much. 
I: So that must be quite difficult to deal with 
P: When I first saw a psychiatrist he molested me when I was (age of 
patient). He was homosexual. I don’t care I got over that but I was quite 
scared at the time. I was only a kid. When I first went to (the name of 
Hospital) I was (age of patient) and I saw a doctor and he said “I can’t see 
anything wrong with you but I’ll get you to see another doctor”. . . . I’m 
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not homosexual. He knew I was frightened. What I can remember is that 
for a long time I was frightened, I wasn’t very happy and I thought I 
could talk to him and he’d give me some sort of therapy or something. 
Actually he started touching me on the hands and I said “what are you 
doing that for” and next thing he’s kissing me and his hand goes down 
my jeans and next thing he’s sitting on the floor. . . So the whole thing 
disgusted me, well it didn’t disgust me but I was frightened you know 
that it would happen again.  
I: Have you ever told any one about this? 
P: I’ve told a few doctors about this but they can’t do anything about it I 
suppose. I don’t care. That’s history, I don’t worry. He didn’t hurt me 
physically, there was no violence or anything like that. I can’t prove it. 
Even if I could, I wouldn’t punish him. He was nice to me after that, he 
took me to the beach and he didn’t touch me again afterwards.  He invited 
me to his house for dinner and we used to go fishing at . . .  
After this interview I discussed with the patient the nature of the information and 
if he wanted to pursue it further. He declined and informed me “there was no 
point” and that he had reported the incident to the police and relevant authorities 
many times and many years ago. He reported that given it had happened some 
time ago he did not see the point in rehashing it, and there was a sense of 
protection for the abuser. He reported that he wanted his interview information to 
be released as it may help other people in similar situations. The patients’ 
subsequent drinking, seeking “help” and receiving ECT and being abused was 
this patients experience of mental health services. Despite these emotional 
traumas and retraumatising James reported that he manages by staying clear of 
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places that prompt his drinking or drug use, e.g., hotels, certain friends. He also 
reported that he uses “blocking” to block anxious thoughts, a well-known 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) technique.  He concludes that he 
“cherishes most days” stating that he is “lucky to have got this far.”  
James’ admissions are many and his medication regime has varied from 
self-administration to depot medication (where he would either be visited by 
community nurses or attended outpatient appointments for depot medication).  
Admissions were plenty and indicated an increased level of dependency on the 
psychiatric system. From the history of his 53 admissions there was no 
documentation or mention of psychological intervention. What is evident in this 
case study, apart from the detrimental effects of being abused by the profession 
he initially went to for “help,” is that after 53 admissions the likelihood of James 
having a collaborative approach to his treatment is virtually nil, as confirmed by 
the depot medications he is “required” to have when discharged out into the 
community or else he faces an involuntary admission. James has lost all 
negotiating and involvement within his treatment which would and has had a 
profound affect on his coping.   
The first thing that he said in the opening line of his interview was that he 
found “worrying about death” difficult to deal with at that exact point in time. He 
reported the many frustrations of his power being taken away from him and was 
able to articulate and converse well, as evidenced by this long transcript. What 
would have been the outcomes for James had he had some involvement in his 
treatment? These cycles of coercion around medication compliance can 
exacerbate patient’s symptoms particularly the “symptoms” of paranoia and 
mistrust, such that a hospitalisation may become a traumatic experience for these 
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people. Interestingly, when these “symptoms” are treated this way, with first line 
of treatment being medication, problems are not addressed and are usually more 
likely to occur.  
While reporting these things as being difficult to manage, James also 
reported that after a number of admissions he had witnessed a lot at this 
psychiatric hospital. When asked how he was managing and if he was complying 
with medication regimes, James reported: 
. . .  I’ve been coming to this hospital off and on for 23 years and do you 
know I’ve counted 17 of my friends from this hospital who’ve hung 
themselves, gassed themselves with hoses from exhausts. They’ve either 
jumped off flats or jumped in front of trains, I can’t take it. This hospital 
is supposed to help people and there’s some people I recognize from 20 
years ago who are three times worse than when they first came here. 
There is a sense in James’ reports that he is angry about the lack of progress of 
his friends mental health, and, given his own negative experiences with mental 
health services, this at times is too much for him. As he states “I can’t take it.”  
Tanya. Tanya was a 28-year-old woman, who lived with her boyfriend 
and his parents and also had admissions to psychiatric facilities in the eastern 
states of Australia. Her admissions stated that she had a long history of bipolar 
disorder. She was initially admitted to the hospital on a Form 3 - an Involuntary 
Transportation Order under the Western Australian Mental Health Act 1996 and 
soon after re-admitted as an involuntary patient. Tanya reported that her  
friends complained about her and made reports to authorities about her behaviour.  
She reported that she finds “medication compliance” difficult and also uses 
cannabis and alcohol.  
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Tanya was immediately commenced on an anti-psychotic medication on 
her first admission to hospital and reported no psychological intervention. 
Tanya’s second admission occurred two months later. In this admission Tanya 
was admitted for using marijuana heavily and was bingeing on alcohol over the 
weekends and was commenced on another anti-psychotic medication When 
asked about the sorts of things she found difficult to manage, Tanya reported: 
I:  Are there any particular situations you find difficult to manage? 
P:  I’m really weak towards men, in terms of they can play me so easily. I 
can get trapped because I need to be loved by my father. Female 
friendships I find extremely difficult because I’ve been hurt so many 
times, I don’t trust them.  
Tanya’s friends and family were involved in Tanya’s’ admission to the 
psychiatric facility and she was “upset” with this. In her interview Tanya 
described her lack of trust towards men and her friends. Given this, she described 
very sensible, creative coping mechanisms, consisting of creative writing, 
religion, yoga to cope with her situation and she had even designed what 
psychologists would call a desensitisation program, which helped her to get out 
into the community:  
I: What sort of things do you do to manage these difficult situations? 
P: Well I suppose I create my own reality where I don’t have to go to 
work, I can study and concentrate on things that I find important to 
human civilisation. One of my biggest things is that I’m not here for me 
I’m here to evolve as a human being for the whole of us. When I say ‘we’ 
I’m talking about the human race. I study eastern philosophy and 
theology and religions and yoga. I study music privately . . . I write about 
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what I see in the world that upsets me. I write about the good I see in the 
world. I write about my own feelings. I write poetry. That’s a major 
outlet, it keeps me alive. 
I: When do these various approaches get used? 
P: Well poetry for instance is a coping mechanism that I invented to re-
enter society. I was so panic stricken that going out with my notebook I 
could go to a café, I could order a coffee, I could open my book and I can 
write. And that way I feel like I’m doing something. I suppose for an 
unemployed person, a long-time unemployed person, you think that 
everybody knows you’re unemployed, and you think I’m not allowed to 
be sitting here drinking this coffee. I mean you don’t think you’re 
allowed to be doing anything when you’re unemployed. So that’s given 
me a job that I feel if I’m doing something, if somebody looks at me. I’m 
also not that aware of those looking at me. So that’s a huge coping 
mechanism for me and it’s creative.  
I: If I were to ask you what strategy you use that works the best, what 
would you say? 
P: Now that we’re sitting here talking I realise how strong the poetry is, 
because it also enables me to think wow I’ve written 5 pages, I feel good. 
I’ve done something. So on top of everything else it’s an accomplishment. 
So I’d probably say that stands quite high up on the list. In my bedroom it 
would be different. It depends what I’m coping with. Suicidal thoughts or 
something like that is very difficult to come out of. Then I have to have 
layer upon layer, I have to have a bath, have the essential oils, I have to 
do some meditation, I have to pray. Or even to deal with thoughts when I 
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plug into mass consciousness and think, wow I have no money, wow I 
have nowhere to live, wow I supposedly need these things. And that does 
overwhelm me from time to time. I see people driving round in nice cars 
and nice clothes, I still see those things in life but I don’t need them. I 
draw on all my resources when I need them.  
I: Is there anything else you can tell me about that you do or think about 
that helps? 
P: Yoga  . . . would have to be a Godsend. I would never have stopped 
yoga in general because I would never have stopped trying to kill myself 
without yoga, as an exercise as a philosophy but the yoga niga is a 30-
minute relaxation compared to a 10-minute type. So that’s a very deep 
sleep whilst you’re wide-awake. That would have to be the most 
important thing. I don’t do it enough. 
While a lengthy excerpt, it details the very sensible, logical, and practical ways 
Tanya “coped” with difficulties from prayer to yoga. Towards the end of her 
admission file, Tanya was offered psychological counselling and did accept. 
There was no mention as to whether she was referred to an outpatient community 
clinic for follow-up. 
Ben. Ben was a 30-year-old man and reported many family difficulties 
and that he was sexually abused as a child. He reported that he uses a 
combination of prescribed medications and illicit substances to “cope.” Ben’s 
admissions to hospital indicated that since the age of 18 he acquired 
disproportionately large number of diagnostic labels in psychiatry, such as: 
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, depression, personality 
disorder NOS (not otherwise specified), generalised anxiety disorder and 
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paranoid schizophrenia. Along with numerous admissions, he had had 
unsuccessful placements in the community. 
He described feeling depressed and reported mood swings. He reported 
that he feels that “everyone is blaming me for being in hospital” and feels anger 
towards people and therefore to “cope” tends to avoid people. He reported that 
he has lost much confidence to socialise and as a result he has low self-esteem, 
feels unable to sustain or form friendships and has no close friends or family.  
Ben had 26 admissions to the inpatient hospital and he was on a disability 
pension and an administrator managed his financial affairs. His itinerant lifestyle 
and unstable accommodation, were reported to have made it difficult to ensure 
adequate community mental health follow-up. On occasion that, Ben reported he 
would “get admitted” to acquire enough money to “get ahead” in some of his 
debts. As Hallam and Bender (2011) point out being disabled by a diagnosis of 
mental illness and thus having to claim benefits on this criteria must be both 
demoralizing and demotivating for people. The reality is that many of these 
patients’ pensions barely cover rent and food, and patients often find themselves 
itinerant and looking for accommodation. In some psychiatric hospitals in 
Western Australia, patients are known to admit themselves for a week to buy 
time in which they can save up money, highlighting a very real economic 
problem that these patients have.  
Ben’s medical history revealed that he was on a number of medications, 
ranging from anti-depressant medication to anti-psychotic medication and doses 
of benzodiazepine, used pro re nata (PRN as needed or as the situation arises), to 
“little or nothing.”  His diagnoses varied from emotionally unstable personality 
disorder to borderline type. His multiple diagnoses led to second psychiatric 
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opinions and one of which recommended psychological counselling for all issues, 
for substance abuse, recent bereavement (mother dying), self-esteem and 
confidence, and for social skills to facilitate a positive personality style. It is 
unclear if he was referred to a psychologist, as medical file notes showed no 
psychological input or that he received such treatment. When asked about the 
types of situations he finds difficult to deal with, Ben described finding social 
situations particularly difficult. He reported in his interview: 
Some days I just want to bury my head in the sand, I just want to 
disappear especially if the focus is on me. I manage this by trying to be in 
a good mood which actually helps. 
Ben described that avoiding some social situations was actually helpful for 
alleviating anxiety symptoms. His interview suggested that he had learnt to use 
humour to avoid feeling uncomfortable in social situations. Both avoidance and 
humour were very useful coping mechanisms to help him cope with situations 
with which he was faced.  
Anna. Anna was a 30-year-old woman diagnosed with borderline 
personality disorder (BPD), borderline intelligence and polysubstance misuse. 
Anna reported a difficult family history, and that she was sexually abused by 
both of her biological parents.  
Anna reported that she left home when she was 18 years of age, married 
and had two children. Her husband was in jail at the time of this interview and 
Anna reported that he also had a diagnosis of schizophrenia. She reported an 
emotionally and physically abusive relationship with her husband. Anna reported 
that her biological mother fostered Annas children, and this was due to the 
claims that she was using drugs use and unable to care for her children. Anna 
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reported that she had commenced legal proceedings to prosecute her parents and 
that the legal proceedings had been extremely stressful for her and she was 
finding them difficult to cope with. Anna reported that she found it difficult to 
abstain from drug use in difficult times as she usually uses drugs to help her cope. 
Her substance misuse consisted of marijuana, amphetamines, benzodiazepines, 
IV heroin, alcohol binges, and heavy tobacco use. Most admissions involved a 
medication regime of slowly reducing benzodiazepines. She was also on a 
methadone program for heroin withdrawal.  
Clark (2006) discusses the role of moral judgment in borderline 
personality disorder diagnosis and claims it is a complex diagnosis for the most 
part because it “involves the essence of being a particular person in society” (p. 
184). This diagnosis has received a lot of attention in the research literature 
particularly because it is open to other forms of bias and moral judgment mainly 
due to the types of behaviour requiring classification. A closer look at the DSM-
V classification of BPD states:  
A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-
image, and affects, and marked impulsivity, beginning by early adulthood 
and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by . . . (p. 663). 
The five categories involve issues of abandonment, a pattern of unstable and 
intense interpersonal relationships, identity disturbance, self-damaging 
impulsivity in two areas, recurrent suicidal behaviour, feelings of emptiness, 
inappropriate or intense anger, and dissociation and or stress-related paranoia 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Clark (2006) argues that part of any 
clinical training is learning to keep personal and moral judgments from clouding 
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clinical judgment. However, this does not always occur and as such patients who 
fall into this diagnostic category may be subjected to moral judgment.  
Anna had 11 admissions to the one psychiatric hospital over a 2-year 
period and most of these admissions to hospital were the result of a crisis. She 
had been on various medication regimes from antipsychotic medications, anti-
depressants and benzodiapine medication. She had a series of sessions of 
cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) while in hospital to help her to try and make 
the associated links between irrational beliefs and her behaviour, which she 
reportedly had difficulty doing.  It is unclear as to whether she engaged in further 
psychological treatment or why a CBT approach was chosen, given her 
accompanying diagnosis of borderline intelligence. What was clear was that 
Anna did not maintain follow-up with community services on discharge on that 
occasion. Anna reported in her interview that she can make alterations to her 
lifestyle and at times has done so, however acknowledges that her drug and 
alcohol dependence do at times have a negative impact on her well-being.  She 
reported that she found it extremely hard not having her children and that she 
missed her children. Her complex family history and intermittent contact with 
her mother (as at times she would contact her mother just to talk to her children ) 
caused her to relive parts of her traumatic childhood.  
Annas’ treatment consisted mainly of medical interventions.  In most of her 
admissions she was prescribed high doses of anti-psychotics.  
I saw Anna in her 11th admission and she reported that she was not 
coping without her children and partner’s support. In her interview Anna 
responded as follows:  
I: What things you find the most difficult to deal with in your life? 
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P: Just getting back into a regular routine. Routine, like a structured life. 
It’s been so unstructured for like 4 years and I find to restructure, very 
hard.  Just the general stuff, like housing issues, work issues, because I’ve 
only ever raised a family and been a wife, and now I don’t have any 
responsibilities and no structure I find it hard to get back into the normal 
life structure again.  
These comments demonstrated that Anna was aware that her children added 
meaning to her life and structure. Naturally, she was feeling somewhat lost 
without this in her life:  
I: What sorts of things do you do to manage these difficult situations? 
P: I have very little coping mechanisms, I don’t cope well. I don’t have 
any stress triggers, like I don’t have any signs that I’m under stress and 
when I do erupt it’s usually a self-mutilation of some sort or it’s suicidal 
attempts but there’s no sort of sign in between. It’s either I feel really fine 
or I feel suicidal and there’s nothing in between.  
I: Can you tell me when you do that and what is that in response to? 
P: A build up of it all. I don’t usually notice that it’s there because it’s 
usually blocked out. 
I: With the loss of your children how do manage that, what do you do to 
manage that? 
P: Oh I beat myself up about it every day. I put myself through hell and 
back every day but now I’ve learned I can’t change it so the only thing I 
can do so that I can deal with it is to just accept it. Otherwise I’m just 
going to continue fighting with myself and I’m going to be playing World 
War 3 with myself and beating myself up with self-mutilation keep 
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continuing unless I just accept the situation for what it is, even though 
I’m not happy with it. Just like let it go for my own peace of mind so I 
can just settle, otherwise I’m going to keep on going like this forever. It’s 
easier to walk away rather than keep fighting. 
Anna reported that she is aware that when it “gets all too much” she engages in 
self mutilation as she had “little coping mechanisms” when it came to managing 
her thoughts of not being with her children. With the additional dynamics of the 
custody arrangements with her children in the care of her own mother and father 
who sexually abused her, this would be distressing for any mother. She reported 
that she does manage or cope in the conventional sense and demonstrated that 
she does not notice any warning signs and this is when she engages in self-
mutilation or suicide attempts. Anna reported using unconventional but very 
common coping strategies, with psychiatric patients who have “given up”: 
accepting things as they were, walking away and stop the fighting. These 
techniques helped her and she clearly stated that this was a “temporary measure 
to cope,” to give her some space so that she can “cope with life.” Outwardly, 
these were seemingly useful coping strategies for Anna.  
From a clinical perspective it is unclear why a CBT approach was taken, 
given Anna’s’ diagnoses of borderline intelligence, BPD and polysubstance use. 
Given these factors, it is not surprising that Anna had difficulty with the CBT 
approach. This case illustrates how evidence-based practices sometimes do not 
transfer over into clinical practice. Moreover, what this case study reveals is a set 
of assumptions and procedures imposed upon a vulnerable individual which did 
not help them at all with their “coping.”  Typical mainstream CBT protocols (e.g., 
Fenn & Byrne, 2013) will not work for some specific populations, such as the 
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verbally impaired, because language and intelligence are intertwined like bricks 
are to houses. A longer term therapeutic approach focusing on the historical and 
contextual factors and being reunited with her children would have been more 
likely to help Anna “cope,” as evidenced by her interview.  
Phil. Phil was a man in his mid 30’s with a long history of reported 
chronic paranoid schizophrenia and cannabis abuse. Phil had over 15 admissions 
and serious and multiple suicide attempts over 10 years.  One suicide attempt had 
left him with long term physical injuries, which also led to a long admission in 
the long-stay section in the psychiatric hospital. There was no indication of any 
psychological intervention while in hospital and only various medication regimes 
were listed as the sole treatments (predominantly antipsychotics and 
benzodiapines). He reported that he used marijuana misuse and alcohol, but not 
on a regular basis and reported the odd binge drinking on a weekend. His 
financial affairs were managed by the public trust.  
Phil reported a difficult relationship with his mother, and escalations 
would often occur during his hospital leave, which would cause a “worsening of 
his mental state.” His marijuana use resulted in a number of failed housing 
placements. Phil reported that he found it difficult to abstain from using 
marijuana as many of his friends also used the drug.  In the current admission 
when he was interviewed for this study, he had an injury to his foot which had 
limited his ability to engage in activities, and he was finding this difficult. In his 
interview he reported:  
I: What things do you find the most difficult to deal with in your life? 
P: Not being able to work 
I: What sorts of things do you do to manage not being able to work? 
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P: Not much. Consciously now I’m trying to make sure I do the right 
thing as much as I can which is making sure my rubbish goes in the bin, 
keeping my room tidy and working towards going back to work. When 
the plaster comes off my foot I hope I can get some gardening up at . . . . . 
I: So you’re keeping a routine. Does that help? 
P: Yes 
I: Any other strategies you use? 
P: I don’t know. I just try and relax and get myself through the time, until 
my foot’s better and I can go back to work. Nothing much else I can do. 
I: What other things do you find difficult to deal with in your life? 
P: My psychosis and schizophrenia. 
I: What do you do to manage those situations? 
P: Well I’ve just recently spoken to a lady who’s going to give me some 
drug counselling. I try as best as I can stay away from drugs. I’ve only 
had one cone in 5 weeks. That was 2 weeks ago and it’s been hard to 
cope with because I haven’t lined up a counsellor but that’s happening 
from today, my doctor’s ringing her up. Hopefully once a week I can see 
her and work out exactly what the drugs been doing to me and whether it 
is as bad as what people say and whether it’s the effects will feel after 
being off it for 4 months. Whether I’ll come back to normal or not. I used 
to have a really good lifestyle like you Jacqui. Working, socialising.  
Here Phil compares his life to others. He reflects on what it means to live a 
“normal” life and participate in community living. The interview reflects his 
despair at being back in hospital, as this was his first admission after four years 
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of living in the community. He had been offered drug counselling and he was 
eager to attend. His interview continued as follows:  
I: You think the counselling will be good? 
P: Well if she can tune me in about the effects of the drugs and how to 
stay away from them. 
I: What sorts of things are you doing now? 
I: I don’t like the hostel I’m in. They make you feel very low and they 
wake you up at 7.00 am in the morning. Just depresses you, it’s really 
hard. I believe I’ll come through it eventually one way or another. I don’t 
have my family there much besides mum. I really hope and dream that 
one day in the next 3 months I can go back to work, even if I’m getting 
$2 an hour. I wouldn’t work for under $5 but if I can earn $5 or more an 
hour, I’ll work a bit harder. If I’m working, all this paranoia will go out 
of my brain and I’ll start mixing back into normal living. If you sit around 
too much my brain begins to ferment and stew over things and worry and 
all this. If I meet a close friend and we talk about old surf stories and how 
we go surfing, it gives me hope. I believe mental illness is just a cause 
and effect thing. From my actions, or their actions, what you’ve done in 
the past, what your coping skills are like.  
Phil demonstrated that occupying his time would prevent a build up of negative 
thoughts and help him to recover and enter into a more “normal” lifestyle, e.g., 
working. He acknowledges “sitting around” is not helping him. During this 
admission he was provided with psychological intervention in the form of  
individual counselling while in hospital on a long stay admission. Phil reported 
that he enjoyed this and it helped to talk through all the reasons for his anger. Six 
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months after the interview, while writing up this case study, Phil had been 
discharged and was living in the community. This case study is a good example 
of when a person is seen as a whole person, i.e., the polysubstance issues were 
treated, he was listened to and received longer term intervention. Phil was able to 
live in the community, as opposed to the multiple admissions (15) earlier in his 
life. The fact that he was living independently in the community is evidence that 
he had mostly dealt with “issues of paranoia.”  
Mark. Mark was a 23-year-old, married man with one child who lived 
with his parents. He reported an unhappy childhood. Mark reported that his 
parents were abused as children and that their parents were both heavy drinkers. 
Mark married a lady after a brief courtship and reported being unhappy in this 
relationship, although stayed when his wife became pregnant. Marks first 
admission to hospital was the result of an impulsive overdose in the context of 
interfamilial conflict. He took a mix of his own medication and a family 
members antidepressant medication.  
Mark reported a “miserable” childhood where he was bullied and had  
attempted suicide on many occasions. He reported that was admitted to hospital 
as his mother requested that he be “committed.” He was diagnosed with multiple 
personality disorder, and many of the types of  “personalities” which formed the 
basis of this diagnosis, Mark described in his interview for this study. Mark 
reported experiencing the characters as internal voices that speak to him directly 
in the second person. He struggled to control these voices and believed they were 
inserted into his head and were not under his control. He also described that 
when suppressing a character “my eyes and nose bleed and sometimes I fall to 
the ground.”  
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In both of his admissions he was diagnosed as having a personality 
disorder with bizarre ideation and gender identification issues. Prodromal 
schizophrenia was considered, however, there was no clear evidence of any 
psychotic phenomena during the course of the admission and neurological 
investigations indicated no abnormalities, so therefore this diagnosis was not 
advanced. Being “in character” was not diagnosable and did not meet the DSM-
IV criteria. 
In the interview with Mark, themes of wanting to be accepted emerged. 
He reported, “using characters” to cope:  
I: I’d just like to ask you about some of the things you find difficult to 
deal with in your life 
P: Probably the main thing is wanting to be accepted by other people. Not 
just family but everyone that I meet or associate with.  
I: Are there any particular situations that you find difficult to manage? 
P: Well pretty much all situations I’ve used characters for the past 15 
years, personality type characters to compensate for loss of confidence 
when I’m talking with certain people. Family not so much because they 
know what you’re like but you still feel you’re obligated, not impress 
them, but be in good order.  
I: Are there any other things you find difficult to deal with in your life? 
P: Probably limited experience. Mainly because of religion background. I 
do feel that I’ve been boxed in from a lot of world experiences. For 
example when I was married, I’m separated now, but on my wedding 
night I had no idea what to do. That’s probably a big example of how 
naïve my thinking is. I wasn’t allowed to go to sex ed, I just wasn’t 
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allowed to, I had to go to the library and things like that. It was a bit 
embarrassing at first but I find that with everything that I do, education 
being limited because I left school at 17 in Year 9 I use my characters to 
compensate for . . . 
I: So it’s possibly due to your religious upbringing that you feel quite 
alienated from the world around you? Tell me more about that. 
P: Well it’s not that my parents rammed religion down my throat on my 
own, it’s just that I knew nothing else. Probably if I’d come into it later I 
would have known bits and pieces but even my parents were pretty naïve 
at that kind of stuff.  I feel, well I can do a lot of things because I’m able 
to get around it with some small degree of difficulty. I can compensate by 
pretending or using different characters.  
Mark described finding most things in life difficult due to his strict religious 
parents and his religious upbringing. He described that he was never allowed to 
go to sex education classes at school, and had to go to the library. Therefore 
when he married he had little knowledge of what was expected from him. In the 
interview he described his characters and his religious upbringing, which make 
him feel alienated from society. Mark provided a sensible interpretation of his 
upbringing and clearly demonstrated coping mechanisms to manage these 
difficult situations: 
I: What sorts of things do you do to manage these sorts of situations? 
P: Characters. For instance I like talking to people, it doesn’t bother me 
and I mean people call me a born salesman because when I was doing 
advertising before I got into the hotel industry I could just walk into a 
room and work it, it’s easy. . . I was using characters for instance 
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Chandler from Friends. He’s got good humour, I can do that. “Could I 
have been any more late for work” I can find a lot of confidence from 
that. Even at night time now when I go home, every night I’ve got a four-
hour tape of Friends that just plays even when I’m sleeping through the 
night. I can’t sleep, I just have a laugh, and it doesn’t matter how many 
times I’ve seen the tape I just enjoy it. It’s not just that I’ve got other 
characters. I don’t find myself terribly attractive and so I compensate by 
clothes and trying to imitate looks, like brooding looks, like Angel from 
Buffy the Vampire Slayer. I relate to his character, a tortured soul so to 
speak, you know. Very much.  
I: Can I ask you, are you a character at the moment or are you Mark? 
P: Well this is the thing. Because I’ve done characters for so many years 
since I was about 8, it’s only just recently in the last 6 to 8 months that 
I’m getting pieces of my own personality back. I forgot. Because I used 
to be able with certain people, peer groups or whatever, I could at the 
same time be different characters because that’s how that person wanted 
me to be. So I can’t keep it up, I couldn’t falter . . .  
I: Do you find that that this helps you? 
P: It distracts me.  
I: Is this how you manage your situations? 
P: Most of the time but it’s becoming harder and harder. 
I: Which one works best 
P: I think it’s a combination of all of them because it’s a part of what I’ve 
done for so many years, it’s my comfort zone, you know. When I used to 
get a beating at school I wouldn’t tell my mother. I’d make a story up or 
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something, I fell over that’s why I’ve got a black eye or bruised ribs or 
whatever. I’d distract myself with thinking that at 4 o’clock one of my 
favourite shows would be on TV and that would be it. Everything would 
just go away and that’s how it is even today. I don’t just watch anything, I 
watch something that relates to me which I find essentially how I’d like 
to be or I can relate to . . . 
I: Is there anything else that you think about that helps? 
P: I’m never comfortable with myself and that’s why now I try to drop 
everything and not use my characters so much. Every now and then I try 
to sneak back in. I think is this working and I have self doubt about my 
own abilities, that’s why I plan when I leave hospital to pursue my 
education. Get back on track. Get my Year 10 curriculum. Go to college. 
I feel that by doing that I’ll be able to re-live my lost education 
opportunities.   
What this large extract demonstrated was Mark’s knowledge of the use of 
various behaviours which made him feel comfortable in situations he may not 
have otherwise felt comfortable in. He claimed he knew nothing better when 
growing up and that his experiences were extremely limited. He also 
demonstrated creative construction of various guards or defences to manage 
difficulties in his life, such as humour and pretending to be someone else. He 
described his limitations and the areas he wanted to improve in. Mark used 
creative coping mechanisms, which provided meaning and strengthened his 
sense of self. 
Tara. Tara was an Aboriginal lady in her late 30’s who reported that she 
had been raped several times. She was diagnosed with chronic paranoid 
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schizophrenia and had 9 admissions to inpatient psychiatric facilities. Her 
treatment consisted solely of medication. There was no evidence of her 
involvement in any psychological intervention, occupational therapy or that she 
was linked in with any community supports.  
She had experienced several side effects (agitation and stiffness) and as a 
result her depot intervals for her compulsory medication regime reduced from 
fortnightly to three-weekly to help with the side effects of the medications. Her 
admissions were precipitated by not sleeping for consecutive days. She 
developed side effects (akathisia) on Olanzapine (an anti-psychotic agent) and 
this was stopped on her request. When asked about difficulties she had to 
manage, Tara reported that while she found medication unhelpful, she recently 
changed her mind, as her doctors had informed her that they had found “the 
right” medication. Tara had been in hospital for 3 weeks before this interview:  
I: What things do you find the most difficult to deal with in your life? 
P: Up until this admission I found medication the most difficult to deal 
with . . . I’ve been on medication for 11 years and they’ve finally found 
the right one. I’ve only been on this one for a couple of weeks or just on a 
month I’ve been on it. It takes about six weeks to be really good so my 
psychiatrist tells me . . . I’m still a very strong believer in Mother Nature 
and the power of positive thinking.  
 Here Tara described a history of “medication taking,” which is quite typical of 
individuals who have had numerous admissions to psychiatric hospitals. 
However, what is evident are the years of trial and error, of trying to find the 
miracle cure for patients which Taras’ case demonstrates well. 
I: What sorts of things do you do to manage difficult situations? 
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P: One of the things I’ll have to deal with is going regularly to the clinic, 
that will be different. I can’t deny that, it will be a thing that I will have to 
come to terms with. For 11 years I haven’t been going to a clinic. 
Here is an example of Tara’s foresight, as she is aware that regular attendance for 
medication compliance at her clinic is going to be a commitment and something 
she is possibly going to find difficult to manage. In the next excerpt Tara 
identified that her medication side effects have posed problems in the past and 
the unwarranted side effects of the medication impacted her university studies:  
I: Are there certain situations in general you find difficult? 
P: My studies. I’m going to be studying full time and I see that as a 
potential difficulty because it’s new to me. I think I’ll find that extremely 
difficult at first. I found studying before too difficult because I had too 
many side effects from the medications.  
I: What sorts of things did you do to manage that difficult situation? 
P: Gee, well I used to stop taking the medication basically.  
I: Did that help? 
P: Yeah, because it’s the best sort of life off the medication but it’s very, 
very difficult, it’s extremely difficult and very hard to … you’ve got to 
have a lot of perseverance, a lot of energy to stay positive. If it wasn’t for 
my Christian belief, I would have given up long ago. That’s the only 
thing that keeps me going. My mother said I might find the right drug, 
and I did. Nobody can really take the place of your family and your 
friends ever, you know. The most difficult thing I had to face up to was 
coming to terms with the fact the medication works for me. It was a bit of 
a shock. 
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This excerpt revealed four important factors: First, her “hope” and influence 
from her mother of “finding the right drug” second, her “shock” that medication 
might work for her, after 11 years of problems with medications and their side 
effects; third, she highlighted the role of her supportive family and friends, 
although file notes stated that she wasn’t particularly happy with the friends who 
were behind her admission to hospital; and fourth, the role of her belief system 
and the use of religion to help her manage difficulties, which is often reported by 
patients (Ano & Vasconcelles, 2004; Bergin, Masters, & Richards, 1987; 
Crossley, 1995; Koeing, 2009; Pargament, Koeing, Tarakeshwar, & Hahn, 2004; 
Ruchita, Parmanand, Dandeep, Kumar, Malhotra & Tyagi, 2011; Phillips & Stein, 
2007; Smolak, Gearing, Alonzo, Baldwin, Harmon, & McHugh, 2013). Even 
though her file notes indicated Tara’s religious beliefs and that she attended 
religious services, this coping strategy was not drawn upon further or utilized 
throughout her admission/s, despite the hospital having access to an on-campus 
chapel and chaplain:  
I: So how did your Christian belief help you? 
P: Oh immensely. I wouldn’t be sitting here talking to you now, because 
if you … it’s hard to put into words to be honest. I’ve got a very, very 
strong faith in my religion but I don’t go around shoving it down people’s 
throats. But it teaches me how to live and I can honestly say that I 
wouldn’t be sitting here if it wasn’t for my Christian belief. It’s helped 
me in so many ways. 
Tara has a confused stance on whether her medication is helping, despite her 
belief that it “may just work this time.” But she clearly attributes her Christianity 
and religious beliefs to her improvement. Tara’s response to the next interview 
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question is also rather confusing and sounds more like she is ambivalent about 
how the medication will work for her and is relying on a “doctor knows best” 
assumption. As she says, medication still “limits” her life:  
I: Did stop taking medication work? 
P: Um. It did, but my life was very limited, whereas being on medication 
my life is limited again, but they’ll be a lot more things that I’ll be able to 
do in different ways that I couldn’t do before. I’m no longer scared of 
medication like I was before. I used to have injections and this drug and 
that drug. I just hope they just keep me on this one drug and don’t take 
me off it. So now I’m looking forward to getting married, finding a nice 
guy and having kids, not straight away but later on and doing some study 
and getting into Uni and eventually have a full time job and then get 
married and have a baby which is my goal down the track.  
This excerpt demonstrates that Tara is implicitly aware of Harper’s 
(1999) “rationality trap,” and the difficulty and unpredictability of the position 
she is in. She is almost proving herself and attempting, as best she can, to be seen 
as “normal.” Medication has failed 11 times, she is an involuntary patient and is 
now on an order for medication compliance. Tara described a process of being 
trialled on various medications in order to “stabilise” and this was a scary 
experience for her. Her ultimate goal was to regain a functional life and engage 
in activities most people do, such as entering a relationship, studying and 
employment. It seems most of her life has been “on hold” for some time.  
Galasinski and Opalinski (2012) found in their qualitative study on psychiatrists’ 
views of patient insight that it was possessing and accepting psychiatric 
knowledge which constituted having insight and the unquestioning acceptance 
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and trust in whatever treatment the doctor deems fit to administer. The authors 
concluded that medicalization of mental illness appeared to be the preferred 
mode of patient narrative for psychiatrists. Tara’s case highlights this very point.  
Tara’s case revealed a common problem within mental health settings, 
“the revolving door.” Tara stopped taking her medications because they were 
“limiting,” and the process of readmission occurs again. She is trialled on various 
medications in the hope for “the right one,” as she claims, and when you ask 
Tara what helps her cope, she states religion. Yet, there is a chapel at the hospital, 
which is not utilized in any of her admissions. This system reinforced the cycle 
of behaviour and at each admission nothing was done differently. If a different 
approach had been taken, the door may have stopped revolving.  
Discussion 
The overall aim of this set of case studies was to unpack the complex 
issues perceived by patients in relation to how they cope. The case studies 
revealed a set of life circumstances, shared experiences that these people went 
through as psychiatric inpatients and in their lives in general. When investigating 
what these people shared in common, their narratives reflect very difficult life 
experiences which most people would be hard pressed to deal with. What these 
case studies demonstrate are clear accounts that these patients, most of the time, 
were clearly oriented to time and place, but were deemed to be “out of touch 
with reality” within the current system in which they were placed, or volunteered 
to go to, in some cases. Some patients were held against their will, with little 
choice, and commenced on a myriad of medications, many of which carried 
multiple side-effects which patients then had to “cope” with.  Sharing noisy 
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wards with other “crazy” people, and poor sleep while in hospital contributed to 
feeling unsettled within the hospital and added to feelings of displacement.  
The patients reported very sensibly how they managed and coped. 
Coping was not ineffectual or maladaptive, especially in comparison to what 
they were dealing with. In relation to diagnosis, patients who were classified 
with the same diagnosis were not “the same” and, therefore, as implied by the 
current diagnostic paradigm, did not “suffer the same disease.” Also, of note, 
was that the identification of “insanity, madness, and mental illness” in some 
cases was first made by the individuals themselves, their family members, social 
workers, or general practitioners, before the patient even reached a psychiatrist. 
In these case studies, as Moncrieff (2010) noted previously, diagnosis was a cue 
for the implementation of both social and behavioural control of patients’ 
“problematic behaviour,” for either themselves or for others around them, and 
such control is not provided for by other social systems.  
The cases clearly highlighted the extreme emotional experiences many of 
these patients endured, and presented narratives that could often explain their 
behaviours. Attributing their explanations as symptomatic of a mental illness for 
these cases was unreasonable. The cases also demonstrated that most suffered 
abuse of some kind, and mostly sexual abuse. As such, Johnstone (2011) states, 
there are well-known responses to abuse. Not being able to cope with the abuse 
again is not a sign of a mental illness. Other commonalities shared by the 10 
cases revealed: lower socioeconomic status; unstable accommodation; drug and 
alcohol use; family conflict; little to no formal psychological 
intervention/treatment; lower levels of education and, in some cases, lower levels 
of intelligence, as assessed by standardised psychological intelligence tests. 
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These issues combined resulted in repeated admissions for some patients, thereby 
demonstrating the limited positive benefits of an admission to hospital. There 
were no file records reporting that the patients improved, got better or were 
“well” after their admissions, only notes stating “mild improvement” at best. 
Admission length depended on the nature of the diagnosis, with most patients 
being discharged after 2 weeks, with no formal treatment plan while in the 
community, which usually resulted in readmissions for these patients, supporting 
the “revolving door theory” of mental health settings.  
Hallam and Bender (2011), when describing the journal letters about how 
poorly treated a schizophrenic man was from 1960-1971, emphasise that there 
are more therapeutic and available psychological methods which have been 
developed for managing such kinds of problems. However, a number of these 
case studies never received any form of psychological treatment.  Out of 38 cases 
only 5 engaged with psychology in their admission and medication was always 
the first line of treatment.  
What was also revealed throughout the case studies was a degree of 
professional privilege. Nevertheless, the patients interviewed in this study were 
quite aware of their need for therapeutic treatment outcomes, despite the fact that 
their medicated treatment regime was often trite and banal. An excerpt from one 
of the 38 patients sums up the divide between patients and the psy-professions; 
When asked how he managed this difficulty he encountered, he responded with:  
I try to be as true to myself as possible. If I say I’m depressed, 
psychiatrists want to give me an antidepressant, when what I really want 
if I say I’m depressed is for them to say ‘why are you depressed? Let’s 
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examine why, where does it come from, what is its cause, what is its 
cure?’ See what I mean, see the difference. 
This very point runs through all the case studies and is evidence of the lack of a 
collaborative approach to patient treatment. Diagnosis was the beginning and end 
to understanding patient problems and dictated patient treatment regimes.  
Given patients’ life circumstances and the degree of coping and 
understanding these patients employed, it does not make sense to retain the 
criterion “difficulty in managing” or “inability to cope” as an indicator of 
“madness.” As such, an ascription of mental illness to these patients’ accounts is 
unwarranted. I justify for this assertion by drawing upon elements from the 
substantial literature on the negative effects of labelling on the individual. It has 
been argued that concepts of “pathology” or “abnormality” within psychology 
and psychiatry are used to view ‘distress” as occurring in the individual and what 
has ‘gone wrong” with them either psychologically or biologically. For example, 
Smail (1993) pointed out that the utilisation of pathology by psychology and 
psychiatry suggests “that there something is ‘wrong’ with the person in distress 
which has to be put ‘right’”(p.19), and ignores the various contexts in which the 
distress is occurring. This pathologising prevents a level of critical analysis from 
extending beyond the individual to the nature of society itself and also gives way 
to more categorising, isolating and treating these so-called “mental faults.”  
 Another well-known advocate against concepts of “pathology” the 
psychiatrist R.D. Laing, who demonstrated that the problems in the lives of 
people diagnosed with “schizophrenia” were indeed due to “problems of living,” 
such as problems with their families, relationships, financial concerns and in 
questions about the meaning of life (Laing, 1960). Laing became critical of 
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psychiatry because he believed that it tended to individualize, and subsequently 
pathologize, what were in fact problems of living. Individualising behaviours and 
putting the onus back on to the person allowed psychiatry to act as an agent of 
social control. Laing’s ground breaking book sparked a number of moral and 
political critiques of psychiatry. Laing himself saw “madness” as a patient’s 
journey, at times distressing, although full of meaning, rather than an illness 
within the individual.  
More than half a century later, Boyle (2011) wrote that this notion of 
converting experience to symptoms of disorders is problematic in several ways. 
Firstly, it allows a lot of research to be carried out using “intra psychic attributes” 
(p.29), without a mention of the context in which the behaviours occur. Secondly, 
Boyle warned that focusing on the individual’s inner world, a narrow approach, 
gives way to “diagnoses” and “disorder,” providing the basis for researching 
psychopathology. Boyle (2011) states:  
“…If we are ever to de-medicalize misery, then both the impact of 
people’s environments and their life experiences, as major causes of emotional 
distress, and the social significance of these connections will have to be made 
more prominent” (p. 27).  
There are other reasons why concepts of pathology, diagnosis and mental 
illness should be discarded (see also Chapter 2 on the stigma associated with 
being given a “diagnosis”). Patients interviewed in this study found that the label 
of a “psychiatric disorder” did little to empower them or increase their well being. 
More often than not such labelling led to further suffering as a result of being 
diagnosed with “pathology” leading to reports of shame, low self esteem, social 
isolation and alienation by family and peers.  
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The use of  psychiatric diagnoses are on the rise and their consequences 
are far reaching, despite very little evidence for their existence as distinct entities 
(Boyle, 2002, 2011; Rapley, 2012). Hallam (2013) also states: 
 “There is very little evidence for discrete biomedical causes of the 
common  psychological problems: “psychological disorders” bear only a 
minor  resemblance to medical disorders” (p. 9).  
Justifications for abolishing all concepts of diagnoses in psychiatry and 
psychology have been raised well before this thesis.  However, such action 
seems more needed now than ever, with an increasing number of diagnoses being 
put forward, and the cited unreliability of diagnoses (Aboraya, 2007; Boyle, 
1990, 1999, 2002, 2007; Jacobs, 2009; Kinderman et al, 2013. It is time for 
another serious rethink about the use of the terms “pathology” and 
“psychopathology” when referring to peoples’ presenting problems.  
Although while I advocate along with others for diagnoses in psychiatry 
and psychology to be abolished, I also concur with a noteworthy point raised by 
Hallam (2013). He states that one should not ignore the existence of patterns of 
an individual’s complaint. Indeed, patterns are useful to gather an understanding 
of an individual’s distress. However, when grouped into “disorders” or 
“diagnoses” and given a uniformity by the nature of “criteria,” they then give rise 
to a supposed commonality which leads to the design of particular treatments for 
such “disorders.” This may not be as problematic for very distinctive complaints 
such as anxiety and panic, for which there are proven psychological techniques 
including cognitive behavioural therapy, hypnosis and relaxation techniques, that 
can be helpful in reducing symptoms. There are also many extremely short-term 
sedative medical treatments, such as the use of  benzodiazepines to provide 
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instant relief of the disturbing and often physiological symptoms, e.g., heart 
racing, sweating, fear of losing control. Anxiety and panic, without the word 
“disorder,” are therefore not problematic entities, in so far as the treatment 
regime is not as stringent and long lasting and, therefore, ‘help’ from 
professionals is usually short-term, depending on symptom etiology.  However, 
the criteria proposed to meet the diagnosis of schizophrenia is extremely 
problematic, in so far as the criteria themselves are ambiguous. Often patients do 
not meet all the criteria which leads into splitting off diagnostic formulations, 
such as “Not otherwise specified,” or schizo-affective disorder, and medication is 
usually the first treatment option for such a diagnosis. Patients have been “shoe 
horned” into diagnostic categories which they do not meet, although this is now, 
of course, less problematic since the release of the DSM-5 which has more 
diagnostic categories with some looser criteria.  In any case, as Hallam (2013) 
states “labelling a pattern as a disorder does not amount to an explanation for it” 
(p.10).  
The conclusions that can be drawn from these 10 case studies is that most 
of the patients did not respond particularly well to medication regimes as the sole 
treatment. Patients were not restored to societal functioning after any of their 
admissions or treatments regarding their so called “pathology,” hence, the high 
readmission rate for some patients. The results of this study, along with research 
on the unreliability of diagnosis, stigmatizing effects of labelling, and the 
negative impact of pathologzing behaviour, provide some supporting evidence 
for advocating for the abandonment of all concepts of pathology.  
As far as could be inferred from a detailed examination of the patients 
medical files, medication was used as the first line of treatment for all of the 10 
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patients in this study. Psychological intervention was only recommended in a 
single file note in Ben’s case and was not followed up. It was suggested that Ben 
receive psychological input for his “grief issues” relating to his mothers death, 
alongside some of his “other psychological issues,” such as low self-esteem, but 
he was offered no such input and was commenced on a medication regime. 
Cultural context was also ignored in the case of Rose, who was not unlike 
many indigenous Australians incarcerated in both psychiatric and prison systems 
here in Australia. Little attention is given to the cultural needs of indigenous 
Australians within these systems and they continue to be managed within a 
westernized framework of mental health. Such management often results in 
deteriorating mental health and poor outcomes for these people.  
For the 10 cases reviewed here, it seems these patients “coped” 
considerably well, given this type of “help,” that did not significantly change, 
add to or make better their circumstances in any significant way. Patient 
“symptoms” became comprehensible and provided a set of meaningful ways of 
managing some very difficult experiences in their lives. This conclusion is 
supported by an earlier single case study on dialogical engagement with voices 
by Davies, Thomas and Leuder (1999), who found evidence of the ways in which 
patient experiences can be unearthed and properties explicated in the context of 
patient narrative. Narratives draw on people’s accounts and experiences and offer 
an opportunity to construct a powerful and plausible argument about how people 
end up where they are and how they cope and change over time. Unfortunately 
this kind of narrative model was not used in patient management in the 
psychiatric setting. Instead, what emerged and lead the way was characteristic of 
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a distinctly Westernized, gendered, and culture-bound version of the self, which 
neglected more meaningful ways of interpreting patient coping.  
The case studies provide sensible accounts and reflect the complexities of 
individual’s lives and the fact that some people are hard pushed to “cope” with 
their life. To say that this is symptomatic of a mental illness is not supported by 
the evidence from these patients’ accounts. This is not to say such people are not 
difficult or may not be a menace to society. However, applying diagnostic 
criteria with one-fit treatment regimes does not seem to work. The interviews 
reflect sensible, creative and useful ways of managing difficulties, and even 
patient “not coping” was not sufficient enough to qualify them as diagnosable 
and “mad.” There was a sense of patients really wanting and needing to be heard 
and wanting “us” to take note of what they were telling us.  
It must be reiterated that diagnosis was not a reliable reflection of patient 
circumstance or coping abilities, as most of these patients had been given more 
than one diagnosis over the course of their life.  Patients acquired at least four 
different diagnoses over their lives as patients within the psychiatric facility. This 
was usually but not always the case for patients with more than 3 presentations to 
a psychiatric facility within Australia. While the latest diagnosis was used in the 
case studies, medication regimes often reflected the paths of previous treatment 
regimes and, again, were dictated by a diagnostic approach. In particular, one 
diagnosis, “schizophrenia,” revealed a one-way street treatment regime of 
medication. Johnstone (2011) reports that this particular diagnosis-medication 
pathway has been highlighted in the research and she emphasises that ‘psychotic’ 
patients should be offered the same range of psychological therapies as any other 
clients with a history of abuse; however, they are not.  
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In these case studies it was evident that there was not a single discussion 
about “cause.”  Qualitative information gathered from medical files revealed no 
file notes, no psychiatric reports, and no psychiatric opinion, which detailed 
asking any questions such as “What caused this? What happened to you?” 
Obviously this point is slightly biased by the form of data collection used in this 
study and these questions cannot be answered retrospectively; however, from 
files reviewed, patient formulation did not focus on cause. What seemed to be the 
case was that the diagnostic framework took precedence, which then determined 
the treatment regime. This scenario occurs all too frequently within psychiatry, 
where “psychological disorder” has resulted in prescribed treatment manuals 
which translate each disorder into therapeutic procedures.  This pathway is 
problematic on many levels because the sole reliance on following a set of 
treatment steps based upon a diagnosis may miss or override essential 
information on patients, information that might help them.  
It is now well known that therapist expertise plays a role in whether 
treatment is successful. Hallam (2013) contends that there are many therapeutic 
approaches applicable to the individual case, “without having to view a client’s 
putative disorder as determining what is offered” (p. 47). As Hallam points out, 
descriptions are not “formulations.” He maintains that while researchers have 
made an effort to understand the processes causing “disorders,” their 
preconceptions of what constitutes a disorder hamper and influence. Hallam 
asserts that the diagnosis needs to be a starting point to understand behaviour and 
determinants, rather than an end point. 
Both Johnstone (2011) and Read (2007, 2005, 2008) have argued that 
distress is often a reflection in the majority of cases of abuse (physical and 
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sexual) and in the response to the abuse. Furthermore, Weich, Patterson, Shaw 
and Stewart-Brown (2009) argue that “prospective long-term cohort studies over 
periods ranging from 10 to 37 years support the view that parental abuse 
(physical and sexual abuse, and neglect) in childhood is inextricably linked with 
common psychiatric disorders later in life” (p. 397). In essence, however, this 
link is not deterministic, not being able to cope with the aftermath of abuse is not 
a sign of mental illness.  
We have a choice as health professionals to deal with patient reports of 
trauma in a different way. What these case studies demonstrate is the unique, 
creative use of personalised coping strategies that were good for as long as they 
lasted and as long as they were needed. However, more importantly, they reflect 
the many obstacles and, in particular, the “trauma” which leads to an array of 
upheavals and stressors in patient’s lives, which would test anybody’s coping 
repertoire. What is astounding is that the psychiatric system added to the burden 
experienced by these patients and worsened their so-called “symptoms.” In the 
very extreme cases, some patients reported being exposed to many more 
stressors (including rape and abuse), to a myriad of medications, and ECT, which 
did not increase coping and, in fact, produced aversive symptoms, e.g., 
considerable memory loss, which lead to increased helplessness. For a system 
that purports to “help” people with all the advances in medication, psychiatric 
training and psychological input, these accounts leave one questioning the impact 
this particular mental health system was having on these people.  
The patients within this psychiatric facility were inpatients already on 
medication regimes, many of whom required sedation on a daily basis. In the one 
case when psychological therapy was offered to a woman diagnosed with 
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borderline personality disorder, cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) was the 
model used. The use of CBT within a high care psychiatric facility over 
individualistic approaches is questionable and illuminates yet another obstacle 
which stands in the way of what is the best intervention which enables patient 
progress and helps them to “cope.” As indicated previously, CBT protocols (e.g., 
Fenn & Byrne, 2013) will not work so well for specific populations, such as the 
verbally impaired, because language and intelligence are required for CBT to be 
comprehended and effective. Perspective taking is also a function of language as 
the ability for “you” to reflect on “you” is a function of language (mainly 
pronouns). Given this, the conceptualisations CBT often use are unworkable with 
people with underdeveloped language ability and with poor attention and 
concentration spans. Individualised formulated treatment approaches are more 
suitable for those people presenting in crisis situations with multiple stressors.  
The requirements of the CBT approach, e.g., the homework tasks; high 
attention and concentration spans to grasp tasks and to make the links between 
thoughts, feelings and behaviours, are going to be difficult for somebody who 
has to line up and be administered their medication daily by a nurse.  More 
supportive forms of therapy are better suited to acute psychiatric care facilities, 
because patients, when admitted, are usually traumatised and/or withdrawing 
from drugs and alcohol, and have lowered attention and concentration spans.  
 Inpatient psychiatric settings require professionals with particular skill 
sets and skill levels. Hallam (2013) acknowledges that therapist skills are often 
the result of many years of accumulated knowledge and experience in the field. 
Ideally, “a practitioner has to combine nomothetic knowledge that relates to a 
theory of therapeutic change with an intimate knowledge of cultural norms and 
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social practices” (Hallam, 2013, p. 42). Hallam further explains that therapists 
should take into considerations their knowledge and expertise before choice of 
strategy is applied. And, finally, evaluation of outcomes can be done both 
formally (e.g., via a reliable and valid assessment) or informally through the 
patients’ descriptions/outcome (e.g., the person no longer reports anxiety). 
Patient file notes in the current study did not reflect that any such approaches 
were taken for those who were offered or who received psychological input.  
While some clinicians and researchers suggest that diagnosis often 
facilitates patients’ and their families’ meaning-making of what is being 
experienced, and that this nurtures adaptive coping, this study suggests the 
opposite. A review of the medical files of the many patients interviewed revealed 
that they had many diagnoses, from schizophrenia to bipolar disorder to major 
depressive disorder to personality disorder, and had been medicated accordingly. 
Many had been given three or four different diagnoses over a period of two years 
and multiple medications. This process of diagnosis was very confusing for 
many of the patients and left them with feelings the opposite of nurturing or 
adaptive meaning-making. The labelling process and diagnosis did not facilitate 
patients’ coping and, in fact, did the complete opposite for some, as they 
themselves reported.  Of particular note was that some patients found the 
diagnosis to be “unhelpful” and reported this many times. In addition, at this 
inpatient facility, families were not directly involved with patient care, despite 
patients reporting, more often than not that families were, in fact, the cause of the 
distress experienced by the patients. Diagnosis triggered a standardized 
medication treatment regime that failed to take into consideration social and 
cultural context, personal circumstances of the patient, and failed to incorporate 
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reliable formulations as to the root causes of patient behaviour. This approach 
did not consider what patients themselves deemed as effective coping strategies. 
According to Read, Haslam, Sayce and Davies (2006), people diagnosed 
with schizophrenia are the target of some of the worst prejudgement and 
discrimination. The problem is pervasive and is seen often in harmful attitudes 
among some mental health staff. In their review, Read et al. state that attitudes do 
not seem to have improved over the 50 years they have been conducting and 
reviewing studies and that source evidence suggests that attitudes are 
deteriorating. This study is further evidence of this fact. Indeed, diagnostic 
labelling simultaneously increases the perceived seriousness of the person’s 
difficulties, lowers evaluations of the person’s social skills and produces more 
pessimistic views about recovery. It also leads to social distance and rejection. 
Martin, Pescosolido and Tuch (2000) found that labelling schizophrenia as a 
mental illness created a social stigma and increased people’s desire to keep at a 
distance from people diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
The commonalities shared amongst the 10 case studies are not new to the 
literature, as such.  For example, we are aware of the impact of negative family 
relationships in childhood increasing the likelihood of psychiatric disorders in 
later life (Keyes, et al., 2012; Read, 1997, 2005a; Read & Bentall, 2012; Weich, 
et al., 2009). The literature has also established that psychiatric patients find the 
healthcare system less than supportive of their “coping” efforts (Goodwin et al., 
1999) and we have considerable evidence of the stigmatizing effects of being a 
"psychiatric" patient in the first place. What is newer information is the extent to 
which this population found that the limiting definitions of "coping" by others in 
their environment affected their experience of “self” and their views of their 
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strengths and their coping.  The complexities of the individual require complex, 
contextualised treatment regimes and not off-the-rack, blanket responses to a 
“diagnosed” condition. The latter, all- too-commonly applied blanket responses 
can entrench individuals as patients by eroding their ability to apply the coping 
mechanisms that they advocate and accept as useful in restoring their own 
functional lives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
Discussion and Final Conclusions 
Preamble 
In this chapter the salient implications and key findings of this series of studies 
are summarised, in an effort to demonstrate from a clinical perspective how 
coping should be researched and understood by mental health professionals in 
the future. The overall purpose of this research was to understand what 
psychiatric patients find particularly challenging, how they cope with these 
challenges, and what were the most helpful ways to measure this. The major 
research questions were:  Does the prevailing assumption about “not coping” in 
those diagnosed with a mental illness do justice to the complexity of what coping 
might be for these people? Does it make sense to measure coping in a psychiatric 
population?  The assertion that is commonly referenced in the psychological 
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literature that people diagnosed with a mental illness, such as depression, 
schizophrenia and anxiety, lack adequate coping resources for managing the 
challenges of daily living, which at times causes psychological distress 
(Piccinelli & Wilkinson, 2000; Taylor & Stanton, 2007), was not fully supported 
by this qualitative and quantitative study. The findings of this series of studies 
that addressed these questions, as described below, were then used to challenge 
mainstream definitions of coping.  
Relational Meaning: Meaning-Making as Integral to Coping 
People try to make sense of their lives and experiences everyday, and will 
adapt to the circumstances in which they find themselves. Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984) state: “Humans are meaning-oriented, meaning-building creatures who 
are constantly evaluating everything that happens…” (p. 276-277). The process 
of making sense of your world and adding meaning to it is very individual in 
nature. People also differ in their sensitivity and vulnerability to certain types of 
events/situations and in interpretations of and reactions to those events/situations 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Nevertheless, people who present to psychiatric 
inpatient facilities in Western Australia are considered to have dysfunctional 
coping repertoires, as judged implicitly by the current psychiatric paradigm in 
place and those psychologists and psychiatrists working within these frameworks. 
The findings of this thesis clearly refute this assumption and further add that such 
an assumption does not do justice to the complexity of who these people are and 
what they have experienced. The findings in this thesis support the importance of 
meaning-making and relational support as being integral to understanding coping 
in those people diagnosed with a mental illness.   
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Lazarus and Folkman (1984) believe that understanding the cognitive 
appraisal process is essential to understanding stress and coping. Individuals will 
vary in their sensitivities to and reactions towards particular situations and it is 
the process of the interplay between both environmental and individual factors 
which defines coping.  Thus, the relationship an individual has with their 
environment determines to a large degree what coping mechanisms they will use 
and the level of stress they will experience (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Patients 
in this study reported using both primary and secondary appraisal processes to 
assess coping for various situations that arose in their lives. They reported clear 
accounts of adopting certain coping strategies in these situations. It was evident 
that relational meaning took place, whereby the patient weighed up the pros and 
cons of situations before they employed a particular coping strategy. Thus, in this 
way the relational meaning influenced the coping process. In some instances, 
patients reported that they were equipped with the coping resources to manage 
these difficulties. However, when they were not, they reported relying on the 
mental health system, which, in effect, was a form of coping. Extenuating life 
circumstances and/or problems in living usually precipitated this.  
Lazarus’s coping theory provided a foundation for understanding the 
coping process for the patients in this study and, furthermore, it can be used to 
assist professionals in mental health settings in understanding patient coping. In 
addition, focussed attempts towards developing supportive and enabling models 
of practice are needed which replace the current “caring” and “service providing” 
ones. As discussed later in this chapter, patients in this study reported that the 
mental health system did little to promote adaptation and coping and, in fact, 
worsened their distress, which called for additional coping.  
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The Inadequacy of Quantitative Approaches to Coping  
While quantitative methods may be useful for the measurement of coping 
per se, in the general community, in this study a quantitative approach was less 
sensitive to the experience and meaning of coping for patients. The CSA as a 
measurement of coping strategies provided a set of useable results. However, the 
CSA could not pick up what the qualitative investigations revealed, i.e., that 
patients had suffered severe trauma and were continuing to suffer within the 
psychiatric institution to which they had come to be “cared for.” Instead, CSA 
results produced a set of coping strategies which were then categorised into two 
groups, mainly productive and unproductive coping, which did little to honour 
the true coping experience for this group of people, and, furthermore, ran the risk 
of overlooking aspects of important variables related to their coping experience. 
 Via a qualitative approach and planned semi-structured interviews,  
additional information was revealed about the meaning of coping for psychiatric 
patients. The impact of contextual variables, diagnoses, childhood trauma and 
neglect lay bare the very real nature of patient experience and how this impacted 
on their coping. These findings highlighted the real importance of recognising 
meaning in order to understand “psychiatric disturbance,” and to aid in the 
patients’ recovery. The CSA missed the very individual nature of coping and out 
of such results further questions arose, such as: “What do these scores mean? 
What value do they add to the coping experience of a psychiatric inpatient?” The 
very fact that in semi-structured interviews inpatients revealed more about 
“coping” and reported that they coped in a multitude of ways is evidence of the 
value of qualitative approaches. This study again highlighted the problem other 
authors have identified with coping research: that the coping process cannot be 
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measured with quantitative methods alone. As Boyle (2011) points out, scales 
which are designed to measure ‘deficits,’ i.e., “unproductive coping” as seen in 
the CSA, neglect the context and life experience of the individual.  
This thesis has also demonstrated through its findings that coping is a 
complex, multi-dimensional construct. Just as individuals are complex, coping 
varies from situation to situation and its development and use depend upon  
many different social and cultural contexts, all of which complicates the 
measurement of it. The unveiling of the meaning of coping for those diagnosed 
with mental illnesses revealed the many layers contributing to patient “coping.” 
What has become apparent during the investigative process of coping is that 
psychiatric inpatients demonstrated clear understandings of the reasons for their 
coping or not coping and detailed very sensible ways of coming to terms with a 
set of circumstances many people would be hard pushed to face. However, some 
of the current systems in place within Western Australia deem these people in 
such institutions to be “out of touch with reality.”  
Measurement of Coping 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis I reviewed the area of quantitative 
measurement of coping. There are a plethora of new coping scales coming out, in 
particular those measuring religious coping. This study would argue that this 
influx is not warranted and needs to be curtailed, because coping as a construct is 
complex and multi-layered and needs to be inclusive of the many variables 
involved in this process. The second major study, which looked at the 
measurement of coping in a psychiatric population, found that the sole use of 
quantitative measures did not reflect the true meaning of coping for this 
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population and, detrimentally, missed vital details contributing to the 
understanding of coping.  As Lazarus and Folkman (1984) state: 
Definitions of coping must include efforts to manage stressful demands, 
regardless of outcome. This means that no one strategy is considered 
inherently better than any other (p.134). 
While the Frydenberg and Lewis (1997) Coping Scale for Adults (CSA) based its 
items on Lazarus’s theory, the process of the categorization of the scale items 
into productive and non-productive coping goes against Lazarus’s theory, in 
some respects.  
Another useful point made by Folkman and Lazarus (1980) on the 
measurement of coping was the recognition that more appropriate measures of 
coping were needed, because measures devised to assess coping on a normal 
population have been inadequate or inappropriate. They acknowledged that the 
difficulty lies with transferring stress and coping theory into interventions, which 
can be problematic, because measurement depends on how coping is understood. 
This author would concur. Possible approaches to safeguard the understanding of 
coping for psychiatric inpatients and to prevent their coping from being 
misrepresented were discussed in this thesis. This thesis also advanced the 
argument, that, similarly, it is the act of measurement which constructs an object 
referred to as “coping,” but that in so doing the quantitative measurement 
jeopardises an adequate understanding of the very nature of coping for the people 
it seeks to calibrate.  
A closer examination of both quantitative and qualitative findings 
revealed information that did not truly reflect what patients were really saying 
about themselves. Some patients reported high scores on productive coping 
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mechanisms, yet they considered their overall coping mechanisms as far from 
being able to “cope.” Patients demonstrated that such “unproductive coping 
strategies” were extremely useful for them. For example, avoidance was 
sometimes misinterpreted as a symptom of their disorder, rather than a very 
productive coping mechanism to deal with the very unpleasant side effects of 
medications. Sleeping off the side effects of medication was instead a productive 
strategy rather than avoidance. These findings are in direct contrast to the 
conclusions of Lysaker et al. (2004) who found that persons diagnosed with 
schizophrenia cope with stress in a relatively “avoidant and ineffectual manner.” 
I would argue such descriptions are unjustified and are highly judgemental. A 
high score on the CSA’s non-productive coping, which included: worry, keep to 
self, self-blame, wishful thinking, ignore the problem and not cope, could be 
negatively viewed but this would misrepresent the actual coping experience of  
psychiatric patients.  
The patients interviewed in this study who were diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, namely, Rose, Ben, Phil, James and Tara, coped in various 
creative ways to manage the difficulties they faced. Some coping strategies were 
unique to the individual and creative and some were more well-known 
mainstream coping strategies which have been well recognised in the literature, 
e.g., religious coping, avoidance, alcohol and substance use, social support, 
listening to music. Here then, by definition, is a sample of people who 
supposedly cannot “cope,” but when they were asked about the kinds of things 
they found difficult to manage in their lives, what was revealed was that these 
people could cope in a multitude of ways. Furthermore, these people reported 
real sets of unimaginable life circumstances, such as sexual abuse, violent rape, 
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extreme neglect and poverty, and they responded to these traumas with some 
very adaptive, creative coping.   
What is missing from a very practical standpoint within mental health 
settings and needs to be taken into consideration here is that these people solved 
their problems in the best ways they could, with what they had at the time. For 
example, Rose was an Aboriginal woman coping with physical abuse, rape, her 
own drug addiction and her children being taken out of her care (which she had 
no control over). Tara reported trying to engage in university studies, but the side 
effects from her antipsychotic medications (which are well documented) 
interfered with her ability to pursue her studies and reduced her coping. 
Quantitative measurement of coping neglects contextual, cultural and the many 
individualistic layers of what coping means to a person and their sense of self. 
As argued in Chapter 5, considering the coping strategies of those 
diagnosed with mental health illness as productive and non-productive is more 
reliant on reductive and circular logic. Understanding coping in this way misses 
the essentially rational, local and individual nature of what might count as 
“coping” in the context of psychiatric inpatients’ lives. This point has major 
implications for mental health settings in relation to how patients are assessed 
and the type of treatment they are offered.  
The coping efforts described, both quantitatively and qualitatively, reflect 
firstly, how a questionnaire suggested psychiatric inpatients were managing their 
“coping efforts,” and secondly, how inpatients perceived their coping through 
their own accounts. This raised an important phenomenological question, as 
reflected by these patients’ high scores on some aspects of their coping, yet, 
when interviewed, patients reported many factors, both within and outside of 
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their control, that impacted on their coping.  The five themes identified in 
Chapter 5 highlight the very real nature and underpinnings of patients’ coping 
efforts, e.g., poor trust of health professionals, medication side-effects, feeling 
misunderstood, that contributed to their need to engage in more coping efforts 
and affected their overall sense of coping.  
Therefore, a sole reliance upon quantitative measures of coping would 
miss the entirety of what coping means for psychiatric patients. If there is to be 
an authentic account of coping for these people, which reflects the “whole 
person,” then this needs to be researched qualitatively. A combination of 
quantitative and qualitative measures may be useful, but only clinically on an 
individual basis, because quantitative measures alone do not reveal the true 
meanings of coping. By taking more of an individualistic approach, therapists 
can begin to assist in helping psychiatric patients to help themselves recover and 
build upon their strengths.  
Given what we already know from the concerns raised in the literature 
that the field of coping research is ‘disappointing’ and has ‘stagnated’ 
(Somerfield & McCrae, 2000), and the many, unresolved, methodological issues 
in quantitative coping research (De Ridder, 1997), we now know that it is not 
sensible to categorise people’s attempts at “coping” as unproductive. Such broad 
categorisations of coping as “productive” or “unproductive” are based on a 
supposedly definitive, westernised empirical knowledge base and are more moral 
judgments than scientific evaluations.   
As detailed in Chapter 2, qualitative research in the area of coping is not 
as vast as the quantitative research, however it provides a useful alternative to  
understanding peoples’ distress and coping.  A number of authors recommend 
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the use of qualitative methodologies to enhance our understanding of coping 
behaviours (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Iwasaki, Mactavish & Mackay, 2005; Moos 
& Holahan, 2003). The advantage of qualitative research is that it involves an in-
depth understanding of human behaviour and the reasons that govern human 
behaviour. Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research relies on reasons 
behind various aspects of behaviour. The “why” and “how,” as compared to the 
“what” “where” and “when” of quantitative approaches. Smaller samples rather 
than large random samples are usually utilised.  Qualitative research categorises 
data into patterns, themes, or categories as the basis for organising and reporting 
results. The use of qualitative methodologies in psychology and psychiatry is a 
notable breakthrough in research, as for many years both disciplines have used 
many “statistical” and “quantifiable” research approaches that suggest a highly 
transferable science. Within mental health, this has often meant that this highly 
transferable science, in the form of labelling and diagnosing, takes precedent 
over “helping” individuals, a point that will be expanded on further in this 
discussion.  
Importance of Social and Cultural Context 
Parts of the findings from qualitative studies in this thesis echo what the 
literature has established; namely, that psychiatric patients find the healthcare 
system less than supportive, and there is considerable evidence of the 
stigmatizing effects of being a "psychiatric" patient in the first place. However, 
this thesis provided new information regarding the extent to which these 
psychiatric inpatients found the limiting definitions of "coping" by others in their 
environment affected their experience of 'self' and their views of their 
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strengths.  This finding suggests that pejorative moral judgment continues to be 
at play within psychiatric settings.   
Being diagnosed as having a mental illness affected patients’ belief of 
self and what they believed that they could and could not do and, therefore, did 
not aid in their recovery. First line treatments of medication regimes within 
psychiatric hospitals overlooked the very nature of the reason why patients were 
referred in the first place. As seen in Chapter 2, many medications prescribed 
within psychiatry carry very serious side-effects and sometimes black box label 
warnings, e.g., anti-depressant medications which may increase suicidal ideation. 
The findings of this thesis revealed that many patients suffering from sexual 
abuse were, therefore, already “coping” with a significant level of trauma, and to 
be treated with medication regimes having serious psychological side-effects by 
a so-called “care” facility is a failure of  “care.”  
Certainly on a national level, the Mental Health Council of Australia 
(MHCA) is aware of the crisis in mental health care, as evidenced by this 
reporting in 2005 which detailed:  
… after 12 years of mental health reform in Australia, any person seeking 
mental health care runs the serious risk that his or her basic needs will be 
ignored, trivialised or neglected. …In the short-term, the system as it 
currently operates may result in a failure to provide basic medical and 
psychological health care, inappropriate use of short-term seclusion, 
confinement or over-reliance on sedating medications. Longer-term, the 
impact may include deteriorating mental health and wellbeing, suicide, 
higher rates of homelessness, prolonged unemployment, incarceration or 
increased financial burden and poverty…For many people, ongoing 
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financial and personal support from family and friends is the only real 
safeguard against these outcomes (MHCA, 2005, p.14-15). 
A similar picture was reflected in the experiences of the people from this study 
who were having difficulty “coping,” had come from impoverished backgrounds, 
unsupportive and abusive family environments and who went to a system to ask 
for “help.”  However, the mental health system fails to recognise that “perceived 
mental health problems may be a normal reaction to harsh living conditions” 
(Summerfield, 2008, p.993). Certainly, the findings from the current study would 
support such a suggestion.  
National work groups, such as the National Mental Health Commission, 
have been established to help report on and add awareness to these very issues 
within the mental health system. However, up until 2012 in Western Australia 
there has been very little reporting from these work groups.  
A very recent finding, particularly relevant to this thesis, is a concerning 
statistic reported by a working group from the National Mental Health 
Commission.  Holland, Dudgeon and Milroy (2013) found that, at present, within 
the Australian mental health system the rates of suicide and hospitalisation for 
mental health conditions among indigenous Australians are double those of other 
Australians. Cultural context continues to be ignored in most mental health 
institutions within Australia, despite the number of indigenous Australians 
presenting to such facilities.  
Indeed, indigenous Australians are treated within a standard western 
framework, which pays little to no attention to their belief systems of ways of 
being.  But, as Vicary and Andrews (2000) point out, a white psychologist 
offering a service to an Aboriginal community has to work in a very different 
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way than they would within a white community, and also has to have a fairly 
comprehensive understanding of the Aboriginal culture and belief system.  
Practicing clinicians already know that reframing patient problems in terms of 
their life circumstances and social contexts, past and present, goes a long way in 
helping the understanding of the issue of concern and bringing about change in a 
positive way for that person.    
Indeed, this study has revealed that any particular coping strategy can 
sensibly be labelled as ‘effective’ or ‘ineffective,’ ‘productive’ or ‘non-
productive,’ or even ‘adaptive’ or ‘maladaptive’ without reference to the context 
in which it is used. But, it is only when context is considered that coping can be 
understood. 
Diagnosis and its Impact on Patient Coping 
As discussed at length in the literature review in Chapter 2, psychiatric 
diagnoses are problematic on several levels. The findings from this study suggest 
that cataloguing human distress in much the same ways as other “proper 
sciences” such as chemistry . . . ” (see Rapley, 2012, p.81, for expanded 
discussion) is unwarranted and unhelpful. Furthermore, a confounding variable 
in this study, as reported in patient medical files, were the many DSM-III and 
DSM-IV diagnoses patients acquired as a result of attendance at a mental health 
facility. Some patients acquired at least four different diagnoses during their time 
within the psychiatric facility, adding further doubt over the use of diagnoses 
within mental health facilities and supporting the argument for the lack of 
reliability and validity of DSM diagnoses. What the findings certainly revealed is 
that a formal psychiatric diagnosis did little to help patients’ understanding of 
their problems.  
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There are those clinicians who believe that diagnosis often facilitates 
patients’ and their families’ meaning-making of what is being experienced, and 
this nurtures adaptive coping. This study provides evidence that the direct 
opposite can occur and did occur, particularly within this high care facility 
psychiatric hospital.  Also, of particular note here, was that, at this inpatient 
facility, families were not directly involved with patient care and, more often 
than not, patients reported that their families were the cause of the distress 
experienced by the patient themselves. The labelling left some patients with the 
opposite feelings of nurturing and adaptive meaning-making and definitely did 
not help them cope, as they themselves reported.  
This study supported the notion that applying a diagnosis reduced coping, 
for some of the patients interviewed.  However, as most clinicians would concur, 
many times in clinical work, as was evident in this study, labelling and 
diagnosing does not foster patients’ coping and, in fact, can do the complete 
opposite. Diagnosing creates an inflexibility which is the antithesis of human 
evolutionary development and adaptation. Patients reflected this very fact in their 
interviews. Some “became the diagnosis” and others had rather given up hope of 
making change which was reflected in their not coping. Thus, putting a diagnosis 
on a person, which by definition is inflexible, does little to promote adaptation 
and coping.  
Review of medical file notes for the 38 patients interviewed revealed that 
none were reported to have been followed up after their discharge from hospital 
and their progress was unknown. This lack of follow-up was particularly 
concerning, given that some patients were only in hospital for one week and 
commenced on medications which carried significant side-effects. Adding to this 
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concern was the fact that over half of the patients in this study had “no fixed 
address” and some were labelled itinerant; therefore, for some, this may have 
meant being discharged back into homelessness. What was revealed was that the 
psychiatric facility had no ongoing contact with the patient and their treatment, 
for example, their medication regime, or their progress. Therefore, if their 
“psychiatric condition” improved, either “spontaneously” or through no contact 
with mental health services for a period of time, the variables and context in 
which this occurred were unknown.  
If patients mental state deteriorated, as evidenced in this study, most 
patients were usually re-admitted to a psychiatric facility on this basis. There was 
no procedure in place to track vital changes in patient mental health and, 
furthermore, it appeared to be not even considered. In my clinical experience of 
working in such environments for over 17 years and the knowledge base I have 
regarding such situations, typically if context was considered at all, it was only 
considered during weekly ward round meetings within inpatient psychiatric 
facilities, which were attended by the psychiatrist, a medical officer, a social 
worker, a clinical psychologist and a nurse. In general, much time would be 
spent in these meetings discussing the reasons for admission, by which time, 
many patients had already been commenced on medication regimes. Therefore, 
while I note in this thesis that context did not appear to be considered, it may 
have been considered verbally in these weekly meetings but not documented on 
the patients’ file. Nevertheless, the actions reflected through admissions and 
patients’ interviews in this study suggest that context was not the focus of 
consideration, nor did or that knowledge of such contexts transfer over into the 
understanding of patients’ presenting problems.   
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Boyle (2011) believes that this “persistent avoidance of context” (p. 43) 
is a problem within the professions of psychology and psychiatry. By ignoring 
context, an individual’s distress is completely overlooked within the 
contingencies of the environment and its influences, the result being a 
reclassification of distress to occurring “within” an individual. Although as seen 
in this study, the life circumstances and experiences reported by these patients 
were experiences most people considered on the “normal” spectrum would be 
hard pushed to deal with.  It seems that if you cope with harsh circumstances, 
then you are not technically “diagnosable,” however, if you don’t “cope,” you 
might very likely fall into a diagnostic framework. The DSM framework ignores 
context and converts distress into “problem behaviour,” or “symptoms” and 
“disorders,” occurring “within” the individual, as written under the definition of 
mental disorder in the manual. When referring to mental disorder the DSM IV 
states: 
Whatever its original cause, it must currently be considered a 
manifestation of a behavioural, psychological, or biological dysfunction 
in the individual (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. xxi-xxii).  
The DSM-V definition of mental disorder has become more obscure: 
. . . clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion 
regulation, or behaviour that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, 
biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning. . . . 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.20). 
The focus is still on “within” the individual and neglects context. 
Mainstream psychology and psychiatry have been influenced by these 
assumptions, which decontextualize an individual’s life, and frame behaviours in 
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terms of cognitions and emotions, which have links to the mind and brain (Boyle, 
2011).  These assumptions are particularly problematic and open to a great deal 
of misinterpretation by clinicians, resulting in differing opinions regarding 
diagnosis and medication regimes. 
As seen in the current study, a review of patient medical files indicated 
that what was considered at the time of the patient’s admission, and often 
repeatedly on some admissions, was medication noncompliance, frequently 
recorded as “a reason for an admission,” especially with diagnoses such as 
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. What was most unfortunate though, was that 
some of these same patients were able to demonstrate, quite clearly in their 
interviews, the circumstances leading up to their admission and the difficulties 
they faced, e.g., poor housing, no accommodation, poverty, abusive relationships, 
drug and alcohol problems, rape, trauma; however, rarely was this information 
documented as, a reason for their presenting concern upon admission to the 
hospital.  
As described in Chapter 6, psychological intervention was rarely 
provided to the patient and the only form of “help” which was clearly 
documented was medication regimes and ECT.  I am not advocating here that 
psychological approaches would have been better for those patients, just merely 
stating that this was the process (for a detailed argument on why some current 
psychological approaches e.g., CBT are no better Boyle, 2011, p. 32-33).  It 
appeared that the diagnostic approach at the hospital bypassed patients’ attempts 
at coping and did not help them with their current life situations. When the 
meaning of coping was explored with psychiatric inpatients, the difficulties they 
faced, and how they “did” coping, one feature emerged repeatedly: professional 
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intervention in the form of diagnosis, as opposed to understanding patients as 
people experiencing “problems in living,” (Szasz, 1960), reduced informants’ 
ability to cope. Some research (Ziolkowska, 2011) has already confirmed that 
doctors’ interpretations of illness do indeed eliminate the possibility of exploring 
the complex relationships between patients and their problems, thereby providing 
more evidence to reject the prevailing framework. 
I would argue, along with Kinderman et al. (2013) and other concerned 
psychologists and psychiatrists, that the mental health community needs to 
embrace a paradigm shift with respect to the impact of diagnosis. A paradigm 
shift along the lines of Kinderman, et al., who advocate that “dropping the 
language of disorder within mental health” would be a good starting point. This 
shift is crucial for future development of new ways of understanding the reality 
of the lived experience of being a psychiatric inpatient, and for a more 
sophisticated theoretical approach by the research community towards coping 
behaviour and interpretations of coping amongst psychiatric inpatients. The 
horrendous situations impacting upon an individual do not warrant labels such as 
“mad,” or “mental illness,” or a diagnosis, e.g. schizophrenia. Undeniably some 
people suffer distress and are in need of help; however, there is no evidence that 
these experiences are best understood as “illnesses” with biological causes or that 
these patients have overall coping deficits. 
A more fitting approach to understanding patient behaviours is suggested 
by Hallam (2013). When formulating the reasons behind much problematic 
behaviour, he states, “that normal psychological processes, in combination with 
events that are not necessarily out of the ordinary, can conspire together to 
produce problems of all kinds” (p. 44). Unfortunately, the psychiatric 
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classification systems in practice endorse limited views of causality which have 
serious implications within mental health settings, such as subscribing to 
medication regimes as the first line of treatment. These practices are not new. For 
example, Mosher (2004) describes how over the last four decades at least 
psychopharmacological treatments have taken the place of a psycho-social model 
treatment of schizophrenia. Indeed, the recursive nature of current mental health 
are reflected in the sentiments of Laing (1960):  
The behaviour of the patient is to some extent a function of the behaviour 
of the psychiatrist in the same behavioural field. The standard psychiatric 
patient is a function of the standard psychiatrist, and of the standard 
mental hospital (p.28).   
An example of an alternative approach which minimized the use of 
medications is seen in the project of Soteria House in California which was 
established in the 1971 to treat those diagnosed with schizophrenia. Neuroleptic 
medications were not used for at least the first 6 weeks upon a patient’s 
admission to Soteria (for a full review, see Mosher Hendrix & Fort, 2005). 
Soteria house was more about understanding the individual as a whole person. 
Mosher (2004) states its model:  
“focused on finding shared meaning and understanding of the subjective 
experience of ‘schizophrenia’ (‘personal or developmental crisis’ was the 
operant term), including the experience of others involved in the 
interactional process” (p. 350-351).  
This facility resembled the earlier moral treatments to mental illness and its 
results were impressive. The Soteria Project also collected data (see Mosher 
2004, for a review) and overall patients who were admitted to the facility had 
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partially recovered within 6-8 weeks. At a follow-up 6 weeks after admission, 
76% of the people had not received antipsychotic medications. At a 2 year 
follow-up, 43% used no antipsychotic medications and were functioning well in 
society with fewer admissions (Mosher, 2004). This demonstrated that by 
understanding context and meaning, treating individuals with decency and 
respect, and creating an environment conducive to that healing, actually had a 
positive impact on patients’ functioning.  
Where to From Here?  
In reference to survivors of the psychiatric system, Dorothy Rowe (2007), 
in her book Beyond Fear, uses a famous axiom “the more things change the more 
they remain the same” (p.152). This still appears to be the situation within mental 
health systems throughout Australia, and this study is evidence of this. The 
patients in this study reported discrimination by friends, family and the mental 
health system that added to patients’ problems and clearly obliterated their 
attempts at coping. The treatments available within these systems are unlikely to 
help patients recover and rarely consider patient attempts at coping. This study 
demonstrated that this psychiatric facility served to decrease the self-esteem of 
most of the patients interviewed even further by the treatments it imposed on the 
patients. The procedures and practices of the service served to decrease any 
chance some of these patients had of returning to normal societal functioning. If 
we know anything about coping per se, it is that it is the ability to adapt, and 
what the patients in this study have shown is an incredible adaptation to 
sometimes the most horrific circumstances and unhelpful forms of treatment.  
Future directions in mental health in terms of provisions for the treatment 
of those diagnosed with a mental health illness have been mapped out for some 
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time and are underway, as seen in both Britain and Australia.  There are some 
who believe, like Lord Layard of the English House of Lords, that more 
psychologists and cognitive behavioural therapy through the NHS (United 
Kingdom National Health System), which is akin to the Medicare Mental Health 
Care Plan Scheme in Australia, will lead to more positive mental health in the 
general community and, thus, more “coping”. However, there are those who 
disagree with this proposition (e.g., Harper, 1996; Rowe, 2003, 2007; 
Summerfield, 2008, 2006, 2012a) and believe that such approaches create a 
version of the self as one of vulnerability and not resilience. Moreover, these 
approaches are also seen to take away individual freedoms and the power of the 
people to make a difference in their own lives.  
Harper (2012) suggests that the assumption that the source of people’s 
unhappiness “lies inside people’s heads”(p.2), and in how they see the world is 
problematic, because it is followed by the assumption that changing a person’s 
thinking is the solution, which still puts the onus back on to the individual to 
make their life “better.”  He believes that approaches such as these ignore social 
and cultural contexts, including whether these people have supportive 
relationships, a reasonable income, etc. Harper states: 
Unfortunately, we have a tendency to attribute a person’s behaviour to 
individual factors such as intelligence or moral strength, rather than their 
social context such as poverty or child abuse. This is such a common 
research finding that psychologists have a term for it: the fundamental 
attribution error (Harper, 1996, p. 2).  
The inequality in peoples’ lives was reflected in patients’ interviews and 
case histories in this thesis and suggests that addressing social context, poverty 
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and child abuse would go a lot further to increasing the general “coping” and 
overall happiness of these patients and others than current treatments. David 
Smail (1993) agrees that a person’s ‘psychology’ consists of the meaning 
systems through which their experience of the environment is understood, 
interpreted, and represented. In general, the goal of any such treatment 
intervention should be to help a client manage in the context of a life that is 
bound together by their individual set of values and circumstances.  
A full review of all the practical and theoretical concerns and debates of 
the future of mental health is beyond the scope of this thesis (see Boyle, 2011 for 
more detailed exposition). However, a few important points raised by Boyle are 
relevant to this thesis. One point Boyle raises is that if there is to be any advances 
towards an approach inclusive of context, then the language used by both 
psychology and psychiatry needs to be reconsidered. Boyle notes that 
medicalised terms, inclusive of the term mental health, convey the impression of 
“. . .  a lack of intelligibility and suggesting a pathological or deficient 
individual” (p. 41). Boyle is quite candid about where the problems lie and how 
to begin fixing them, “. . . without exposure – by which I mean that prominence 
is given to context and life experience at every possible opportunity in practice, 
theory and research – nothing will change” (p. 40). The current diagnostic 
paradigms within psychiatry and psychology, as they stand, ignore context and 
serve to undermine the distress an individual experiences. 
In line with the recommendations of  Boyle (2011), Davies et al. (1999) 
and Hallam (2013), a way forward should focus more on an individualistic 
approach inclusive of context. In this way professionals can work with personal 
accounts of patients’ lives, and within each person’s explanatory framework to 
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help strengthen patient coping repertoires. Rowe (2007) asserts that peoples’ 
problems are often resolved, if they are listened to and treated with respect. 
Summerfield (2004, 2005, 2008) also believes people need to cope and develop 
strategies “in their own way,” as opposed to strategies being imposed on them. 
This approach makes sense, because coming to terms with a traumatic 
experience appears to be linked to thinking about oneself in relation to others, 
and this relational thinking would be the common cultural social context which 
surrounds and means something for the individual.   
Conclusion 
Overall, the findings from the studies in this thesis revealed that the bedrock 
assumptions of psychology’s and psychiatry’s approaches to coping, in those 
diagnosed with a mental illness, do not do justice to their actual accounts of 
coping. Firstly, the diagnostic approach and medical treatment of distress and 
mental health issues were identified as problematic and a recommendation was 
put forward for a more respectful, nuanced understanding of the notion of coping 
by mental health professionals. Clinicians within mental health settings need to 
pay more attention not only to the content of patient’s lives, but also to re-
establishing that background sense of coherence, purpose and meaning for the 
individual. The findings of this study challenge stereotypical interpretations of 
coping, and are long overdue, as is the portrayal of psychiatric inpatients’ coping 
as helpful to them, regardless of ‘expert’ judgments thereof. In so doing, this 
thesis calls for practitioner and academic reconsideration of how coping is 
conceptualized, as a matter of urgency.   
How then are we as mental health practitioners to refrain from making 
formalised judgements about psychiatric inpatients’ coping? Perhaps, most 
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reliably, we can accept the uncertainty of the mental condition of people, and that 
every coping strategy used may be good for as long as it lasts; we can refrain 
from formalised measurement of the qualitative phenomena “coping” with 
patients and, finally, we can seal the lid on the quantitative coping box. To 
describe such ways of coping by psychiatric inpatients, as were found in the 
current research, as “non-productive,” or as “symptoms” of  “mental disorder” is, 
as suggested previously in this thesis (pace Sarbin and Mancuso, 1984), not to 
arrive at a medical diagnosis, but rather to pass pejorative moral judgment. As 
Smail (1993) claims it is individuals’ worlds and not their ‘psychology’ which 
causes them distress. Therefore, to respond to the distress and trauma of 
psychiatric inpatients with further, frequently life-long, traumatisation in the 
guise of “help” needs to be urgently reconsidered.   
 !
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APPENDIX A 
Chapter 4 Study A and B 
Consists Of The Following Tables and figures from Chapter 4 Study A and B 
 
• Psychiatric Patients: Chi Square Test for Independence: Actual and Expected 
Counts of Men and Women Classified by Gender and Diagnosis  
• Psychiatric Sample: Gender Diagnosis Cross Tabulation 
• Psychiatric Sample: Preliminary Analysis of Subscale data Box plots and 
Histograms, Gender = Male 
• Psychiatric Sample: Preliminary Analysis of Subscale data Box plots and 
Histograms, Gender Female:  
• FACTOR ANALYSIS – Psychiatric Sample- Scree Plot 
MACTHED STUDY – Study B 
• Coping strategies in the psychiatric group matched for age and sex: t-tests for 
each matched subscale 
• Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests for Male Matched Sample 
• Correlational Matrix – Psychiatric Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 
Psychiatric Patients: Chi Square Test for Independence: Actual and Expected Counts of Men and 
Women Classified by Gender and Diagnosis  
 
Diagnosis  Schizophrenia Depression    Bipolar          Personality         Not Otherwise 
    Disorder         (PD)                  Specified (NOS)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                               Total 
Gender  
Male Count  30 12 7 2 4 55 
   
 Expected Count 25.0 11.0 11.5 4.5 3.0 55.0
                     
    
Female Count  20 10 16 7 2 55 
   
 Expected   Count 25.0 11.0 11.5 4.5 3.0 55.0
   
   
 Count  50 22 23 9 6 110 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total     
  Expected Count 50.0 22.0 23.0 9.0 6.0 110.0 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!Psychiatric Sample: Gender Diagnosis Cross Tabulation 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
    Diagnosis Total 
    schizophrenia Depression     Bipolar Disorder    Other    Schizophrenia 
 
Gender  
Male Count  30 12 7 6 55 
 
  Expected Count 25.0 11.0 11.5 7.5 55.0 
 
  Std. Residual 1.0 .3 -1.3 -.5   
   
Female Count  20 10 16 9 55 
 
  Expected Count 25.0 11.0 11.5 7.5 55.0 
 
  Std. Residual -1.0 -.3 1.3 .5   
 
Total         Count  50 22 23 15 110 
 
                  Expected Count 50.0 22.0 23.0 15.0              110.0 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!Psychiatric Sample: Preliminary Analysis of Subscale data Box plots and Histograms 
 
Gender = Male 
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Psychiatric Sample: Preliminary Analysis of Subscale data Box plots and Histograms 
 
 
Gender Female:  
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FACTOR ANALYSIS – Psychiatric Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: Scree Plot 
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!Study B - Matched study 
 
Coping strategies in the psychiatric group matched for age and sex: t-tests for each matched 
subscale.  
Strategy       Psychiatric Sample         Community Sample  
     
       N=20                   N=20 
      x      SD x  SD x  SD 
                                 Difference Difference     p values 
 
 
Seek social support 12.05 12.05 4.76 13.85 3.28 -1.80 5.48 0.158  
  
Focus on Solving the  
Problem   24.25 7.95 26.8 4.54 -2.55 8.40 0.191 
Work hard and achieve 10.1 4.15 11.6 2.32 -1.50 4.54 0.157 
Worry   13.95 4.50 11.5 3.37 2.45 6.37 0.102 
Improve relationships 12.95 4.89 10.25 3.00 2.70 5.62 0.045 
Wishful Thinking  13.90 4.67 10.65 2.15 3.25 5.36 0.014  
Tension reduction  10.90 4.73 10.35 2.49 0.55 5.13 0.637 
Social action  10.35 4.90 6.90 2.67 3.45 4.28 0.002 
Ignore the problem  9.2 2.60 7.55 2.11 1.65 3.58 0.054 
Self blame  12.15 5.15 12.85 3.85 -0.70 6.64 0.643 
Keep to self  13.75 4.27 11.2 3.87 2.55 5.49 0.052 
Seek spiritual support 9.90 4.54 5.80 2.19 4.10 5.21 0.002 
Focus on the positive 13.25 5.84 12.80 3.28 0.45 5.375 0.712 
Seek professional help 12.25 4.99 9.30 4.93 2.95 7.17 0.082 
Relax   12.85 5.05 13.45 2.21 -0.60 4.13 0.524 
Physical recreation  8.50 4.14 7.90 3.50 0.60 4.14 0.525 
Protect self  12.25 5.19 11.1 2.69 1.15 5.51 0.363 
Humour   9.80 4.16 9.15 2.53 0.65 5.18 0.582 
Not Coping  9.05 3.79 7.90 2.90 1.15 5.53 0.365 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: significant at p= 0.0026 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests for Male Matched Sample 
Matched Scale Mean Z score P value 
Social support Community 
Social support - Psychiatric 
12.6 
12.6 
-0.102 0.939 
Problem focused- Community 
Problem focused-Psychiatric 
28.5 
25.9 
-0.891 0.406 
Work hard and achieve-Community 
Work hard and achieve - Psychiatric 
12.6 
11.5 
-1.199 0.273 
Worry- Community 
Worry- Psychiatric 
10.8 
13.5 
-1.368 0.191 
Improve relationships- Community 
Improve relationships - Psychiatric 
9.8 
13.5 
-1.68 0.102 
Wishful thinking – Community 
Wishful thinking- Psychiatric 
10.7 
14.7 
-2.20 0.031 
Tension reduction – Community 
Tension reduction-Psychiatric 
10.3 
12.4 
-1.02 0.332 
Social acceptance – Community 
Social acceptance - Psychiatric 
7.9 
11.0 
-2.204 0.021 
Ignore the problem-Community 
Ignore the problem - Psychiatric 
8.1 
8.8 
-0.672 0.523 
Self Blame- Community 
Self Blame – Psychiatric  
11.7 
11.6 
-0.059 0.969 
Keep to self – Community 
Keep to self - Psychiatrc 
12.7 
13.0 
 
-0.060 0.992 
Seek spiritual support – Community 
Seek spiritual support - Psychiatric 
6.5 
10 
-1.79 0.080 
Focus on the positive – Community 
Focus on the positive - Psychiatric 
14.1 
13.5 
-0.280 0.820 
Seek professional help – Community 
Seek professional help - Psychiatric 
7.8 
11.1 
-0.1482 0.158 
Seek relaxing diversions- Community 
Seek relaxing diversions- Psychiatric 
13.1 
14.1 
-0.778 0.469 
Protect self- Community 
Protect self - Psychiatric 
11.6 
12.9 
-0.655 0.512 
Physical recreation – Community 
Physical recreation - Psychiatric 
9.8 
9.5 
-0.360 0.752 
Humour- Community 
Humour- Psychiatric 
9.6 
11.2 
-1.077 0.320 
Not Cope – Community 
Not Cope - Psychiatric 
6.8 
8.3 
-0.893 0.426 
Note: significant at p=0.0026. 
 
 
!Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests for Female Matched Sample 
Matched Scale Mean Z score P value 
Social support Community 
Social support - Psychiatric 
15.1 
11.5 
-2.105 0.035 
Problem focused- Community 
Problem focused-Psychiatric 
25.1 
22.6 
-0.816 0.443 
Work hard and achieve-Community 
Work hard and achieve - Psychiatric 
10.6 
8.7 
-1.129 0.297 
Worry- Community 
Worry- Psychiatric 
12.2 
14.4 
-1.023 0.336 
Improve relationships- Community 
Improve relationships - Psychiatric 
10.7 
12.4 
-0.981 0.367 
Wishful thinking – Community 
Wishful thinking- Psychiatric 
10.6 
13.1 
-1.068 0.324 
Tension reduction – Community 
Tension reduction-Psychiatric 
10.4 
9.4 
-1.075 0.301 
Social acceptance – Community 
Social acceptance - Psychiatric 
5.9 
9.7 
-2.045 0.041 
Ignore the problem-Community 
Ignore the problem - Psychiatric 
7.0 
9.6 
-2.094 0.047 
Self Blame- Community 
Self Blame – Psychiatric  
14.0 
12.7 
-0.474 0.680 
Keep to self – Community 
Keep to self - Psychiatric 
9.7 
14.5 
-2.045 0.043 
Seek spiritual support – Community 
Seek spiritual support - Psychiatric 
5.1 
9.8 
-2.077 0.039 
Focus on the positive – Community 
Focus on the positive - Psychiatric 
13.0 
11.5 
-0.831 0.441 
Seek professional help – Community 
Seek professional help - Psychiatric 
10.8 
13.4 
-0.869 0.385 
Seek relaxing diversions- Community 
Seek relaxing diversions- Psychiatric 
13.8 
11.6 
-1.546 0.141 
Protect self- Community 
Protect self - Psychiatric 
10.6 
11.6 
-0.459 0.678 
Physical recreation – Community 
Physical recreation - Psychiatric 
6.0 
7.5 
-0.566 0.621 
Humour- Community 
Humour- Psychiatric 
8.7 
8.4 
-0.103 0.957 
Not Cope – Community 
Not Cope - Psychiatric 
9.0 
9.8 
-0.408 0.717 
Note: significant at p=0.0026. 
 
 
 
!APPENDIX B 
Chapter 4 Study C 
 
Consists Of The Following Tables and figures from Chapter 4 Study C 
• University Sample: Preliminary Analysis of Subscale data Box plots and 
Histograms for males 
• University Sample: Preliminary Analysis of Subscale Data Box Plots and 
Histograms for Females 
• Sample Descriptive Statistics University Sample – Mean and Standard 
Deviations by Gender 
• Coping Strategies Used by Adult Samples: University and Normative Sample 
(Adopted Normative Table From: Frydenberg & Lewis, 2002, Table 2. 
P647). 
• Factor Analysis – University Sample – Scree Plot 
• Figure. Age by Gender And Group Interaction Plot (University and 
Psychiatric Sample). 
• Correlational Matrix – University Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!University Sample: Preliminary Analysis of Subscale data Box plots and Histograms 
for males. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
notcope2protsel2relax2focpos2keepsel2ignore2tensred2imprel2work2socsup2
80
60
40
20
0
1
26
27
48
5
7
2634
37
2
47
48
17
31
41
47
45
50
48
47
7
23
27
18
2
6 45
47
26
34
1
gender: Male
!University Sample: Preliminary Analysis of Subscale Data Box Plots and 
Histograms for Females. 
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Sample Descriptive Statistics University Sample – Mean and Standard Deviations by 
Gender 
 
!
!
Descriptive Statistics for Gender – University Sample 
  Gender N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Age Male 55 26.9818 5.24754 .70758 
Female 55 33.7091 10.57193 1.42552 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!
 
Coping Strategies Used by Adult Samples: University and Normative Sample 
(Adopted Normative Table From: Frydenberg & Lewis, 2002, Table 2. P647). 
 
Strategy        
                     University      Normative        
  (N=110)      (N=369)               
     Mean SD             Mean    SD      p values   
  
  
       
Seek social support     13.43  3.81    12.65 3.12 0.52 
Focus on Solving  
the Problem                 26.10    4.11     25.59 4.61 0.268  
Work hard and  
achieve  11.20   2.16      12.01 3.19 0.002*  
Worry   10.85   3.49      11.26 3.26 0.274 
Improve  
relationships  10.79    3.17     12.07 4.18 0.001* 
Wishful thinking 11.14    2.97     10.07 3.84 0.002* 
Tension reduction 9.69       3.10     8.69 3.19 0.004 
Social action  7.52       2.96     7.23 2.93 0.367 
Ignore the problem 7.17       2.12     6.51 2.43 0.006 
Self blame  11.13    3.99     11.36 3.17 0.580 
Keep to self  10.04     3.50    11.43 3.61 0.000* 
Seek spiritual 
Put here 
support    6.09       3.57     5.49 2.44 0.101 
Focus on the 
 positive  12.60      2.98    12.75 3.30 0.652 
Seek profession 
 help   8.26       2.99     7.95 3.52 0.361 
Relax   14.90    2.64     14.45 3.62 0.154 
Physical recreation 8.15       2.94     8.24 3.09 0.781 
Protect self  11.95     3.06     12.14 3.52 0.582 
Humour  8.84       3.04     7.87 2.94 0.004 
Not Coping  6.89      2.75      6.71 2.66 0.545 
_________________________________________________________________* 
Note: significant at p= 0.0026 
 !!!!
 
 
!Factor Analysis – University Sample- Scree Plot 
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• Figure. Age by Gender And Group Interaction Plot (University and 
Psychiatric Sample). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!APPENDIX C 
 
• Part 2- Chapter 6. Table of Patient Demographics (N=38) 
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Patient Sex Year 
born 
Diagnosis Admissions Suicide 
attempts 
Family 
history of 
illness 
Psychiatric 
medication 
Counselling 
offered 
Drug use No fixed 
address 
Deceased 
1. Tanya F 1974 Depression 3 0 No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
2. Ben M 1970 Bipolar 26 26 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
3. Anna F 1971 BPD 11 11 No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
4. Jim M 1972 Bipolar 3 0 No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
5. M 1964 Schiz 7 4 No Yes No No No No 
6. Rose F 1972 Schiz 3 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
7. Mark M 1977 Depression 2 2 Yes Yes No No No No 
8. Tara F 1968 Schiz 9 1 No Yes No No No No 
9. M 1973 Schiz 6 1 No Yes No Yes No No 
10. Maria F 1962 Bipolar 5 5 No Yes No No Yes Yes 
11. F 1952 Depression 2 1 No Yea No No Yes No 
12. F 1955 Schiz 1 0 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
13. F 1967 Personality 3 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
14. F 1958 Bipolar 6 2 No Yes Yes No Yes No 
15. F 1953 Bipolar 6 2 No Yes Yes No Yes No 
16. M 1967 Schiz 21 19 Yes Yes No Yes No No 
17. M 1965 Personality 13 13 No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
18. M 1962 Schiz 4 3 Yes Yes No Yes No No 
19. M 1955 Schiz 15 11 No Yes No No No No 
20. M 1962 Schiz 7 2 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
21. F 1975 Schiz 1 1 No Yes No No Yes No 
22. F 1962 Schiz 1 0 No Yes No No No No 
23. M 1975 Schiz 3 3 No Yes No No No No 
24. M 1957 Depression 1 1 Yes Yes No Yes No No 
25. M 1963 Depression 2 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
26. Phil M 1968 Schiz 15 11 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
27. M 1973 Bipolar 5 0 No Yes No Yes Yes No 
28. M 1977 Bipolar 1 1 No Yes No No Yes No 
29. M 1937 Bipolar 7 0 No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
30. M 1971 Schiz 9 0 No Yes No No No No 
31. M 1970 Schiz 2 0 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
32. M 1965 Schiz 1 0 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
33. M 1972 Schiz 5 2 No Yes No Yes Yes No 
(continued) 
 
Patient Sex Year 
born 
Diagnosis Admissions Suicide 
attempts 
Family 
history of 
illness 
Psychiatric 
medication 
Counselling 
offered 
Drug use No fixed 
address 
Deceased 
34. M 1973 Schiz 5 5 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
35. F 1982 Schiz 2 1 No Yes No Yes No No 
36. M 1972 Schiz 12 6 Yes Yes No No No No 
37. M 1976 Schiz 3 2 Yes Yes No Yes No No 
38. James M 1957 Schiz 53 12 No Yes No Yes Yes No 
 
